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Governor Gray Davis, Colleagues and Citizens of California:
In 1995, the Legislature implemented landmark legislation directing the authorization of
digital signatures to be used by the public when con.d ucting business with the state
electronically. Last year, Governor Davis signed the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, in
order to facilitate the development of secure transactions on the Internet.
However, the public's continued distrust oflnternet transactions has been well-documented.
Many consumers regard most commercial websites as having a low regard for their protection
and fear that hackers will gain access to their personal information. In addition, not one state
agency has introduced an application Qn the Internet that utilizes the regulations developed for
the implementation of digital signatures.
The most plausible reason for the public's distrust of the security of electronic transactions is
that the public is unfamiliar with the high level of security offered by digital signature
technology. Digital signatures, if created by the appropriate technology, are convenient, lowcost, and more secure than manual written signatures. For all practical purposes, digital
signature software is so good that digital signatures are virtually "forge-proof."
The Legislature and Administration still have the ability to effectively promote secure
electronic commerce and "government-to-citizen" Internet transactions. We also have the
responsibility to promote this security through the use of digital signatures.
lly submitted,

· ·~
1020 N STREET, ROOM 357 • SACRAMENTO, CA 94249-0105 • (916)319-3945
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I Digital Signature Use in California
Executive Summary
California adopted the Digital Signature Act in 1995. However, according
to the Secretary of State, five years later and despite the adoption of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme not one state agency in California is
currently using digital signatures in any of its transactions.

The "non-use" of digital signatures in the State of California may very
well stem from concerns that citizens and consumers continue to entertain
regarding the security of transactions that involve the Internet. However,
digital signatures are purported to be even more secure than manual,
written signatures.

Indeed, surveys of private sector activity have suggested that consumers'
concerns regarding internet security have less to do with electronic
transactions themselves than with the methods in which online merchants
handle their personal information after the consumer submits it to them
over the Internet. It has been suggested that security concerns regarding
Internet transactions that involve digital

signatur~s

may be alleviated with

the use of third party authentication services and education about how
these authentication services work.

The California Legislature has been at the forefront of the e-commerce
movement with the passage of two primary pieces of legislation: the
California Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, or "UETA," and the
California Digital Signature Act of 1995

California UETA declares that all electronic transactions should be given
the same legal effect as transactions that are recorded on paper and that an
electronic signature cannot be denied its legal effect solely because it is in
electronic form.
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California's Digital Signature Act of 1995 creates a criteria-based
approach to dealing with digital signatures. In order for a digital signature
to be valid, it must: be unique to the person using it, be capable of
verification; under the sole control of the person using it; linked to the data
in such a manner that if the data is changed, the signature is invalidated;
and conform with regulations adopted by the Secretary of State.

These regulations, subsequently adopted by the Secretary of State, require
that in order for a digital signature to be valid, a form of technology that
has been approved by the Secretary of State must create it. Currently, the
Secretary of State has authorized that digital signatures created by the
Public Key Infrastructure or "PKI" and Signature Dynamics technologies
are to be given their full legal effect because they meet all of the
enumerated requirements of the Digital Signature Act.

Currently, the Office of the Secretary of State is unaware of any state
agency that is using or in the process of developing digital signature
technology. The office fears that digital signatures suffer from a "chicken
and egg" problem. Agencies are weary of creating digital signature
technology until citizens have acquired digital signatures. However,
citizens are unwilling to acquire digital signatures until agencies have
developed applications for digital signature usage.

Concerns, regarding the transmission of information over the Internet to
state agencies, most likely stem from the public's unfamiliarity with
available technology and have little to do with the actual quality of
security offered by digital signatures. Additionally, many of the concerns
that citizens entertain regarding these transactions may have more to do
With a lack of notice regarding the privacy and security of the websites
these transactions take place on.
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As implementation of digital signatures is still in the infancy stage,
numerous actions in the Legislature may still be taken in order to
effectively promote secure e-commerce and "government-to-citizen"
. Internet transactions through the use of digital signatures. The effect, if
any, of the recent enactment of a federal digital signature law on the
state's own digital signature law and UETA may prompt further reexamination. In addition, California must deftne the rules of conduct
applicable to the use of digital signatures by individuals and create
standard incentives for state agencies to better integrate digital signature
technology into Internet-based initiatives.

I Assembly Committee on lnfonnation Technology
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Internet Transaction Security Concerns Persist
Digital signatures, if created by the appropriate technology, are
convenient, low-cost, and more secure than manual, written signatures.
For all practical purposes, digital signature software is so good that these
signatures are virtually "forge-proof." 1

However, the public's distrust of Internet transactions persists, and has
been well documented by the media. The most plausible reason for the
public's distrust ofthe security of many transactions is that the public is
unfamiliar with the high level of security offered by digital signature
technology. Additionally, the media's constant portrayal of"hackers'
exploits" and the federal government's stance towards encryption export
controls do not aid in the public's trust of digital signatures. 2

Recent research has documented that consumers regard most websites as
having a low regard for consumer protection.3 Consumers fear that
hackers will gain access to their personal information and use it against
them. However, after filtering through the abundance of research that
exists regarding the consumers' distrust of Internet transactions, it is
apparent that many of their concerns have little to do with the security of
the transactions themselves. For example, most consumers are concerned
with how the company they submit their information to will use the
information once it is in their possession. 4

1

Mark Grossman, Contracts Using Digital Signatures (Part II) (visited July 14, 2000)
<www.mgrossmanlaw.com/articles/1996/contracts using digital signatur.htm>.
2
John Cunningham, Esq., Paperless Real Estate Transacrions-How Far Behind Can
We Be? (visited June 7, 2000) <www.eatonpeabody.com/art paperless.htm> (copy on
file with the California Assembly Committee on Information Technology).
3
Cheskin Research, Trust in the Wired Americas (July 2000).
4 Jd
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In most digital signature situations, the primary threat to the validity of the
transaction is fraud - parties to the transaction want to make sure that the
person who created the signature is really who they say they are. In cases
where the digital signature is created through Public Key Infrastructure
technology, third party certification authorities will verify that the
individual to the transaction is who he or she is.

If an instance of fraud occurs, certification authorities, like Veri sign, Inc.,
of Mountain View, California, have insurance programs that can be
purchased that limit the digital certificate holder's liability if their digital
signature is compromised.

Additionally, certification authorities can easily be prevented from
releasing personal information about the digital signature user through tort
or contract law. These authorities are independent entities, consumers do
not need to worry about government accessing their personal information
contained in an authority's depository.

The Internet and Need for Secure Transactions
The Internet's predecessors, including the federal Advanced Research
Project Agency Network, or ARPANET, and the National Science
Foundation's NSFNET, began to develop in the 1970s and 1980s, the
population of users was limited to government, defense, education and
research agencies. However, in the early 1990s, as the Internet grew and
evolved, the population oflnternet users grew tremendously. Today,
commercial facilities, private individuals, government organizations, and
.researchers all over the world use the Internet.
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With the expansion in the user base of the Internet also came an increase

in the number of commercial transactions taking place electronically. This
rise of e-commerce has facilitated and, in many respects, demanded the
development of a secure contracting standard for transactions that take
place over the Internet. However, the law, in many situations, requires a
written manual signature in many transactions in order to authenticate the
transaction.

With the emergence of electronic transactions, it quickly became apparent
that a manual signature would not always be available or viable. The lack
of a secure, legal digital signature law has caused many consumers,
companies and governments to be weary of the potential for fraud in
electronic transactions. Subsequently, many state Legislatures and
Congress have focused their efforts on developing ways to authenticate
electronic and digital signatures and facilitate transactions that are both
secure and enforceable.

The California Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
In order to bring some uniformity to the world of electronic transactions,
in 1999, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) developed the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, or
"UETA," in 1999. UETA represented the first "national effort at
providing some uniform rules to govern transactions in electronic
commerce that should serve in every state. " 5

It is intended that state legislatures which enact UETA will be ensuring

that electronic transactions are just as enforceable as transactions recorded

5

National Conference Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Summary: Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (visited May 23, 2000)
<www. nee usl.org/ uni form act summaries/un i formacts-s-ueta. htm>.
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with manual signatures, without creating an entirely new and unique legal
standard that only applies to electronic transactions.

Indeed, the basic objective ofUETA is to ensure "that an electronic record
of a transaction is the equivalent of a paper record, and that an electronic
signature will be given the same legal effect, whatever that might be, as a
manual signature [in order to] remove perceived barriers to electronic
commerce. " 6

Of course, states, if interested, are free to adopt the UETA as developed by
the NCCUSL, they may develop their own rules governing electronic
transactions, or they may simply choose not to act. At the time of this
report, 13 states, including California, have adopted variations of the
UETA and 15 states have introduced legislation resembling the UETA.

Legislatures adopting VETA have recognized that state governments need
to set standards to make contracts and commitments enforceable
regardless of the physical nature of the signature affixed to the contract. In
enacting various versions of the UET A, states have been particularly
concerned about the effect that electronic transactions will have on
traditional legal writing and signature requirements.

In September 1999, Governor Davis signed SB 820 (Sher) (Chapter 428,
Statutes of 1999) enacting the California Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act. SB 820 largely followed UETA as drafted by NCCUSL; however,
some amendments were made to the California version including the
exemption of a number of state laws. These exemptions include the
following:
(1) "All statutes which require specifically identifiable text or
disclosures in a record or a portion of a record be separately
signed or initialed."

I Assembly Committee on Infonnation Technology
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(2) "Statutes with special notice requirements or where the notices
trigger particular legal rights such as the running of a time
period to appeal."
(3) "Statutes affecting post-contract rights or activities."
(4) "Statutes which were passed to restrain particular types of
activities."7
As NCCUSL intended, SB 820 promulgates the goal that electronic
transactions should be given the same legal effect as transactions that are
recorded on paper by providing that a record, contract, or signature can not
be denied its legal effect solely because it is electronic in nature. It is
generally accepted that the Act provides Californians and California
businesses with a uniform set of rules governing electronic transactions
and should play a positive role in promoting the secure growth of ecommerce.

Enactment of the Federal Digital Signatures Bill
On June 30, 2000 President Clinton signed the Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act into law creating a national
framework for interstate and foreign electronic transactions. According to
the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), the Act
achieves four notable goals:
(I) "Its broad pre-emption language creates a uniform national
standard for the validity of online contracts, avoiding the
potential of a patch quilt of differing state-based approaches;"
(2) "It proves for the validity of transferable records executed
using an online process;"
(3) "It creates important protections and safeguards for consumers
necessary to instill confidence in the full promise of ecommerce;" and
(4) "The statute codifies the principle of technical neutralityCongress and the states will not legislate or ordain the
evolution of new technologies in this space. " 8

7

CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1633.1 (enacted by Chapter 428).
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The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act urges
states to adopt the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, which California
has already done. The adoption of UETA, consistent with the Electronic
Signatures Act clarifies the scope of interstate commerce as it applies to
Internet transactions.

The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act affects
those transactions that deal with interstate or foreign commerce, preempting individual state laws that touch on the same matter. In addition,
because of the Act's pre-emptive qualities, states are severely limited in
their ability to create digital signature legislation regulating the
enforceability of contracts. This leaves states essentially three options.
They can either create their own legislation for intrastate commerce, enact
UETA, or simply accept the pre-emption of the federal legislation.

If states, like California, choose to limit the scope of their electronic
transactions law to apply only to intrastate commerce, the outcome is
unclear. Large amounts of satellite litigation regarding the definition of
intrastate commerce may overburden state court dockets. In addition, the
question persists of whether any Internet transaction can be defmed as
solely an intrastate transaction. The Federal Communications
Commission, for example, has ruled that ISP's and the Internet itself are
subject to their jurisdiction under the Federal Communications Acts of
1934 and 1996."9

8

Information Technology Association of America, Digital Signature LegislationS. 761 :
Summary and Analysis (2000).
9 /d.
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California's Digital Signature Statute and Regulations
The California Legislature had its eye on the electronic transaction arena
in 1995, long before it enacted the California Uniform Electronic
Transaction Act. The Digital Signature Act of 1995 provides that if a state
department so chooses, some or all ofthe communications with that
department may be conducted electronically.

The Legislature, in enacting the Digital Signature Act, elected to adopt a
criteria-based approach to digital signatures and directed the Secretary of
State to develop regulations for its implementation. It was further the
state's goal to promote the expansion of digital signatures by avoiding
strict statutory requirements that could stifle the introduction of new
digital signature technologies as they are developed.

The criteria established by the Digital Signature Act of 1995 provides,
"[a]n electronic signature is legally effective if it is:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Unique to the person using it;
Capable of verification;
Under the sole control of the person using it;
Linked to the data in such a manner that if the data is changed
the signature is invalidated; and
e. In conformity with regulations adopted by the appropriate state
agency usually the Secretary ofState." 10

The Act and its associated regulations have established the appropriate
measures to insure against fraudulently created signatures. The "unique"
and "verification" requirements established by the Act are critical to
assuring the identity and validity of any electronic transaction.
Additionally, AB 1577 provided that a digital signature is only valid ifthe
·signature is "linked to the data in such a way that it is invalidated if the
data is changed."

°CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1633. 1 (enacted by Chapter 428).

1
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Digital Signature Regulations & Technology
The Secretary of State, presently, has authorized that digital signatures
created by the Public Key Infrastructure, or "PKI," and Signature
Dynamics technologies, which meet established statutory requirements,
are to be given their full legal effect.

•

California Code of Regulations § 22000 provides that a digitally
signed communication "is a message that has been processed by a
computer in such a manner that ties the message to the individual that
signed the message."

•

California Code of Regulations § 22001 provides that a digital
signature must be created by a form of technology that has been
accepted by the State of California in order for the digital signature to
be valid.

•

California Code of Regulations § 22002 outlines the requisite criteria
to be met in order for the digital signature to be legally effective.

•

California Code of Regulations § 22003 provides that Public Key
Infrastructure is an acceptable method of creating a valid, legally
binding digital signature.

•

California Code of Regulations § 22004 outlines the process by which
a company or individual can apply to add a new technology to the
Secretary of State•s list of acceptable digital signature technologies.

•

California Code of Regulations § 22005 requires public entities that
use digital signatures to ensure that the digital signature is sufficiently
secure.
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Creating a digital signature

Message
Message
Digest

Digital
S iwature

Signer's Private Key

Verifying a digital signature
Message

Digital
Signature

Message
Digest
Message
Digest

If the message
digests are
identical, the
signature will
verify. If they are
different in
anyway, the
signature will not
verify

Signer's Public Key

Diagrams provided by Digital Signature Trust Co.,
www. digsigtrustco. com/digital/signatures. html

Public Key Infrastructure allows a person wishing to use a digital
signature to create two encryption keys. "The ftrst key, the private key, is
kept secret, and is used to encrypt the message. The second key, the
public key, is used to decrypt the message." 11 The person who creates the
message retains the private key and the public key is distributed to those
who are the intended recipients of the message.

11
Department of Financial Institutions, Commissioner's Comments: Electronic
Commerce and Financial Services Regulatory Challenges (visited May 15, 2000)
<www .dfi.ca.gov/newsltr/spring99/ 1999.hnn>.
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Since only the private key can encrypt the message, or lock it, the
recipient of the message, who decrypts or unlocks the message, with the
digital signature affixed, can be sure that the message was actually sent by
sender. A PK.I system assures the recipient that the sender created the
public key by allowing for automatic verification of the sender's identity
through the use of a Certification Authority. A Certification Authority is a
third party to the transaction that verifies the identity of the sender ofthe
message before the keys are created.

PKI Process Flow

Certification
Authority

Repository

Subscriber

Step 1: Subscriber applies to Certification Authority for Digital
Certificate.
Step 2: CA verifies identity of Subscriber and issues Digital Certificate.
Step 3: CA publishes certificate to Repository.
Step 4: Subscriber digitally signs electronic message with Private Key to
ensure Sender Authenticity, Message Integrity and Non-Repudiation and
sends to Relying Party.
Step 5: Relying Party receives message, verifies Digital Signature with
Subscriber's Public Key, and goes to Repository to check status and
validity of Subscriber's Certificate.
Step 6: Repository returns results of status check on Subscriber's
Certificate to Relying party.
Diagram provided by Digital Signature Trust Co.,
www. digs igtrustco. com!digitallsignatures. html
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In California, any agency that chooses to use PKI technology must use a
Certification Authority that is registered with the Secretary of State. In
order for a Certification Authority to become registered with the Secretary
of State it must undergo an audit conducted by a third-party corporation
authorized to conduct financial investigations. Currently, only two
Certification Authorities are registered with the Secretary of State:
Verisign, Inc. of Mountain View, California and Digital Signature Trust
Co. of Salt Lake City, Utah.

A state agency can also use digital signatures created by Signature
Dynamics or "SD" technology. "Signature Dynamics uses a digitized
version of the sender's physical signature. The person sending the
message literally signs his or her name on a pad which digitally records
the speed, pressure, and emphasis of that signature." 12 A digest of the
signature is created and run through a "hash" program which encrypts the
digest. The encrypted signature is then electronically attached to the
message. However, if any portion ofthe message is altered or tampered
with in any manner, the signature becomes invalidated:.

Unlike PKI technology that employs the use of Certification.Authorities,
digital signatures created by SD are not capable of immediate
authentication. However, a confirmation of the signature can be made at
anytime after the message has been received.

Unfortunately, because the Secretary of State does not keep statistics
regarding state agencies that choose to use digital signatures, there is no
precise data regarding the use of digital signatures in the state. However,
at this time, the Secretary of State's office is unaware of any state agency
that it is employing the use of digital signatures.

12

/d.
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The Office of the Secretary of State, has further surmised that widespread
use of digital signatures in state agencies has been slow because of a
"chicken and the egg" implementation problem. Agencies are weary of
creating digital signature applications until people have acquired digital
signatures. However, people are unwilling to acquire digital signatures
until agencies have created applications that require the use of digital
signature technology.

The Future of Digital Signature Law
To effectively promote electronic commerce through the use of digital
signatures, the law must accomplish two primary goals. First, California
must effectively promote the use of digital signatures by state agencies
when implementing programs and projects on the Internet. Second,
California must define the scope of its own UETA law-either by further
defining the scope of existing state law or allowing federal law to preempt state law.

This is a multi-faceted project. The first step is to educate the public about
digital signatures and to gain the public's trust and confidence in
electronic transactions. Studies show that public trust of electronic
transactions increases with experience. This means that California needs
to begin putting digital signatures to use in California so the public can
acquire them and begin to use them in electronic transactions.

In order to balance the use of digital signatures with the public's concern
about Internet security, when digital signature use is introduced
policymakers should take the opportunity to look into instances of fraud
and other privacy and identity theft related issues.
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The Legislature must define the rules of conduct that are to apply to
electronic transactions and digital signatures. If the body of law that is to
apply to electronic transactions can be effectively defined, this will aid in
creating predictability and consistency in electronic transactions which can
eventually evolve into increased public confidence of electronic
transactions. Should the Legislature wait too long to define the controlling
body of laws, this decision may be left up to the judicial system and it
could take years for courts to define the body of laws that govern
electronic transactions for years to come.

I Assembly Committee on Information Technology
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Unitbnn Electronic Transactions Act: Consumer Nightmare or Opportunity?

http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/899nclcwc.htr
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Reports

prepared: 8123199
Consumers Union West Coast Regional Oftice
[Author's note: This article was written while the California proposal was still in bill form. It has since been
enacted. All of the protections described here as found in the California bill are now part of the California
UETA.]

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act:
Consumer Nightmare or Opportunity?

Should a lender be allowed to send a
foreclosure notice only to an email address
that is five years old?

If a consumer needs a paper copy of a
disclosure or contract notice sent by email,
should the consumer have to pay a fee to get a
copy of that notice?

Should a salesperson be able to sign a
consumer up to receive all future notices by
email when the consumer does not own a
computer?
Should utility shutoffwarnings go only to an
email address that might be shared within a
family and checked primarily by the children?

If a law requires that a certain type of contract
be in writing, should a record of a phone call
satisfy that requirement?

Are the consumer warning bells going off in your head? Well, all of these scenarios and more will be
permitted by the new Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UET A). UET A is coming soon to your state
legislature.

What is UETA?
UETA is a uniform law approved July 1999 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL).(l) If adopted by state legislatures, UETA will elevate electronic records and
signatures to the same legal status accorded paper records and handwritten signatures. UETA is grounded
on three premises:
· That most state law requirements for a writing can be satisfied by an electronic record,
including an email.
·That most state law requirements for a signature can be satisfied by an electronic signature.
· That, in most cases, the parties to a contract can agree to any form of electronic
communication.

VETA's Underlying Premises Ar~ Problematic

I of7
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Often, however, these premises do not apply in consumer contracts. The first premise will be true in only
some consumer situations. An electronic record may be just as good as a written record for an inexpensive
transaction that is completed in a short time. On the other hand, a consumer entering into a five-year car
loan or a 30-year mortgage needs the note and contract in a form which he or she can keep. Home
computers are replaced every few years, and previously downloaded contracts are unlikely to be copied
over to a new system. Change-of-terms notices for a service provider operating only on the Internet
probably can be delivered by email, but a notice that your car is being recalled for a safety problem should
arrive in the mail.
The first premise also assumes that email arrives at least as reliably as regular mail, which is contrary to the
experience of many consumers. Consumers currently may change email addresses more frequently than
they move. Those with email addresses seem to check them either far more frequently or far less frequently
than their daily check of the regular mail. In addition, an Internet email provider may go out of business,
leaving a consumer with no choice but to obtain a new email address.
As to the second premise, an electronic signature does not always fully serve the purposes of a written
signature. Where there is a risk of forgery, a written signature may provide additional safeguards because it
may be harder to forge than a purported electronic signature. An electronic click made at home may not
serve the purpose of emphasizing the seriousness or the particular risks of a transaction as well as a written
signature.
The third premise of UETA is reflected in the broad deference it gives to the autonomy of contracting
parties. It defers to the agreement without distinguishing between negotiated agreements and standard form
contracts or contracts of adhesion. This approach could give wide latitude to drafters of standard form
contracts to define and impose the conditions of electronic communication.
For example, UETA adopts the principle that each party should be able to determine when it will receive
information electronically, and when it wishes to insist on receiving a paper communication. This sounds
good in theory, but in practice it allows one-sided contracts. UETA also allows an on-line seller to insist on
sending all information to the consumer electronically. The seller, however, can require that the consumer
communicate any complaints, refund requests, billing disputes or other communications. to the same
company only by regular mail.
Here is another example of a perverse effect created by UETA's rule of autonomy to contracting parties.
UETA contains definitions of both "sent" and "received." According to these provisions, material is "sent"
when it enters a computer system or a server that is outside the control of the sender. Further, that
information is "received" when it enters the recipient's computer. These definitions contain loopholes. A
message is received even when the recipient cannot open or read it; or when the message was automatically
discarded by a junk mail filter. The definitions nevertheless do capture the basic idea that something is
received when it gets to you or to a place where you can retrieve it.
UETA permits the parties to the contract to vary these definitions so that "sent" and "received" can be
redefined to be anything. Under UETA, a web seller could define information to have been received by the
buyer at the moment that the seller posts that information to its own web site-even if the customer is not
aware of its posting.

Other Drawbacks
UETA:
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·Permits using a paper contract followed by an electronic change in the terms of that paper
contract.
·Permits using email to substitute for legal requirements to provide a paper notice even when
the consumer has not been doing business with the company by email.
· Permits an electronic signature to be made to a paper record.
·Exposes consumers to the risk that notices with a legal or contractual effect will be sent only
to a rarely checked email address.
· Exposes consumers to the risk that notices with a legal or contractual effect will be
considered received even ifthe consumer is unable to open or read them, or if the notice is
automatically discarded by a junk mail filter.
· Permits a party to redefine "sent" and "received" so that both are satisfied merely by posting a
notice to a web site.
· Allows a record of a telephone call to substitute for a written record.(2)
· Fails to include a right to a free, written copy of a contract or notice delivered electronically.
·Lacks a rule stating that an electronic record is not considered delivered if it is delivered in a
form which cannot be opened and read by the recipient.
· Offers no unfettered right on the part of the consumer to revoke an authorization to
communicate electronically and revert to paper communication. (The consumer may revoke the
authorization with respect to future transactions, but not for the initial transaction).
· Lacks a statutory restriction on the use of old email addresses.(J)
Challenges for Consumers Abound

Electronic commerce has pluses and minuses for consumers. For those consumers who have access to the
Internet, on-line shopping holds out the promise of increased price competition and selection. At the same
time, electronic commerce also offers some new opportunities for sellers to hide contract terms, posting
them in ways that make the consumer unlikely to find or read them, or even sending the terms only after
payment. UETA also produces some new opportunities for scam artists, e.g., by allowing a seller to switch
to electronic communication after a paper contract has been signed. For the creative and criminal mind,
VET A offers few limits.
UET A was introduced in California before it was finalized as a uniform act. Some important improvements
for consumers were added to the California version.(4J These improvements are absent from the uniform
version which will be offered in other state legislatures. Legislators, consumers, consumer law enforcement
officials, consumer advocat~s, and others should consider insisting upon both the California changes and
other improvements to UET A before it moves forward in their states.
A Roadmap for Improving UET A

Two kinds of changes should be made to UETA in each state legislature. First, those interested in consumer
protection should develop a list of .state statutes which should be exempt from the general UETA rule

3 of7

07/19/2000 1:41 Pl\1

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Consumer Nightmare or Opportunity?

http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/899nclcwc.htm

permitting electronic records and electronic signatures to replace written records and signatures. Section 3
of UETA allows a state to exempt specifically identified state laws from UETA's reach.
Second. both the California amendments and certain other consumer protections should be added.
Unfortunately, the drafters ofthis law did not see consumer protection as their job. They argue that VETA
is merely a procedural law which facilitates electronic commerce without changing underlying substantive
laws. Procedural rules, though, often affect substantive rights. Permitting electronic delivery of consumer
notices, contracts, and disclosures may undermine effectiveness of some existing consumer protection
statutes.

Types of statutes that should be exempted from UETA
· All statutes which require that specifically identifiable text or disclosures in a record or a
portion of a record be separately signed or initialed. Separate signature and separate initialing
requirements are often used in consumer laws to draw attention to contractual provisions with
a special impact on the customer. If these statutes are not exempted, some of their requirements
may be weakened by UETA's broad substitution of electronic signatures for ordinary
signatures.
· Statutes with special notice requirements or where the notices trigger particular legal rights
such as the running of a time period to appeal. Special notice statutes include a notice before
infringing upon a medical patient's privacy. Notices affecting legal rights include health-care
denial notices.
· Statutes affecting post-contract rights or activities. Examples of these statutes include
foreclosure statutes, auto conditional sale and loan repossession-related notices, and eviction
notices.
·
· Statutes which were passed to restrain particular types of activities. Statutes falling into this
category include statutes requiring notices before life, health and Medigap insurance policies
may be replaced; credit repair statutes; usury laws; and statutes addressing the rent-to-own
business, payday loans, and foreclosure consultants.
All ofthese types of state laws were exempted in the California version ofUETA.(5)

Necessary substantive improvements to UETA
Consumer protection law enforcement officers and consumer advocates should push to add certain basic
consumer protections to UETA as a precondition to any broad substitution of electronic records for writings
and of electronic signatures for written signatures. UETA can be improved by:
· Restricting UETA only to agreements to communicate electronically which are made
electronically. (This change was made in the California UETA bill.) (6)
·Adding a right to reyoke an authorization to receive communications electronically. (This
change was made in the California UETA bill.)
· Restricting the use of stale email addresses.
· Adding a requirement of good faith and fair dealing in the implementation of an agreement to
communicate electronically.
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·Deleting transactions resulting from telephone calls for personal, family, or household
purposes from coverage of the Act, and narrowing the defmition of electronic record so it does
not include phone calls.
· Adding a right to get a paper copy of any document delivered electronically at any time and
without charge.(?)
· Tightening the definitions of "sent" and "received" so that they cannot be unreasonably varied
by agreement. (This change was made in the California UETA bill.)
· Restricting redefinition by agreement of "sent" and "received." (The California version of
UETA only contains a reasonableness restriction on redefinitions of sent and received).(B)
· Requiring that if notices of the right to cancel are delivered electronically, then the right to
cancel must also be permitted to be exercised electronically.(9) (This change was made in the
California VETA bill.)
·Defining the on-line consumer transaction to have been made at the consumer's home.(! D)
· Broadening when a consumer can raise an error defense for orders placed using electronic
agents by eliminating the current rule that defeats the defense whenever a confirmation screen
is used in the transaction.
· Tightening the definition of an electronic signature so that it must occur in connection with an
electronic record, not a paper one. (This change was made to the California UETA bill.)
· Eliminating the broad authorization for electronic acknowledgement, verification, and sworn
statements. (This change was made to the California UETA bill.)
Consumer protection enforcement officials and consumer advocates in other states can look to the
California precedent which should make it easier to argue for and obtain these critical amendments to
UETA.

Electronic Commerce is Here to Stay
Advocates need to recognize that electronic commerce is here and will affect all consumers, rich or poor.
Consequently, consumer laws must be evaluated in light of electronic commerce. In many cases, consumer
laws will be rendered obsolete if they are not updated at the same time that rules facilitating electronic
commerce are put into place.
Despite its problems, UETA is more balanced than many ofthe electronic record and electronic signature
proposals that have been made in Congress. Some of those proposals would simply substitute electronic
records and signatures for written records and signatures without any exceptions. Unlike those proposals,
UETA contemplates that some statutes will be exempt, and it expressly preserves state law requirements for
the formatting of records when those records are delivered electronically. UETA also avoids formalistic
definitions of assent and mechanical rules that attribute messages to consumers who did not send them-a
weakness found in some other electronic commerce proposals.
With the addition of the pro-consumer changes made in California and other strengthening amendments,
UET A could become a statute that facilitates electronic commerce without harm to consumers.
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Many key issues must be resolved before UETA can serve the purpose of facilitating electronic commerce
when both parties desire to deal electronically without creating new avenues for the abuse of consumers.
Much work is needed by consumer enforcement agencies, public and private consumer advocates, and state
legislators to meet that challenge.(/ I)

(1) The full text of VETA, with official commentary, can be downloaded from:
http://www.law.upenn. edu/librarylu/clulcJrame. htm
The above address will take you to the NCCUSL Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts Official Site page. Click on the Final Acts
link, which will take you to the NCCUSL Final Acts page. Scroll through the Index on this page and choose the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act link, which will take you to the VETA Final Draft link at the bottom of the page.
(2) VETA defines an electronic record to include information that is either inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in
an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. A telephone call that is tape-recorded or digitally
retrievable is an electronic record under this definition.
(3) Even in a five-year car loan or a 30-year mortgage, VETA would allow the creditor to keep using the same email address
whether or not there is any reason to believe that address is still good. VETA does contain a limited restriction on the use of
bad addresses if the email bounces back to the sender.
(-I) The full texi of the California's VETA bill, SB 820, can be found at:
http://www.sen. ca. gvv!htbinltesthin!ca-htmi?GOPHER ROOT2: [81 LL. CURRENT.SB. FROM0800.SB0820lCURR VER. TXT: /.'hi

(5) Wide consultation with regulators, law enforcement, and consumer groups will be needed to develop that list in each state.
Coalition-building will critical in this process.
(6) A seller should not be able to use a preprinted paper contract to sign a consumer up to receive all future communications by
email. Requiring that the initial agreement be made electronically at least ensures that the consumer had the capacity to
process email at the time the agreement was first made.
(7) Consumers are unlikely to request a paper copy unless they need one. When they need a paper copy, they should be able to
get it promptly and without a fee.
(8) It is unfair if a contract provision promises notice to a consumer of an important event, e.g.• an increase in the loan interest
rate, but then uses a redefinition ofsent and received to require the consumer to "come and get it from our web site."
(9) The current rule of VETA could lead to confusion: it would allow a seller to email the notice of right to cancel but insist that
the notice be mailed back to exercise that right.
(10) This may affect which state's consumer protection laws are applicable. among other issues.
(11) A copy ofthe pro-consumer amendments made in the California VETA bill, plus proposed legislative language to
implement the additional consumer protections described here can be found at www.consumersunion.org/finance!finance.htm.
This article will appear in the July/August issue ofNCLC Reports, Credit & Usury Edition. Prepared by: Gail Hillebrand,
Consumers Union ofU.S.• West Coast Regional Office, San Francisco, CA 94103. Phone: 415-431-6747 Fax: 415-431-0906
Email: hil/ga@consumers.org
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>Summary
UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT
The Uniform Law Commissioners promulgated the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA) in 1999. It is the first comprehensive effort to prepare
state law for the electronic commerce era. Many states have already adopted
legislation pertaining to such matters as digital signatures, but UETA represents
the first national effort at providing some uniform rules to govern transactions in
electronic commerce that should serve in every state. Although related to the
Uniform Commercial Code, the rules of UET A are primarily for "electronic
records and electronic signatures relating to a transaction" that is not subject to
any article of the Uniform Commercial Code, except for Articles 2 and 2A. A
"transaction" means an action or set of actions occurring between two or more
persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, or governmental affairs.
Much is excluded in this definition, including required notices, disclosures or
communications by courts and governmental agencies.
UETA applies only to transactions in which each party has agreed by some means
to conduct them by electronically. Agreement is essential. Nobody is forced to
conduct to electronic transactions. Parties to electronic transactions come under
UETA, but they may also opt out. They may vary, waive or disclaim most ofthe
provisions of UETA by agreement, even if it is agreed that business will be
transacted by electronic means. The rules in UET A are almost all default rules that
apply only in the event the terms of an agreement do not govern.
Electronic commerce means, of course, persons doing business with other persons
with computers and telephone or television cable lines. The Internet is the great
marketplace for these kinds of transactions; a marketplace developing almost daily
in 1999 (and presumably into the foreseeable future) . The outlines and boundaries
for this marketplace are still unknown and developments are not predictable. It is
not possible to predict with any certainty how new law should develop to serve
that marketplace or any other electronic marketplace that might develop in the
future.
However, a few things are known about the existing electronic marketplace and
there are some assumptions about the law that governs transactions within it that
can be made with reasonable certainty in 1999, and that will continue to be
reasonably certain into the future. Electronic transactions are conducted by
communicating digitized information from one person to another. That digitized
information can be communicated and stored without the use of paper, and the
basic language of electronic transactions is fully and inherently paperless. In fact,
relying on paper for the memorialization of transactions and upon manual
signatures fo'r verifying them are most likely to impede electronic transactions,
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adding to their costs. And there is no benefit to any party to an electronic
transaction, with very few exceptions, in requiring that they be memorialized on
paper with signatures that are manual. The need to expand requirements in the law
for writings and manual signatures so that electronic records and electronic
signatures will satisfy those requirements, is the one thing that is reasonably
certain with respect to electronic transactions.
UETA does not attempt to create a whole new system of legal rules for the
electronic marketplace. The objective ofUETA is to make sure that transactions in
the electronic marketplace are as enforceable as transactions memorialized on
paper and with manual signatures, but without changing any of the substantive
rules of law that apply. This is a very limited objective--that an electronic record
of a transaction is the equivalent of a paper record, and that an electronic signature
will be given the same legal effect, whatever that might be, as a manual signature.
The basic rules in VETA serve this single purpose.
The basic rules are in Section 7 of UETA. The most fundamental rule in Section 7
provides that a "record or signature may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form." The second most
fundamental rule says that "a contract may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation." The
third most fundamental rule states that any law that requires a writing will be
satisfied by an electronic record. And the fourth basic rule provides that any
signature requirement in the law will be met if there is an electronic signature.
Almost all ofthe other rules in UETA serve the fundamental principles set out in
Section 7, and tend to answer basic legal questions about the use of electronic
records and signatures. Thus, Section 15 determines when information is legally
sent or delivered in electronic form. It establishes when electronic delivery
occurs--when an electronic record capable of retention by the recipient is legally
sent and received. The traditional and statutory rules that govern mail delivery of
the paper memorializing a transaction can't be applied to electronic transactions.
Electronic rules have to be devised., and UETA provides the rule.
Another rule that supports the general validity of electronic records and signatures
in transactions is the rule on attribution in Section 9. Electronic transactions are
mostly faceless transactions between strangers. UETA states that a signature is
attributable to a person if it is an act of that person, and that act may be shown in
any manner. If a security procedure is used, its efficacy in establishing the
attribution may be shown. In the faceless environment of electronic transactions,
the obvious difficulties of identification and attribution must be overcome. UETA,
Section 9 gives guidance in that endeavor.
Much has been much written about digital signatures in electronic commerce.
What is a digital signature? It is really a method of encryption that utilizes specific
technology. In the faceless environment of the electronic marketplace and
particularly the Internet, such technologies are highly useful.
It is not wholly certain what the legal impact of these technologies should be. For
that reason UET A may not be characterized as a digital signature statute. It does
facilitate the use of digital signatures and other security procedures in rules such as
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the one in Section 9 on attribution. Section 10 provides some rules on errors and
changes in messages. It favors the party who conforms to the security procedure
used in the specific transaction against the party who does not, in the event there is
a dispute over the content of the message:
But nothing in UET A requires the use of a digital signature or any security
procedure. It is technologically neutral. Persons can use the most up-to-date digital
signature technology, or less sophisticated security procedures such as passwords
or pin numbers. Whatever parties to transactions use for attribution or assuring
message integrity may be offered in evidence ifthere is a dispute.
UETA is procedural, not substantive. It does not require anybody to use electronic
transactions or to rely upon electronic records and signatures. It does not prohibit
paper records and manual signatures. Basic rules of law, like the general and
statutory law of contracts, continue to apply as they have always applied.
There are three provisions in UETA that need special attention, and that are not
directly in support ofthe basic rules in Section 7. First, UETA excludes
transactions subject to the Uniform Commercial Code, except for those under
Articles 2 and 2A, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, laws
governing estates and trusts, and any other specific laws that a state wants to
exempt from the rules applied in UETA. Some writing and signature requirements
in state law do not impact the enforceability of transactions, and have objectives
that should not be affected by adoption of a statute like UETA. The limitation of
UETA to agreed electronic transactions will eliminate any conflict with other
writing requirements for the most part. However, there is some room for
jurisdiction-specific tailoring of UETA permitted in each state, to assure no
conflict. Exclusions should be carefully and conservatively selected. Most law
relating to contracts and transactions between persons will serve the public better
if electronic records and signatures are recognized.
Second, UETA provides for "transferable records" in Section 16. Notes under
Article 3 and documents under Article 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code are
"transferable records" when in electronic form. Notes and documents are
negotiable instruments. The quality of negotiation relies upon the note or
document as the single, unique token of the obligations and rights embodied in the
note or document. Maintaining that quality as a unique token for electronic records
is the subject of Section 16. A transferable record exists when there is a single
authoritative copy of that record existing and unalterable in the "control" of a
person. A person in "control" is a "holder" for the purposes of transferring or
negotiating that record under the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 16 is
essentially a supplement to the Uniform Commercial Code, until its relevant
articles can be fully amended or revised to accommodate electronic instruments.
Third, UETA clearly validates contracts formed by electronic agents. Electronic
agents are computer programs that are implemented by their principals to do
business in electronic form. They operate automatically, without immediate human
supervision, though they are certainly not autonomous agents. They are a kind of
tool that parties use to communicate. Section 14 provides that a person may form a
contract by using an electronic agent. That means that the principal, which is the
person or en~ity which provides the program to do business, is bound by the
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contract that its agent makes.
When somebody buys something on the Internet, therefore, that person will be
assured that the agreement is valid, even though the transaction is conducted
automatically by a computer that solicits orders and payment information. Did
anyone really think that every order on the Internet involves a direct
communication with a human being?
Three sections of UET A deal with electronic records that state governmental
agencies create and retain. SecHon 17 allows a state to designate one agency or
officer as the authority on creation and retention of governmental records. Section
18 allows a state to designate which agency or officer regulates the communication
of electronic records and use of electronic signatures between agencies and other
persons. Section 19 allows a state to designate an agency or officer to set standards
that promote consistency and interoperability between state agencies with respect
to the use of electronic records and signatures. All three sections are optional
sections, there for the state that needs them, but not mandatory for all states in
order to implement uniformity. These are very important provisions, however,
because they provide a state with some root law for organizing the electronic
business of the state. They should be given very serious consideration in every
state.
It is not possible to cover every aspect of UETA in a short summary. This
summary highlights some important aspects. The adoption of these rules will be a
boon to electronic commerce. They will not artificially skew any market or make
any substantive law relating to contracts any different from that governing
transactions memorialized on paper. Every state should adopt them as quickly as
possible.
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> A Few Facts About the ...
UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT
PURPOSE:
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act is designed to support the use of
electronic commerce. The primary objective of this act is to establish the legal
equivalence of electronic records and signatures with paper writings and
manually-signed signatures, removing barriers to electronic commerce.
ORIGIN:
Completed by the Uniform Law Commissioners in 1999.
APPROVED BY:
American Bar Association
ENDORSED BY:
American Council ofLife Insurance
Equipment Leasing Association of America
STATE ADOPTIONS:

Arizona
California
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Indiana
Iowa

Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota
Nebraska
North Carolina**

Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Utah
Virginia

2000 INTRODUCTIONS:

Alabama
Colorado
Delaware

District of Columbia
Michigan
New Jersey

Rhode Island
Vermont
West Virginia

For any further information regarding the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,
please contact John McCabe or Katie Robinson at 312-915-0195.
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>Why States Should Adopt ...
THE UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) allows the use of electronic
records and electronic signatures in any transaction, except transactions subject to
the Uniform Commercial Code. The fundamental purpose ofthis act is to remove
perceived barriers to electronic commerce.
The VETA is a procedural statute. It does not mandate either electronic signatures
or records, but provides a means to effectuate transactions when they are used.
The primary objective is to establish the legal equivalence of electronic records
and signatures with paper writings and manually-signed signatures.
There are many reasons why every state should adopt the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act.
• UETA defines and validates electronic signatures. An electronic signature is
defined as "an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically
associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted by a person
·with the intent to sign the electronic record."
• UETA removes writing and signature requirements which create barriers to
electronic transactions.
• UETA insures that contracts and transactions are not denied enforcement
because electronic media are used.
• UETA insures that courts accept electronic records into evidence.
• UET A protects against errors by providing appropriate standards for the use
of technology to assure party identification.
• UETA avoids having the selection of medium (paper vs. electronic) govern
the outcome of any disputes or disagreements, and it assures that parties
have the freedom to select the media for their transactions by agreement.
• UETA authorizes state governmental entities to create, communicate,
receive and store records electronically, and encourages state governmental
entities to move to electronic media.
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Senate Bill No. 820

CHAPTER428
An act to add Title 2.5 (commencing with Section 1633.1) to Part
2 of Division 3 of the Civil Code, and to amend Section 18608 of the
Financial Code, relating to electronic transactions.
!Approved by Governor September 16. 1999. Filed
with Secretary of State September 16, 1999.1
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL' S DIGEST

SB 820, Sher. Electronic transactions.
Existing law contains provisions regulating contracts and requires
certain contracts to be in writing and signed. Existing law contains
certain special provisions applicable to electronic transactions, such
as provisions relating to electronic funds transfer, but does not
generally set forth the effect of transactions entered into
electronically.
This bill would enact the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. It
would generally apply to electronic transactions, except that it would
not apply to the creation and execution of wills and testamentary
trusts, and would not apply to certain other transactions.
The bill would provide that a record or signature may not be
denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic
form . The bill would provide that a contract may not be denied legal
effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used
in its formation . It would provide that if a law requires a record to be
in writing, or if a law requires a signature, an electronic record
satisfies the law. The bill would enact related provisions. The bill
would authorize the provision of written information by electronic
record. The bill would set forth provisions governing changes and
errors, the effect of electronic signatures, and admissibility in
evidence.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Title 2.5 (commencing with Section 1633.1) is added
to Part 2 of Division 3 of the Civil Code, to read:
TITLE 2.5.

ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS

1633.1. This title may be cited as the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act.
1633.2. In this title the following terms have the following
definitions:

88

Ch. 428

-2-

(a) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found
in their language or inferred from other circumstances and from
rules, regulations, and procedures given the effect of agreements
under laws otherwise applicable to a particular transaction.
(b) "Automated transaction" means a transaction conducted or
performed, in whole or in part, by electronic means or electronic
records, in which the acts or records of one or both parties are not
reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course in forming a
contract, performing under an existing contract, or fulfilling an
obligation required by the transaction.
(c) "Computer
program"
means
a
set of statements
or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in an information
processing system in order to bring about a certain result.
(d) "Contract" means the total legal obligation resulting from the
parties' agreement as affected by this title and other applicable law.
(e) "Electronic" means relating to technology having electrical,
digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar
capabilities.
(f) "Electronic
agent"
means a computer program or an
electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate
an action or respond to electronic records or performances in whole
or in part, without review by an individual.
(g) "Electronic record" means a record created, generated, sent,
communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.
(h) "Electronic signature" means an electronic sound, symbol, or
process attached to or logically associated with an electronic record
and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the
electronic record.
(i) "Governmental agency" means an executive, legislative, or
judicial
agency,
department,
board,
commission,
authority,
institution, or instrumentality of the federal government or of a state
or of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of a state.
U) "Information"
means data, text, images, sounds, codes,
computer programs. software. data bases. or the like.
(k) "Information processing system" means an electronic system
for creating, generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying, or
processing information.
{I) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust,
estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint
venture, governmental agency, public corporation, or any other legal
or commercial entity.
(m) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable form.
(n) "Security procedure" means a procedure employed for the
purpose of verifying that an electronic signature, record, or
performance is that of a specific person or for detecting changes or
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errors in the information in an electronic record. The term includes
a procedure that requires the use of algorithms or other codes,
identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or other
acknowledgment procedures.
(o) "Transaction" means an action or set of actions occurring
between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business,
commercial, or governmental affairs.
1633.3. (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivisions (b) and
(c), this title applies to electronic records and electronic signatures
relating to a transaction.
(b) This title does not apply to transactions subject to the following
laws:
(1) A law governing the creation and execution of wills, codicils,
or testamentary trusts.
(2) Division I (commencing with Section 1101) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, except Sections 1107 and 1206.
(3) Divisions 3 (commencing with Section 3101), 4 (commencing
with Section 4101), 5 (commencing with Section 5101 ). 8
(commencing with Section 8101), 9 (commencing with Section
9101). and II (commencing with Section 11101) of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
(4) A law that requires that specifically identifiable text or
disclosures in a record or a portion of a record be separately signed,
including initialed, from the record. However, this paragraph does
not apply to Section 1677 or 1678 of this code or Section 1298 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
(c) This title does not apply to any specific transaction described
in Section 17511.5 of the Business and Professions Code, Section 56.11,
56.17, 798.14, 1133, or 1134 of, Sections 1350 to 1376, inclusive, of,
Section 1689.6, 1689.7, or 1689.13 of, Chapter 2.5 (commencing with
Section 1695) of Title 5 of Part 2 of Division 3 of, Section 1720, 1785.15,
1789.14, 1789.16, 1789.33, or 1793.23 of, Chapter 1 (commencing with
Section 1801) of Title 2 of Part 4 of Division 3 of, Section 1861.24,
1862.5, 1917.712, 1917.713, 1950.5, 1950.6, 1983, 2924b, 2924c, 2924f,
2924i, 2924j, 2924.3, or 2937 of, Article 1.5 (commencing with Section
2945) of Chapter 2 of Title 14 of Part 4 of Division 3 of, Section 2954.5
or 2963 of, Chapter 2b (commencing with Section 2981) or 2d
(commencing with Section 2985.7) of Title 14 of Part 4 of Division 3
of, or Section 3071.5 of, the Civil Code, subdivision (b) of Section
18608 or Section 22328 of the Financial Code, Section 1358.15, 1365,
1368.01, 1368.1, 1371, or 18035.5 of the Health and Safety Code, Section
658, 662, 663, 664, 666, 667.5, 673, 677, 678, 678.1, 786, 10083, 10086,
10087, 10102, 10113.7, 10127.7, 10127.9, 10127.10, 10197, 10199.44,
10199.46, 10235.16, 10235.40, 10509.4, 10509.7, 11624.09, or 11624.1 of
the Insurance Code. Section 779. I. 10010.1. or 16482 of the Public
Utilities Code, or Section 9975 or 11738 of the Vehicle Code. An
electronic record may not be substituted for any notice that is
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required to be sent pursuant to Section 1162 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to prohibit
the recordation of any document with a county recorder by
electronic means.
(d) This title applies to an electronic record or electronic
signature otherwise excluded from the application of this title under
subdivision (b) when used for a transaction subject to a law other
than those specified in subdivision (b).
(e) A transaction subject to this title is also subject to other
applicable substantive law.
(f) The exclusion of a transaction from the application of this title
under subdivision (b) or (c) shall be construed only to exclude the
transaction from the application of this title, but shall not be
construed to prohibit the transaction from being conducted by
electronic means if the transaction may be conducted by electronic
means under any other applicable law.
1633.4. This title applies to any electronic record or electronic
signature created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or
stored on or after January 1, 2000.
1633.5. (a) This title does not require a record or signature to be
created, generated,
sent,
communicated, received,
stored,
or
otherwise processed or used by electronic means or in electronic
form.
(b) This title applies only to a transaction between parties each of
which has agreed to conduct the transaction by electronic means.
Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic
is
detennined
from
the
context
and
surrounding
means
circumstances, including the parties' conduct. Except for a separate
and optional agreement the primary purpose of which is to authorize
a transaction to be conducted by electronic means, an agreement to
conduct a transaction by electronic means may not be contained in
a standard fonn contract that is not an electronic record. An
agreement in such a standard form contract may not be conditioned
upon an agreement to conduct transactions by electronic means. An
agreement to conduct a transaction by electronic means may not be
inferred solely from the fact that a party has used electronic means
to pay an account or register a purchase or warranty. This subdivision
may not be varied by agreement.
(c) A party that agrees to conduct a transaction by electronic
means may refuse to conduct other transactions by electronic means.
If a seller sells goods or services by both electronic and nonelectronic
means and a buyer purchases the goods or services by conducting the
transaction by electronic means, the buyer may refuse to conduct
further transactions regarding the goods or services by electronic
means. This subdivision may not be varied by agreement.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in this title, the effect of any of
its provisions may be varied by agreement. The presence in certain
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provisions of this title of the words "unless otherwise agreed," or
words of similar import, does not imply that the effect of other
provisions may not be varied by agreement.
1633.6. This title shall be construed and applied according to all
of the following:
(l) To facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other
applicable law.
{2) To
be consistent with
reasonable practices concerning
electronic transactions and with the continued expansion of those
practices.
(3) To effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
with respect to the subject of this title among states enacting it.
1633.7. (a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect
or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form .
(b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability
solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.
(c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record
satisfies the law.
(d) lf a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies
the law.
1633.8. (a) If parties have agreed to conduct a transaction by
electronic means and a law requires a person to pro~ide, send, or
deliver information in writing to another person, that requirement
is satisfied if the information is provided, sent, or delivered, as the
case may be, in an electronic record capable of retention by the
recipient at the time of receipt. An electronic record is not capable
of retention by the recipient if the sender or its information
processing system inhibits the ability of the recipient to print or store
the electronic record.
(b) If a law other than this title requires a record to be posted or
displayed in a certain manner, to be sent, communicated, or
transmitted by a specified method, or to contain information that is
formatted in a certain manner, all of the following rules apply:
( 1) The record shall be posted or displayed in the manner
specified in the other law.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) of subdivision
(d), the record shall be sent, communicated, or transmitted by the
method specified in the other law.
(3) The record shall contain the information formatted in the
manner specified in the other law.
(c) If a sender inhibits the ability of a recipient to store or print an
electronic record, the electronic record is not enforceable against the
recipient.
(d) The requirements of this section may not be varied by
agreement, except as follows :
( 1) To the extent a law other than this title requires information
to be provided, sent, or delivered in writing but permits that
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requirement to be varied by agreement, the requirement under
subdivision (a) that the information be in the form of an electronic
record cap;1ble of retention may also be varied by agreement.
(2) A requirement under a law other than this title to send,
communicate, or transmit a record by first-class mail may be varied
by agreement to the extent permitted by the other law.
1633.9. (a) An electronic record or electronic signature is
attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the
person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the
efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person
to which the electronic record or electronic signature was
attributable.
(b) The effect of an electronic record or electronic signature
attributed to a person under subdivision (a) is determined from the
context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation,
execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement, if any, and
otherwise as provided by law.
1633.10. If a change or error in an electronic record occurs in a
transmission between parties to a transaction, the following rules
apply:
(l) If the parties have agreed to use a security procedure to detect
changes or errors and one party has conformed to the procedure, but
the other party has not, and the nonconforming party would have
detected the change or error had that party also conformed, the
conforming party may avoid the effect of the changed or erroneous
electronic record.
(2) In an automated transaction involving an individual, the
individual may avoid the effect of an electronic record that resulted
from an error made by the individual in dealing with the electronic
agent of another person if the electronic agent did not provide an
opportunity for the prevention or correction of the error and, at the
time the individual learns of the error, all of the following conditions
are met:
(i) The individual promptly notifies the other person of the error
and that the individual did not intend to be bound by the electronic
record received by the other person.
(ii) The individual takes reasonable steps, including steps that
conform to the other person's reasonable instructions, to return to the
other person or, if instructed by the other person, to destroy the
consideration received, if any, as a result of the erroneous electronic
record.
(iii)The individual has not used or received any benefit or value
from the consideration, if any, received from the other person.
(3) If neither paragraph (I) nor (2) applies, the change or error
has the effect provided by other law, including the law of mistake,
and the parties' contract, if any.
(4) Paragraphs (2) and (3) may not be varied by agreement.
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1633.11. (a) If a law requires that a signature be notarized, the
requirement is satisfied with respect to an electronic signature if an
electronic record includes, in addition to the electronic signature to
be notarized, the electronic signature of a notary public together
with all other information required to be included in a notarization
by other applicable law.
(b) In a transaction, if a law requires that a statement be signed
under penalty of perjury, the requirement is satisfied with respect to
an electronic signature, if an electronic record includes, in addition
to the electronic signature, all of the information as to which the
declaration pertains together with a declaration under penalty of
perjury by the person who submits the electronic signature that the
information is true and correct.
1633.12. (a) If a law requires that a record be retained, the
requirement is satisfied by retaining an electronic record of the
information in the record, if the electronic record reflects accurately
the information set forth in the record at the time it was first
generated in its final form as an electronic record or otherwise, and
the electronic record remains accessible for later reference.
(b) A requirement to retain a record in accordance with
subdivision (a) does not apply to any information the sole purpose of
which is to enable the record to be sent, communicated, or received.
(c) A person may satisfy subdivision (a) by using the services of
another person if the requirements of subdivision (a) are satisfied.
(d) If a law requires a record to be retained in its original form, or
provides consequences if the record is not retained in its original
form. that law is satisfied by an electronic record retained in
accordance with subdivision (a).
(e) If a law requires retention of a check. that requirement is
satisfied by retention of an electronic record of the information on
the front and back of the check in accordance with subdivision (a).
(f) A record retained as an electronic record in accordance with
subdivision (a) satisfies a law requiring a person to retain a record for
evidentiary, audit. or like purposes, unless a law enacted after the
effective date of this title specifically prohibits the use of an electronic
record for a specified purpose.
(g) This section does not preclude a governmental agency from
specifying additional requirements for the retention of a record
subject to the agency's jurisdiction.
1633.13. In a proceeding, evidence of a record or signature may
not be excluded solely because it is in electronic form .
1633.14. (a) In an automated transaction, the following rules
apply:
( 1) A contract may be formed by the interaction of electronic
agents of the parties, even if no individual was aware of or reviewed
the electronic agents' actions or the resulting terms and agreements.
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(2) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic
agent and an individual, acting on the individual's own behalf or for
another person, including by an interaction in which the individual
performs actions that the individual is free to refuse to perform and
which the individual knows or has reason to know will cause the
electronic agent to complete the transaction or performance.
(b) The terms of the contract are determined by the substantive
law applicable to it.
1633.15. {a) Unless the sender and the recipient agree to a
different method of sending that is reasonable under the
circumstances, an electronic record is sent when the information is
addressed properly or otherwise directed properly to the recipient
and either (I) enters an information processing system outside the
control of the sender or of a person that sent the electronic record on
behalf of the sender, or (2) enters a region of an information
processing system that is under the control of the recipient.
(b) Unless the sender and the recipient agree to a different
method of receiving that is reasonable under the circumstances, an
electronic record is received when the electronic record enters an
information processing system that the recipient has designated or
uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records or information
of the type sent, in a form capable of being processed by that system,
and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record.
(c) Subdivision (b) applies even if the place the information
processing system is located is different from the place the electronic
record is deemed to be received under subdivision (d).
(d) Unless otherwise expressly provided in the electronic record
or agreed between the sender and the recipient, an electronic record
is deemed to be sent from the sender's place of business and to be
received at the recipient's place of business or, if the recipient is an
individual acting on his or her own behalf, at the recipient's place of
residence. For purposes of this subdivision, the following rules apply:
(l) If the sender or recipient has more than one place of business,
the place of business of that person is the place having the closest
relationship to the underlying transaction.
(2) If the sender or the recipient does not have a place of business,
the place of business is the sender's or recipient's residence, as the
case may be.
(e) An electronic record is received under subdivision (b) even
if no individual is aware of its receipt.
(f) Receipt of an electronic acknowledgment from an information
processing system described in subdivision (b) establishes that a
record was received but, by itself, does not establish that the content
sent corresponds to the content received.
(g) If a person is aware that an electronic record purportedly sent
under subdivision (a), or purportedly received under subdivision
(b), was not actually sent or received, the legal effect of the sending
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or receipt is determined by other applicable law. Except to the extent
permitted by the other law, this subdivision may not be varied by
agreement.
1633.16. If a law other than this title requires that a notice of the
right to cancel be provided or sent, an electronic record may not
substitute for a writing under that other law unless , in addition to
satisfying the requirements of that other law and this title, the notice
of cancellation may be returned by electronic means. This section
may not be varied by agreement.
1633.17. No state agency, board, or comm1ss1on may require,
prohibit, or regulate the use of an electronic signature in a transaction
in which the agency, board, or commission is not a party unless a law
other
than
this
title
expressly
authorizes
the
requirement,
prohibition, or regulation.
SEC. 2. Section 18608 of the Financial Code is amended to read:
18608. (a) A premium finance agreement may contain a power
of attorney or other authority enabling the company to cancel the
insurance contract or contracts listed in the agreement in the event
of default in the terms thereof.
(b) Upon the exercise of such a right to cancel, the company shall
mail to the insured, to his or her last known address or to the address
shown on the premium finance agreement at least 10 days prior to
cancellation, a notice of its intent to cancel the insurance contract or
contracts.
(c) The liability of a company to any person or corporation upon
the exercise of such a right or authority of cancellation shall be limited
to the amount of the principal balance, except in the event of willful
failure by the company to mail the notice required by this section.
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The California exemptions to UET A take three forms:
First, there is a general exemption for all statutes that require that "specifically identifiable text or
disclosures in a record or a portion of a record be separately signed, including initialed, from the record."
Second, there is a special rule for statutes requiring notices of cancellation. While not technically an
exemption. this special rule restricts the application of UETA so that a notice of the right to cancel can't be
delivered electronically unless the right to cancel can be exercised electronically.
Third, there is a list of specific statutes. The statutes are listed in the bill text. The remainder of this
document describes statutes that Consumers Union Sought to have exempted, and which were exempted.
We believed that the purpose of the statutory requirements for a written notice to the consumer would not
be equally well satisfied by sending only an electronic notice.

1. Statutes requiring notice of disposition, eviction, repossession, and balloon payments:
California's loan statutes contain two kinds of notice requirements: 1) notices that must be contained in the
initial contract and 2) notices that must be provided at the time of or following repossession or other action
to foreclose on the security. A broad variety of disclosure requirements for initial contracts were not
exempted. However, post-default notices present a different issue. There will be far fewer of these notices.
They serve a special notice function, and they often inform consumers that their legal rights will be affected
by the next step taken by the other party or by a failure to respond to the notice. Certain kinds of
post-contract notices, including notices of intent to dispose of collateral, were exempted from SB 820,
California's UETA.
Civil Code section 2983.2, Rees-Levering notice of intent to dispose of a repossessed or surrendered motor
vehicle.
Civil Code section 2963, balloon payment notice.
Civil Code section 2987, notice of disposition of leased vehicle to lessee and guarantor after early
termination by the lessee.
Civil Code section 2924i, balloon payment notice.
Civil Code section 2924j, foreclosure.
Civil Code section 2924.3, collection on mortgage by agent.
Civil Code section 3071.5, signed release of an interest in a vehicle subject to a lien. Because this is a
permanent release and relinquishment of a property interest, it should not be satisfied by an electronic click
that other documents have defined to equal a signature.
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Civil Code sections 1950.5(f) and (g)(1), requirement for landlord to provide a written accounting of
disposition of security deposit.
Financial Code section 22328, post repossession, predisposition notice to all persons liable on a loan
secured by a motor vehicle lien. Includes notice of right to redeem notice of conditional right to reinstate
loan.
Civil Code section 1812.2, 1812.3, retail installment accounts, predisposition notice. Ten day
predisposition notice of intent to resell or retain goods financed under a retail installment account. Includes
notice of right to redeem.
Public Utilities Code sections 779.1, 10010.1, and 16482, utility shutoff
These provisions allow utilities to notify customers by mail that their services will be shut off or
discontinued, first at least 10 days prior to the proposed termination, and then within 24-48 hours of
termination. The provisions include notification to a third party designated by customers 65 years of age or
older. Electronic mail is not yet reliable enough in its delivery for these notices. Further, the definition of
receipt in the UETA is not certain enough to assure actual receipt for it to apply to these provisions.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1162, This section is cited in the various eviction codes. It requires
mailed notice to augment posting or to augment personal delivery to a person other than the addressee. A
variety of eviction-related statutes require of notice in the manner prescribed by Section 1162 ofthe Code
of Civil Procedure. See e.g. Civil Code Sections 799.65 and 827. The following was added to California's
UETA:
An electronic record may not be substituted for any notice that is required to be sent pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure Section 1162.

Civil Code sections 1789.14, 1789.16, Credit Services Organization Statute.
California's statute on credit service organizations severely restricts the activities ofthese agencies. The
requirement for a written contract and the requirement for a physical tear-off notice of cancellation form are
very important to the operation of the statute. For this reason, this statute was exempted from SB 820.
Civil Code section 1789.33, requirement of a written agreement for deferred deposit check cashing,
("payday loans"). The Civil Code Section requirement for a written agreement including a statement of the
amount of the APR which is signed by the customer cannot be satisfied by an electronic click definition of
a signature. One important purpose of the signature in this Civil Code requirement is to bring to the
attention of customer the extraordinary APR associated with these loans. In California, the average annual
percentage rate on a payday loan covered by Civil Code Section 1789.33 is several hundred percent.
Insurance Code sections 10197, 10199.44,10199.46, and 10253.16, 10509.4, 10509.7, insurance
replacement warnings.
Insurance replacement has been a longstanding problem. Salespersons sometimes induce consumers to
purchase a new policy when the <;:ustomer would be better off with the old policy, usually because of new
time periods for contestability or preexisting condition restrictions. The Insurance Code addresses this issue
by requiring a particular mailed notice to the consumer by the insurer, and in some cases the selling agent,
when the seller is aware that an insurance replacement is occurring. The special warning and notice
function of these notices is not equally well served by an email notice, and the need to receive them
requires at least the level of reliability provided by regular mail. In addition, some ofthese provisions
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require a signature, which has a special notice function that may not be equally well served by an electronic
click.

2. Notices where nonresponse creates a legal obligation or conclusive presumption, or the notice has a
serious and immediate effect
Insurance Code sections 10083, 10086, 10087, CEA offers. These code sections require mailed notices
related to the offer of earthquake insurance coverage. Each defines nonresponse by the consumer as a
conclusive presumption of a rejection ofthe offer of coverage. Because nonresponse has binding
consequences, the method of delivery and likelihood of receipt should be at least as reliable as regular mail.
Electronic mail does not yet meet that standard.
Insurance Code sections 11624.09 and 11624.1, mailed notice of defect in certificate of eligibility or
application for assigned risk plan. If the consumer doesn't respond to these mailed notices within ten days,
the assigned risk insurance policy is void from its inception. Electronic mail is not yet reliable enough in its
delivery, and the definition of receipt in UETA is not certain enough to assure actual receipt, for it to apply
to these provisions.
Health and Safety Code section 1368.1, plan denying coverage to an enrollee with a terminal illness must
provide enrollee with certain information within 5 business days (i.e. reasons for denying coverage,
alternate treatment programs, etc.). Electronic mail is not yet reliable enough in its delivery for this to be
the only means of delivering this information; and the definition of receipt in the UET A is not certain
enough to assure actual receipt for it to apply to this provision.
Health and Safety Code section 1358.15(a), A plan supplementing Medicare must notify recipients 30 days
prior to any modifications to Medicare supplement contracts.

Civil Code Sections 1803.7, 2984.3, and 2986.4, These provisions create a presumption that the consumer
received a copy of a contract and any credit statement for a retail installment contract ( 1803. 7), vehicle
purchase (2984.3), or a vehicle lease (2986.4) if the consumer does not indicate within 30 days that he or
she was not furnished with a copy of those documents. Again, electronic mail is not yet reliable enough in
its delivery, and the definition of receipt in SB 820 is not certain enough to assure actual receipt for it to
apply to these provisions.

3. Insurer cancellation and lapse notices
Health and Safety Code section 1365(a)(1), Health plans may cancel enrollment or subscription within 15
days after a subscriber has been duly notified of failure to pay a charge.
Insurance Code section 10235.40, lapse notice for long term care insurance.
Insurance Code section 662, cancellation of auto insurance.
Insurance Code section 663, nonrenewal of auto insurance (electronic delivery to the lienholder, but not
to the consumer, is specifically permitted by the Insurance Code for this notice.)
Insurance Code sections 663 and 664, 667 .5, notice of policy expiration and proof of mailing.
Insurance Code section 673 and financial Code section 18608(b), notice by lender to insured of intent
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to cancel auto insurance for nonpayment of financed premium.
Insurance Code section 677, cancellation ofhomeowners insurance and certain other types of insurance.
Insurance Code section 678, nonrenewal ofhomeowners insurance.
Insurance Code sections 786, 10127.9, 10127.7, and 10127.10, notices ofright to cancel insurance policy.
The Insurance Code contains a host of right to cancel provisions. They are not proposed for exemption only
because we have made a more general proposal on the treatment of right to cancel provisions. See, e.g.,
Insurance Code sections 786, disability insurance; 10127.9, individual life insurance; 10127.7, small dollar
life insurance policies, and 10127.1 0, life insurance and annuities.
4. Special Notice rules
Civil Code section 2937, notice oftransfer of mortgage servicing. This section mandates that a borrower
be given written notice on transfer of the servicing of a mortgage or deed of trust for one to four residential
units. The statement of purposes to this section states that borrowers have a right to know when servicing
has been transferred and that notification may protect the borrower from fraud and ensure timely payments.
Given the present inconsistencies in the reliability of email notice, and the possibility of a transfer of
servicing some years after the mortgage was first originated, this statutory purpose may not be satisfied by
substituting electronic notice.
Civil Code section 56.11, authorization to release medical information.
Civil Code section 56.17, written and signed authorization for disclosure of genetic test results to third
parties.
Civil Code section 798.14, mobile home park notices. This section requires that notices required under the
mobile home chapter of Civil Code need to be delivered personally to the homeowner or deposited in the
U.S. mail at the address ofthe site within the mobile home park. The types of notices that must be given
include notice of a meeting to discuss proposed changes in park rules, notice of change in zoning, advance
notice of interruption in utility service, notice of proposed changes in fees, and a letter of intention to sell
the park.
Civil Code section 1133, notice of blanket encumbrance to be signed by the buyer.
Civil Code section 1134, written statement of substantial defects in condominium or cooperative. Delivery
by mail triggers a five day right to terminate agreement to purchase.
Civil Code sections 1350-1376, the condominium law. These sections contain extensive requirements for
specific written notices of various types under the Davis-Stirling Common Development Act.
I

Vehicle Code section 9975, correction of safety defects. The maker of a car is not liable under this section
for the cost of correcting defects if correction is not sought within 45 days after receipt of notification or the
end of the warranty. Because failure to act in after receipt of notice has legal consequences, this section was
exempted.
Civil Code section 1793.23, notice of lemon law buyback or voluntary repurchase of problem vehicle. This
section requires that any person who sells a lemon law buyback car to a new buyer must obtain a signed
disclosure statement from the potential buyer before the sale. This is the kind of signature requirement
where a real (handwritten) signatw:e should be required.
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Civil Code sections 1917.712 and 1917.713, disclosures about shared appreciation loans for seniors.
Health and Safety Code section 1368.01, health care grievance. Plan must resolve a grievance within 30
days of receipt ofthe grievance, or respond to subscribers and enrollees with a written statement on the
disposition or pending status of a grievance within 30 days of receipt of the grievance.
Health and Safety Code section 1371, health care denial. Health plan must reimburse within 30 days of
receipt of a claim (45 days for HMOs), or interest accrues. If the claim is contested, the subscriber must be
notified in writing that the claim is contested or denied within 30 days of receipt of the claim (45 days for
fn\10s).
·
S. Additional statutes
Unruh Retail Credit Act and Rees-Levering Conditional Auto Sales Act
Civil Code section 1720, If an obligor sends an inquiry via certified mail to an obligee concerning any
debit or credit applicable to a retail installment account obligation, the obligee must respond in a writing
sent to the last known address of the obligor within 60 days from the date the inquiry was mailed.
Civil Code section 1785.15(b)(2), A consumer has the right to make a written request for information from
a consumer credit reporting agency, and the agency has to send the information within 5 days after the
request has been received.
Civil Code section 1806.2, Upon the written request ofthe buyer, the holder of a contract shall"give or
forward" a written statement of the unpaid balance.
Civil Code section 1806.4, Upon the written request of the buyer, the holder of a contract shall deliver, or
mail acknowledgment of payment in full.
Civil Code Section 1810.11, If the buyer makes a written reques_t for a statement offin~ce charges
assessed on the account in the preceding year, the seller shall provide the information in writing.
Civil Code Section 1861.24, If judgment isn't paid 30 days after it becomes final, a tenant's or guest's
baggage and property may be sold. The notice of sale shall be posted and mailed to the tenant or guest at
least 15 days prior to the date of the sale.
Civil Code Section 1862.5, Unclaimed property left in a hospital may sold four weeks from the time that
written notice of the sale is given to the last known owner.
Civil Code Section 1983, A former tenant's or owner's personal property may be disposed of not less than
18 days after notice is mailed. .
Civil Code Section 2941, After a mortgage has been satisfied, and upon the written request of the
consumer, the lender shall deliver the original note and mortgage or deed of trust.
Health & Safety Code Section 18035.5(a), Upon the written demand of the registered owner of a
manufactured home, mobilehome, or commercial coach, the secured party shall deliver a copy of the
conditional sale contract or the promissory note and security agreement, and a written statement indicating
the amount of the unpaid balance, among other things.
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Insurance Code Section 657, Upon a consumer's written request, an insurance agent who refuses to accept
or to issue a policy shall furnish the applicant with a written statement explaining the reason for refusal
within 30 days of receipt of the request.
Insurance Code Section 658, An insurer who refuses to accept or to issue a good driver discount policy
when a written application has been made by a qualified applicant shall furnish the applicant with a written
statement explaining the reason for refusal within ten days of the refusal.
Insurance Code Section 664, Proof of mailing is sufficient proof of notification of cancellation or of
intention not to renew an insurance policy.
Insurance Code Section 666, Where notification of cancellation does not include the reason for
cancellation, upon a consumer's written request, the insurer shall mail or deliver the reason for cancellation
within five days of receipt of the request.
Insurance Code Section 678.1(g), Upon the written request of an insured who has received a notice of
nonrenewal, the insurer shall provide a report on the account within 15 days of receiving the request.
Insurance Code Section 10102, Upon issuance or renewal of a residential property insurance policy, the
insured must be provided with a disclosure statement. The statement can be mailed, with first-class mail as
adequate proof of mailing. Ifthe applicant does not return a signed acknowledgement of receipt ofthe
disclosure within 60 days of the date it was provided, then there is a conclusive presumption that the
insurer complied with the disclosure requirement.
Insurance Code Section 10113.7, The insurer must deliver or mail written notice of an increase in the
premium of a life insurance policy to the policyholder 20 days before the increase becomes effective.
Insurance Code Section 10235.16, The insured shall be furnished with a notice of replacement of accident
and sickness or long-term care coverage.
Prepared by:
Gail Hillebrand
Consumers Union
West Coast Regional Office
1535 Mission St.
San Francisco, CA 94103
l415) 431-6747
hillga(W,consumer.org
Consumers Union's West Coast Regional Office
(January 2000)
Additional documents and corresponding links:
"Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Consumer Nightmare or Opportunity?"
Http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/899nclcws.htm
"Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: Proposed amendments to protect consumers"
Http://www .consumersunion.org/finance/uetaws899 .htm
[ Health"] [ Finance] [Food] [ Product] [Telecom] [ Other]
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Summary and Analysis*
The "Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act" (S. 761) was signed into
law on June 30, 2000 and becomes effective on October 1, 2000. It was approved by the
House of Representatives on June 14, 2000 by a vote of 426-4 and the United States Senate
two days later by a vote of 87-0. The bipartisan legislation ensures that digitaVelectronic
signatures will carry the same legal weight as a signature in the offline world.
The new Federal statute is an important achievement for the information technology industry,
parties interested in exploring e-commerce, and consumers. For the first time, a solid national
uniform legal framework exists for online transactions affecting interstate and foreign
commerce beyond relatively simple credit card-based consumer retail purchases. This legal
certainty is a necessary pre-condition for realizing the full scope and potential of ecommerce.
The bill achieves four other notable goals ( 1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

Its broad-pre-emption language creates a uniform national standard for the validity
of online contracts, avoiding the potential of a patch quilt of differing state-based
approaches;
It provides for the validity of transferable records executed using an online
process;
It creates important protections and safeguards for consumers necessary to instill
confidence in the full promise of e-commerce; and
The statute codifies the principle of technical neutrality - Congress and the states
will not legislate or ordain the evolution of new technologies in this space.

Each of these four issues is explored in greater detail below. A section-by-section summary
analysis of the legislation is included to ease familiarity with the statute. This memorandum
closes with a discussion on how different states and their approach to the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (UETA) might be affected by the new Federal law .

• David Colton, IT AA Counsel.

Special thanks to Nishan Kottahachchi, IT AA legal clerk, for his invaluable
assistance in the research and editing of this summary. Mr. Colton can be reached at dcolton@itaa.org.
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I.

Scope And Validity.

A

What is Affected?

The legislation is designed to address any transaction "affecting interstate or foreign
commerce." 1 It is specifically limited to providing that a signature, contract or other record
relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely
because it is in electronic form. 2 This provision, while of vital importance, is nonetheless
limited. The bill specifically does not limit, alter or otherwise affect any underlying
regulation, statute or common law precedent. 3
The statute addresses the basis for the threshold legal validity of online signatures, contracts
or other records relating to a transaction. Other issues such as the specifics for
authentication, matters relating to so-called "identity theft," general online privacy issues,
etc. are outside the ambit of the statute.
It should be noted that the Federal statute leaves untouched the fundamental principle that
substantive contract law remains state-based. Thus, traditional state-based law on contract
formation, breach, cure, as well as other substantive statutory and regulatory laws remain in
place and undisturbed.
B.

Consumer Disclosures.

Consumer protection lies at the heart of the bill. 4 Vendors now may offer electronic means
for those transactions requiring a writing if a consumer, prior to consenting, has been given a
clear and conspicuous statement of his/her rights, if that statement:
L

1L

IlL

informs the consumer of the option to have the information provided in paper
form; and
informs the consumer of the option to withdraw consent to have the
information sent electronically, and what consequences may follow if consent
is withdrawn; and
describes the procedures the consumer must use to withdraw consent; and

1
See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act at Section 101 [hereinafter S. 761]. It states
generally that notwithstanding any existing State statute, regulation, or other rule of law, for those transactions
affecting interstate or foreign commerce, a signature, contract, or other record will not be denied legal validity
because it is in electronic form. This clear legal framework for electronic commerce is a primary achievement
of the statute.

2

/d. at Sec. 10/(a)(l).

3

/d. at Sec. I Of (b)(l) and (2).

4

/d. at Sec. 10/(c)

2

1v.
v.
VL

identifies the types of records that may be provided electronically; and
provides the consumer with the hardware and software requirements for
access to and retention of the electronic records; and
informs the consumer about how a paper copy may be obtained of the
electronic record and whether a fee will be charged for it. 5

The most important aspect of this consent provision is that the consumer must consent
electronically or confirm consent electronically in a manner that reasonably demonstrates
that the ability to access the information in the electronic form that will be used to provide
the information. Statements made by the congressional Floor Managers during the debate on
the bill discussed in part how the provision is intended to allow consumers an ability to
indicate via an email response to a vendor that access is possible by opening an electronic
document. 6
The statute also extends consumers a flexible "opt-out" option. At any time after consenting
to receiving electronic records and documents, a consumer may withdraw such consent and
request the information be provided in an alternative format electronically without penalty.
The bill emphasizes that all existing consumer protections regarding the timing and content
of any notice under any statute, regulation or other rule of law remains unaffected. 7
C. Retention of Contracts and Records.
The statute states that paper records associated with or affected by a transaction in interstate
commerce may be stored electronically, provided that the accuracy of the record is
maintained and that the records are accessible by those who are entitled to access under any
statute, regulation or rule of law. This applies to both requirements for original documents
and checks. 8
II.

Exemptions To Pre-emption

A

Generally.

Section 102 narrows the scope and options available to states when considering this issue.
State options for statutes or regulations to modify, limit, or supersede the provisions of

6

For a variety of reasons, the House and Senate Conferees elected not to have a Report or Report language on
the statute. Accordingly, the exact nature and mechanics of the consent provision likely will be subject to
challenge and/or debate given the contested nature of the negotiations over this language. 1n addition, some
questions remain outstanding regarding the prospective or retrospective applicability of S. 761, as mentioned on
the floor. IT AA will monitor developments as they occur.
7
8

See Sec. 106 (c).
See generally Sec. 101(d) and (e) (detailing accuracy requirements).

3

Section 101 are limited to an enactment or adoption of the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act (UETA) as approved and recommended for passage by the National Conference of
Commissioners on State Laws in July 1999 or the equivalent. 9 10The statute includes the
important provision that states must observe technological neutrality - they may not adopt
provisions favoring a particular technological mode or means.
Moreover, Congress specifically closed potential loopholes in UETA, which could be used to
permit states to add exceptions for applicable transactions. Section 102 expressly closes the
§3(b)(4) UETA loophole 11 by pre-empting any state legislation which is inconsistent with
either title I or II of S 761. In addition, under "Prevention of Circumvention" Congress
stated that a state may not seek to circumvent title I or II by seeking to impose non-electronic
delivery methods under UETA provision §8(b)(2). 12
What this means in practical terms are that options for states to enact legislation that goes
beyond or otherwise is inconsistent with the Federal statute are limited. (Below is a more
complete discussion of state options under the statute).
B.

Specific Exceptions.

The legislation establishes very specific "carve outs" to the pre-emptive scope regarding
those types of contracts or other records that for a variety of reasons are deemed to warrant
continued paper notice. The fundamental principle is that these exceptions are not typically
asso~iated with interstate commerce and are historically subject to state and local rules, laws
and regulations. Thus, Section 101 does not apply to:

9

See http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uecictaluetast84.htmfor a copy of the UETA Model Law and
commentary.
10

S. 761 Sec. I 02)(A) specifies the alternative procedures states may use, but sets limits that (i) such alternative
procedures or requirements are consistent with title I and title II of S. 761; and (ii) such alternative procedures
or requirements do not require, or accord greater legal status or effect to, the implementation or application of a
specific technology or technical specifications.
11

UETA in Section 3(b)(4) states: "This [Act) does not apply to a transaction to the extent it is governed by
other laws, if any, identified by State." A key to the pre-emption issue before Congress was eliminating this
loophole.
12

See S. 761 at Sec. 102(a) and (c). UETA Section 8(b)(2) states "If a law other than this [Act) requires a
record (i) to be posted or displayed in a certain manner, (ii) to be sent, communicated, or transmitted by a
specified method, or (iii) to contain information that is formatted in a certain manner, the following rules apply:
except as otherwise provided in subsection (d)(2),.the record must be sent, communicated, or transmitted by the
method specified in the other law."
It was feared that this language would permit states to enact UET A but subsequently impose requirements for
writings.

4

L

ii

w.
iv.
v.
VL

w.
vw.

ix.

documents pertaining to adoption, divorce, or other matters of family law;
the creation of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
the Uniform Commercial Code, as in effect in any State, other than sections I107 and 1-206 and Articles 2 and 2A;
any court notices, pleadings or other documents from a court proceeding
required to be in writing;
notice of the termination of utility services (including water, heat, and power);
notice of repossession, foreclosure, or eviction of a primary residence of an
individual;
notice of cancellation or termination of health or life insurance or benefits;
notice of a product recall or materia!' failure of a product that poses a danger to
health or safety; nor
documents required to accompany the transportation or handling of toxic or
hazardous materials. 13

The Department of Commerce is tasked with a review of these exceptions within three (3)
years of enactment to determine if the exceptions are still necessary to protect consumers.
Similarly, Federal-regulating authorities may undertake rulemakings to examine this question
and expedite the lifting of these exceptions.
Ill.

Applicability To Federal And State Governments.

Subject to the Government Paperwork Elimination Act (Title XVII of Public Law 105-277),
nothing in Title I of S 761 limits or supercedes any requirement by a Federal or state
regulatory agency that records be filed with it in accordance with their own specified
standards or formats.
Section I 04 (b)( I) preserves the existing rulemaking authority of federal and state regulatory
agencies. Those agencies who are given rulemaking powers urJder another statute, may
interpret Section 101 with respect to that statute by issuing regulations or orders, as long as
they have the authority to do so.
Federal and state regulatory agencies are prevented from adopting the types of regulations or
orders described above in Sec. 104 (b)( 1) unless:
L
IL

w.
iv.
v.
13

the regulation is consistent with Section 101 ;
the regulation does not add to the requirements of Section 101;
there is a substantial justification for the regulation;
the level of requirements imposed on electronic records by the regulation is
equivalent to those set on paper records;
the regulation does not impose unreasonable costs on the use of electronic
records which may hinder its use; or

SeeS. 761 at Sec. 103.

5

Vl.

the regulation does not favor the implementation of a specific technology that
facilitates the use of electronic records or signatures. 14

Federal regulatory agencies may be exempt from the consent provisions in Section lOl(c),
but only under certain stringent standards. The agency must demonstrate that such exemption
is necessary to eliminate a substantial burden to electronic commerce and will not increase
the risk of material harm to consumers.
This language reflects negotiation, particularly the "substantial burden" test. The Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) was also permitted to exempt from the Sec.! 01 (c) consent
provision certain records that pertain to the issuance of securities by investment companies.

IV.

Title II -Transferable Records.

The statute offers provisions on transferable records that are similar but in some ways
perhaps slightly more restrictive than those found in UETA. Section 201 defines a
transferable record as an electronic record that would be a note under Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) if it were in writing, or a record that relates to a loan
secured by real property. Such transferable records may be executed using an electronic
signature.

V.

State Options With The New Legal Framework.

S 761 applies to all transactions that are in or "affect" interstate commerce. This is the limit
of congressional authority. States have essentially three options under S. 761: (a) create their
own legislation for "intrastate" e-commerce; (b) enact UET A; or (c) do nothing and accept
the pre-emption of S. 761. For a variety of reasons, there is. benefit to having states enact
UETA, as described below.

A

Can There Be Purely "Intrastate" Electronic Commerce?

States may pass their own legislation, beyond S. 761 or UETA, claiming the legislation
applies to purely "intrastate" e-commerce activities. From a structural legal perspective, any
state may choose to enact legislation that would affect purely intrastate matters.
How this would work as a practical matter is unclear. States must first answer the question
"What constitutes a purely 'intrastate' matter that does not affect interstate commerce while
using the Internet?"
Courts have traditionally granted broad latitude under the commerce clause of the U.S.
14

/d. at Sec. 104.

6

Constitution15 for federal authority over many seemingly "local" or intrastate transactions 16 ,
purchases, products, etc. 17 Accordingly, analysis is required beyond an initial functional
assessment of the physical situs of the parties, corporate locales, related server(s), etc.
A key and as yet unresolved issue is whether use of the Internet itself potentially raises the
bar on an argument that an electronic/Internet-based transaction could by definition be purely
intrastate. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), for example, in a variety of
dockets and rulemakings, either implicitly or explicitly, has ruled that ISPs and the Internet
itself are subject to Federal jurisdiction under the Communications Acts of 1934 and 1996
(although the FCC itself has chosen to forebear exercising some of that jurisdictional
authority).
State-based, sui generis digital signature legislation, purporting to govern only intrastate
matters, would be problematic and subject to challenge and litigation. Moreover, states
considering this path would defeat the purpose and achievement of S. 761 -the creation of a
unified, broad, Federal legal framework. No one ultimately would benefit from the resulting
potential for confusion, uncertainty and delay.

B.

States and UETA.

Congress specifically endorsed state consideration and enactment of VETA in S. 761.
Enacting UET A for all state-based transactions, intra and interstate, would be a useful step
for a variety of reasons.
First, enacting UETA consistent with S. 761 removes the potential for uncertainty and
possible litigation regarding the scope of the "affecting interstate commerce" provision in an
Internet environment. The legal framework intended by Congress remains unified.
Second, enacting UETA clarifies and gives certainty to a state-based legal protection and/or
cause of action. Third, there are some elements of UETA that are actually more flexible than
15

The Constitution delegates to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U. S. Const, Art. I, §8, cl. 3
16

See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 ( 1941 ), where the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act,
stating:
"The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce
among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the
exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation ofthem appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise ofthe granted power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce." !d., at 118.
17

While the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 513 U.S. 549 ( 1995) for the first time in 60 years limited
the scope of the commerce clause, it did so in the context of Federal legislation seeking to impose bans guns
within school zones. The Lopez Court ruled that such a ban was too tenuous to interstate commerce.

7

S. 761. For all of the above reasons, industry, consumers and governments alike would
benefit from the resulting clarity and certainty.
C.

Existing State Statutes.

Some states have either passed a version of UETA or are considering doing so. 18 S. 761
requires that any state enactment of UETA that would affect interstate commerce conform to
the draft model law as described in the federal statute. Any portions, exceptions and or
modifications to UETA in an underlying state law that are inconsistent with title I or II of the
Federal statute are pre-empted. Our analysis at present is that this pre-emption would not
void the portions of the underlying statute or regulation that are in compliance with S. 761.
We will continue to study this matter and ongoing legal developments in the states.
VI.

Conclusion.

The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ushers in a new era in ecommerce. The Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) will work with all
its members and other interested parties to help realize the full potential of this landmark
legislation. IT AA will also monitor developments and the debate surrounding the new law's
implementation.
For further information, please contact David Colton at 703/284-5337 (dcolton@itaa.org) or
visit the IT AA web site at http://www.itaa.org

18

For example, California enacted its version ofUETA, Senate Bill No. 820, on September 16, 1999, with an
effective date of January I, 2000.
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S.761
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (Enrolled Bill (Sent to President))
--S. 761-S.761

One Hundred Sixth Congress
of the
United States ofAmerica
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday,
the twenty-fourth day of January, two thousand

An Act
To facilitate the use of electronic records and signatures in interstate or foreign commerce.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States ofAmerica in
Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE . .
This Act may be cited as the 'Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act'.

TITLE I--ELECTRONIC RECORDS AND SIGNATURES IN COMMERCE

SEC. 101. GENERAL·RULE OF VALIDITY.
(a) TN GENERAL- Notwithstanding any statute. regulation. or other rule of law (other than this title
and title ll), with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce-( 1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal
effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; and

I of&
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(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was used in its
formation.
(b) PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS- This title does not-( 1) limit, alter, or otherwise affect any requirement imposed by a statute, regulation, or rule of
law relating to the rights and obligations of persons under such statute, regulation, or rule of
law other than a requirement that contracts or other records be written, signed, or in
nonelectronic form; or
(2) require any person to agree to use or accept electronic records or electronic signatures,
other than a governmental agency with respect to a record other than a contract to which it is a
party.
(c) CONSUMER DISCLOSURES(1) CONSENT TO ELECTRONIC RECORDS- Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a statute,
regulation, or other rule of law requires that information relating to a transaction or
transactions in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce be provided or made available to a
consumer in writing, the use of an electronic record to provide or make available (whichever is
required) such information satisfies the requirement that such information be in writing if--

(A) the consumer has affirmatively consented to such use and has not withdrawn such
consent;
(B) the consumer, prior to consenting, is provided with a clear and conspicuous
statement-(i) informing the consumer of(I) any right or option ofthe consumer to have the
record provided or made available on paper or in nonelectronic form, and (II) the
right of the consumer to withdraw the consent to have the record provided or
made available in an electronic form and of any conditions, consequences (which
may include termination of the parties' relationship), or fees in the event of such
withdrawal;
(ii) informing the consumer of whether the consent applies (I) only to the
particular transaction which gave rise to the obligation to provide the record, or
(II) to identified categories of records that may be provided or made available
during the course ofthe parties' relationship;
(iii) describing the procedures the consumer must use to withdraw consent as
provided in clause (i) and to update information needed to contact the consumer
electronically; and
(iv) informing the consumer (I) how, after the consent, the consumer may, upon
request, obtain a paper copy of an electronic record, and (II) whether any fee will
·
be charged for such copy;
(C) the consum~r--

2 of8

07/19/2000 2:02 Pf\1

hnp :11thomas.loc.govlcgi-bin/query/D'>c I06 :5 · /templ-e I06V I Qn~ t·cl

(i) prior to consenting, is provided with a statement of the hardware and software
requirements for access to and retention of the electronic records; and
(ii) consents electronically, or confirms his or her consent electronically, in a
manner that reasonably demonstrates that the consumer can access information in
the electronic form that will be used to provide the information that is the subject
of the consent; and

(D) after the consent of a consumer in accordance with subparagraph (A), if a change in
the hardware or software requirements needed to access or retain electronic records
creates a material risk that the consumer will not be able to access or retain a subsequent
electronic record that was the subject of the consent, the person providing the electronic
record-(i) provides the consumer with a statement of (I) the revised hardware and
software requirements for access to and retention of the electronic records, and (II)
the right to withdraw consent without the imposition of any fees for such
withdrawal and without the imposition of any condition or consequence that was
not disclosed under subparagraph (B)(i); and
(ii) again complies with subparagraph (C).

(2) OTHER RIGHTS(A) PRESERVATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTIONS- Nothing in this title affects
the content or timing of any disclosure or other record required to be provided or made
available to any consumer under any statute, regulation, or other rule of law.
(B) VERIFICATION OR ACKNOWLEDGMENT- If a law that was enacted prior to this
Act expressly requires a record to be provided or made available by a specified method
that requires verification or acknowledgment of receipt, the record may be provided or
made available electronically only if the method used provides verification or
acknowledgment of receipt (whichever is required).
(3) EFFECT OF FAILURE TO OBTAIN ELECTRONIC CONSENT OR CONFIRMATION
OF CONSENT- The legal effectiveness, validity, or enforceability of any contract executed by
a consumer shall not be denied solely because of the failure to obtain electronic consent or
confirmation of consent by that consumer in accordance with paragraph (l)(C)(ii).
(4) PROSPECTIVE EFFECT- Withdrawal of consent by a consumer shall not affect the legal
effectiveness, validity, or enforceability of electronic records provided or made available to
that consumer in accordance with paragraph (1) prior to implementation of the consumer's
withdrawal of consent. A consumer's withdrawal of consent shall be effective within a
reasonable periqd of time after receipt of the withdrawal by the provider of the record. Failure
to comply with paragraph (l)(D) may, at the election of the consumer, be treated as a
withdrawal of consent for purposes of this paragraph.
(5) PRIOR CONSENT- This subsection does not apply to any records that are provided or
made available to a consumer who has consented prior to the effective date of this title to
receive such records il} electronic form as permitted by any statute, regulation, or other rule of
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law.
(6) ORAL COMMUNICATIONS- An oral communication or a recording of an oral
communication shall not qualify as an electronic record for purposes of this subsection except
as otherwise provided under applicable law.
(d) RETENTION OF CONTRACTS AND RECORDS( 1) ACCURACY AND ACCESSIBILITY- If a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires
that a contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce be retained, that requirement is met by retaining an electronic record of the
information in the contract or other record that-(A) accurately reflects the information set forth in the contract or other record; and
(B) remains accessible to all persons who are entitled to access by statute, regulation, or
rule of law, for the period required by such statute, regulation, or rule of law, in a form
that is capable of being accurately reproduced for later reference, whether by
transmission, printing, or otherwise.

(2) EXCEPTION- A requirement to retain a contract or other record in accordance with
paragraph (1) does not apply to any information whose sole purpose is to enable the contract or
other record to be sent, communicated, or received.
(3) ORIGINALS- If a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires a contract or other record
relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce to be provided,
available, or retained in its original form, or provides consequences if the contract or other
record is not provided, available, or retained in its original form, that statute, regulation, or rule
of law is satisfied by an electronic record that complies with paragraph ( 1).
(4) CHECKS- If a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires the retention of a check, that
requirement is satisfied by retention of an electronic record of the information on the front and
back ofthe check in accordance with paragraph (1).
(e) ACCURACY AND ABILITY TO RETAIN CONTRACTS AND OTHER RECORDSNotwithstanding subsection (a), if a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires that a contract or
other record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce be in writing, the
legal effect, validity, or enforceability of an electronic record of such contract or other record may be
denied if such electronic record is not in a form that is capable of being retained and accurately
reproduced for later reference by all parties or persons who are entitled to retain the contract or other
record.
(f) PROXIMITY- Nothing in this title affects the proximity required by any statute, regulation, or
other rule of law with respect to any warning, notice, disclosure, or other record required to be
posted, displayed, or publicly affixed.

(g) NOTARIZATION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT- If a statute, regulation, or other rule of law
requires a signature or record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
to be notarized, acknowledged, verified, or made under oath, that requirement is satisfied if the
electronic signature of the person authorized to perform those acts, together with all other
information required to be i~cluded by other applicable statute, regulation, or rule of law, is attached
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to or logically associated with the signature or record.
(h) ELECTRONIC AGENTS- A contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely
because its formation, creation, or delivery involved the action of one or more electronic agents so
long as the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound.
(i) INSURANCE- It is the specific intent of the Congress that this title and title II apply to the
business of insurance.
(j) INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS- An insurance agent or broker acting under the
direction of a party that enters into a contract by means of an electronic record or electronic signature
may not be held liable for any deficiency in the electronic procedures agreed to by the parties under
that contract if-(1) the agent or broker has not engaged in negligent, reckless, or intentional tortious conduct;
(2) the agent or broker was not involved in the development or establishment of such
electronic procedures; and
(3) the agent or broker did not deviate from such procedures.

SEC.102. EXEMPTION TO PREEMPTION.
(a) IN GENERAL- A State statute, regulation, or other rule oflaw may modify, limit, or supersede
the provisions of section 101 with respect to State law only if such statute, regulation, or rule of law-(1) constitutes an enactment or adoption of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act as
approved and recommended for enactment in all the States by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999, except that any exception to the scope of such
Act enacted by a State under section 3 (b)( 4) of such Act shall be preempted to the extent such
exception is inconsistent with this title or title II, or would not be permitted under paragraph
(2)(A)(ii) ofthis subsection; or
(2)(A) specifies the alternative procedures or requirements for the use or acceptance (or both)
of electronic records or electronic signatures to establish the legal effect, validity, or
enforceability of contracts or other records, if-(i) such alternative procedures or requirements are consistent with this title and title II;
and
(ii) such alternative procedures or requirements do not require, or accord greater legal
status or effect to, the implementation or application of a specific technology or
technical specification for performing the functions of creating, storing, generating,
receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic records or electronic signatures;
and
(B) if enacted or adopted after the date ofthe enactment of this Act, makes specific reference
to this Act.
(b) EXCEPTIONS FOR ACTIONS BY STATES AS MARKET PARTICIPANTS- Subsection
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(a)(2)(A)(ii) shall not apply to the statutes, regulations, or other rules of law governing procurement
by any State, or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
(c) PREVENTION OF CIRCUMVENTION- Subsection (a) does not permit a State to circumvent
this title or title II through the imposition of nonelectronic delivery methods under section 8(b)(2) of
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.

SEC. 103. SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS.
(a) EXCEPTED REQUIREMENTS- The provisions of section I 01 shall not apply to a contract or
other record to the extent it is governed by-( 1) a statute, regulation, or other rule of law governing the creation and execution of wills,
codicils, or testamentary trusts;
(2) a State statute, regulation, or other rule oflaw governing adoption, divorce, or other matters
of family law; or
(3) the Uniform Commercial Code, as in effect in any State, other than sections 1-107 and
1-206 and Articles 2 and 2A.
(b) ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS- The provisions of section 101 shall not apply to-(1) court orders or notices, or official court documents (including briefs, pleadings, and other
writings) required to be executed in connection with court proceedings;
(2) any notice of-(A) the cancellation or termination of utility services (including water, heat, and power);
(B) default, acceleration, repossession, foreclosure, or eviction, or th~ right to cure,
under a credit agreement secured by, or a rental agreement for, a primary residence of an
individual;
(C) the cancellation or termination of health insurance or benefits or life insurance
benefits (excluding annuities);.or
(D) recall of a product, or material failure of a product, that risks endangering health or
safety; or
(3) any document required to accompany any transportation or handling of hazardous
materials, pesticides, or other toxic or dangerous materials.
(c) REVIEW OF EXCEPTIONS( 1) EVALUATION REQUIRED- The Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant
Secretary for Communications and Information, shall review the operation of the exceptions in
subsections (a) and (b) to evaluate, over a period of3 years, whether such exceptions continue
to be necessary for the protection of consumers. Within 3 years after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Assistant Secretary shall submit a report to the Congress on the results of such
evaluation.
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(2) DETERMINATIONS- If a Federal regulatory agency, with respect to matter within its
jurisdiction, determines after notice and an opportunity for public comment, and publishes a
finding, that one or more such exceptions are no longer necessary for the protection of
consumers and eliminating such exceptions will not increase the material risk of harm to
consumers, such agency may extend the application of section 10 l to the exceptions identified
in such finding.

SEC.l04. APPLICABILITY TO FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS.
(a) FILING AND ACCESS REQUIREMENTS- Subject to subsection (c)(2), nothing in this title
limits or supersedes any requirement by a Federal regulatory agency, self-regulatory organization, or
State regulatory agency that records be filed with such agency or organization in accordance with
specified standards or formats.
(b) PRESERVATION OF EXISTING RULEMAKING AUTHORITY(1) USE OF AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET- Subject to paragraph (2} and subsection (c), a
Federal regulatory agency or State regulatory agency that is responsible for rulemaking under
any other statute may interpret section 101 with respect to such statute through-(A) the issuance of regulations pursuant to a statute; or
(B) to the extent such agency is authorized by statute to issue orders or guidance, the
issuance of orders or guidance of general applicability that are publicly available and
published (in the Federal Register in the case of an order or guidance issued by a Federal
regulatory agency).
This paragraph does not grant any Federal regulatory agency or State regulatory agency
authority to issue regulations, orders, or guidance pursuant to any statute that does not
authorize such issuance.
(2) LIMITATIONS ON INTERPRETATION AUTHORITY- Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a
Federal regulatory agency shall not adopt any regulation, order, or guidance described in
paragraph ( 1}, and a State regulatory agency is preempted by section 101 from adopting any
regulation, order, or guidance described in paragraph (1), unless-(A) such regulation, order, or guidance is consistent with section 101;
(B) such regulation, order, or guidance does not add to the requirements of such section;
and
(C) such agency finds, in connection with the issuance of such regulation, order, or
guidance, that-(i) there is a substantial justification for the regulation, order, or guidance;
(ii) the methods selected to carry out that purpose--

(I) are substantially equivalent to the requirements imposed on records that
are JlOt electronic records; and
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(II) will not impose unreasonable costs on the acceptance and use of
electronic records; and
(iii) the methods selected to carry out that purpose do not require, or accord
greater legal status or effect to, the implementation or application of a specific
technology or technical specification for performing the functions of creating,
storing, generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic records
or electronic signatures.
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PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, October 14, 1999

Contact:

Alfie Charles (Jones)
916/653-6575
JeffWender (VeriSign)
Jennifer Haas
650/968-4033

Secretary of State Jones Brings Widespread Expansion
of E-Government One Step Closer to Reality
Jones Approves VeriSign, Inc. as First Certification Authority Permitted to Verify the Integrity of
Digital Signatures Used in Electronic Communication with State and Local Government
MOUNTAIN VIEW -- With the push of a few keystrokes, California Secretary of State Bill Jones
digitally signed a proclamation recognizing VeriSign, Inc. of Mountain View as the first company
authorized to provide digital signature certification services to state and local government across California.
The accreditation of California's first "Approved Certification Authority" will dramatically broaden the
number of government functions that can be conducted over the Internet.
"This is an important step in the march toward electronic government in California," said Jones. "The
availability of reliable digital signatures will go a long way toward improving the number of government
transactions that can be conducted over the Internet.
"Many government agencies have been hesitant to provide complex services over the Internet until
they have reliable digital signatures that they know will have the full force and effect of law. Today, we
have provided those agencies with an additional level of security," said Jones.
Jones presented the digitally signed certificate to VeriSign CEO Stratton Sclavos during a ceremony
at VeriSign's Mountain View, California headquarters.
"VeriSign is honored to be the first Certification Authority recognized by the State of California,"
said Sclavos. "We are committed to providing state and local government with the services they need to
advance E-Government here in our home state."
Under the Digital Signature Act of 1995, digital signatures used in written communication with
California state and local government are only valid if they meet criteria outlined in Government Code
Section 16.5 and regulations adopted by Secretary Jones in 1998. Under those regulations, public entities
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must only rely on digital signature certificates issued by an "Approved Certification Authority". VeriSign,
Inc. is the first company approved to issue certificates for public entities in California.
--End--
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PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, May 28, 1998

Contact:

Alfie Charles
916-653-6575

Secretary of State Jones Proposes Regulations To Allow
Digital Signatures to Be Used By Public Entities in California
Jones Calls it "A Landmark Day in the Evolution of Electronic Commerce";
Digital Signatures Will Allow Paperless Communication to Be Legally Binding
SACRAMENTO-- Unveiling what he said could be a "model for all other states to follow,"
Secretary of State Bill Jones today released his office's proposed regulations to allow for the use of"Digital
Signatures" by public entities in California.
"Implementation of these regulations will eventually allow us to create a 'paperless' government,"
Jones said of his proposal. "When adopted, these regulations will fulfill the vision of California's Digital
Signature Law carried by Assemblywoman Debra Bowen in 1995."
Currently, electronic communication is restrained by the inability to transmit legally binding
signatures on electronically transmitted documents. Once these regulations are adopted, that limitation on
electronic communication will no longer exist for public entities in California.
Digital signatures use encryption technology to enable a computer user to transmit secure
communications over the Internet or through any other open or closed network with a signature that has the
same legal force and effect as a traditional handwritten signature on paper. If an electronic document is
altered in any way - the signature becomes invalid.
"The proposed California regulations are different than most existing government proposals because
they recognize the need for the infant digital signature industry to get off the ground before government
imposes market- and creativity-stifling requirements on prospective service providers," continued Jones.
"Once these regulations are adopted, public entities in California will be able to conduct
legally-binding transactions with digital signatures immediately," noted Jones.
Initially, the regulations approve two different technologies, "Public Key Cryptography" and
"Signature Dynamics." Although Public Key Cryptography is the predominant technology under review by
other states and the federal government, California has also opened the door to the future use of
biometric-based forms ofsignatur6s by including regulations for "Signature Dynamics."
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Kaye Caldwell, President of Silicon Valley's Software Industry Coalition said, "The proposed
regulations are designed to be flexible enough to adapt to emerging technologies that will undoubtedly
surface in this rapidly developing field."
The regulations received private-sector praise from many experts in electronic commerce and Internet
security. Peter F. Harter, Global Public Policy Council for Netscape Communications, said "Secretary of
State Jones' office has prepared a blue-print for all other states to follow. His approach will maximize the
ability of the private sector to rapidly bring new technologies to market."
The regulations were prepared by the secretary of state's office as the result of Assembly Bill 1577
carried by Assemblywoman Debra Bowen in 1995. The Secretary of State's Office received assistance from
numerous other government agencies and private sector experts from across the country in developing these
proposed regulations.
Secretary Jones thanked and commended the participants in a public-private task force he convened
to help accomplish the drafting ofthese regulations. The task force was chaired by Alfred Charles from the
Secretary of State's office and included representatives from the American Electronics Association,
Software Industry Coalition, Wells Fargo Bank, Netscape Communications, Intuit, Verisign, Certco, the
California Department of Information Technology, the Department of General Services and others. The
project was facilitated by Deloitte & Touche, LLP.
The proposed regulations and answers to frequently asked questions are available on the Secretary of
State's web site at http://www.ss.ca.gov . A public hearing on the regulations will be held July 15, 1997, at
the Secretary of State's office in Sacramento.
--End--
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PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Thursday, November 18, 1999

Contact:

Alfie Charles (Jones)
Shad Balch
916/653-6575

Jones Approves Second Company to Provide Digital Signature
Services to State and Local Government in California
"Digital Signature Trust" Approved to Serve as a Certification Authority for
Digital Signature Transactions in California
SACRAMENTO -- In a move that will help California state and local government regain their
leadership role in the use oftechnology to improve government efficiency, Secretary of State Bill Jones
today announced that Digital Signature Trust (DST) has been added to the Approved List of Digital
Signature Certification Authorities in California.
"Digital signature technology will help many state and local government agencies transition toward a
paperless government in California," said Secretary of State Bill Jones.
"When we passed California's digital signature regulations we knew that government, technology
companies and the citizens of the state would all have to work together to make eGovernment solutions a
reality," noted Jones. "Today, we are one step closer to a more efficient California government."
DST, based out of Salt Lake City, Utah, is the second company to apply and receive approval from
the Secretary of State to provide digital signature Certification Authority services to California state and
local government. DST became the first licensed Certification Authority in the U.S. when it gained its
license in the state of Utah in 1997.
Under the Digital Signature Act of 1995, digital signatures used in electronically written
communication with public entities are only valid if they meet criteria outlined in Government Code
Section 16.5 and regulations adopted by Secretary Jones in 1998. Under those regulations, public entities
must only rely on digital signature certificates issued by an "Approved Certification Authority."
Prior to placement on the Approved List, certification authorities must undergo a performance audit
to ensure that their policies and practices are consistent with the requirements of the Digital Signature Act
and the regulations adopted by the Secretary of State. The complete criteria for certification is available on
the Secretary of State's Internet site at: ww\v.ss .ca.!lov.

I of2

07/21/2000 2:19 Pl\1

http://www.ss.ca.gov/digsig'presslll8.htnl

California Secretary of State. Digital Signatures- Press Release

-30-

2 of2

U7/2J,20UU 2: ! ~I'~

I Digital Signature Use in California
Appendix 12

\ Assembly Committee on Information Technology

Assembly Bill No. 1577
CHAPTERS94
An act to add Section 16.5 to the Government Code, relating to
digital signatures.
(Approved by Governor October 4, 1995. Filed
with Secretary of State October 4. 1995.)
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 1577, Bowen. Digital signatures.
Existing statutes do not generally govern the authenticity and
verification of electronic or similar data intended to act as a signature,
except in the case of electronic fund transfers in nonconsumer
situations in which case existing law provides . for security procedures
related to verification of authenticity of orders.
This bill would provide that,. in any written communication with
a publil· entity. a signature may be affixed using a digital signature
and that in those communications, the use of a digital signature would
have the same force and effect as the use of a manual signature if it
complies with the bill's requirements, including a requirement that
it conform to regulations to be adopted by the Secretary of State. The
bill would exempt certain reports relating to environmental
protection. The bill would define a digital signature.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 16.5 is added to the Government Code, to
read:
16.5. (a) In any written communication with a public entity, as
defined in Section 811.2, in which a signature is required or used, any
party to the communication may affix a signature by use of a digital
signature that complies with the requirements of this section. The use
of a digital signature shall have the same force and effect as the use
of a manual signature if and only if it embodies all of the following
attributes:
(1) It is unique to the person using it.
(2) It is capable of verification.
(3) It is under the sole control of the person using it.
(4) It is linked to data in such a manner that if the data are
changed, the digital signature is invalidated.
(5) It conforms to · regulations adopted by the Secretary of State.
lniual n:gulatiun:. :.hall be adopted no later than January I, 1997. In
developing these regulations, the secretary shall seek the advice of
public and private entities, including, but not limited to, the

91

1-

Ch. 594

-2-

Department
of
Information
Technology,
the
California
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of General
Services. Before the secretary adopts the regulations, he or she shall
hold at least one public hearing to receive comments.
(b) The use or acceptance of a digital signature shall be at the
option of the parties. Nothing in this section shall require a public
entity to use or permit the use of a digital signature.
(c) Digital signatures employed pursuant to Section 71066 of the
Public Resources Code are exempted from this section.
(d) "Digital signature" means an electronic identifier, created by
computer, intended by the party using it to have the same force and
effect as the use of a manual signature.
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16.5.
(a) In any written communication with a public entity, as
defined in Section 811.2, in which a signature is required or used,
any party to the communication may affix a signature by use of a
digital signature that complies with the requirements of this
section.
The use of a digital signature shall have the same force
and effect as the use of a manual signature if and only if it
embodies all of the following attributes:
(1) It is unique to the person using it.
(2) It is capable of verification.
(3) It is under the sole control of the person using it.
(4) It is linked to data in such a manner that if the data are
changed, the dig1tal signature is invalidated.
(5) It ~onforms to regulations adopted by the Secretary of State.
Initial regulations shall be adopted no later than January 1, 1997.
In developing these regulations, the secretary shall seek the advice
of public and private entities, including, but not limited to, the
Department of Information Technology, the California Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Department of General Services.
Before
the secretary adopts the regulations, he or she shall hold at least
one public hearing to receive comments.
(b) The use or acceptance of a digital signature shall be at the
option of the parties.
Nothing in this section shall require a
public entity to use or permit the use of a digital signature.
(c) Digital signatures employed pursuant to Section 71066 of the
Public Resources Code are exempted from this section.
(d) "Digital signature'' means an electronic identifier, created by
computer, intended by the party using it to have the same force and
effect as the use of a manual signature.
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California Digital Signature Regulations
Final Text Approved By Office of Administrative Law on June 12, 1998
California Code of Regulations
Title 2. Administration
DIVISION 7. SECRETARY OF STATE
Table of Contents
CHAPTER 10. DIGITAL SIGNATURES

22000 Definitions
22110 I Digital Signatures Must Be Created By An Acceptable Technology
22002 Criteria For Determining If A Digital Signature Technology Is Acceptable
22003 List of Acceptable Technologies
22004 Provisions For Adding New Technologies to the List of Acceptable Technologies
22UU5

22000.

Issues to Be Addressed By Public Entities When Using Digital Signatures

Definitions
a. For purposes of this chapter, and unless the context expressly indicates otherwise:
1. "Digitally-signed communication" is a message that has been processed by a
computer in such a manner that ties the message to the individual that
signed the message.
2. "Message" means a digital representation of information intended to serve
as a written communication with a public entity.
3. "Person" means a human being or any organization capable of signing a
document, either legally or as a matter of fact.
4. "Public entity" means the public entity as defined by California Government
Code Section 811.2.
5. "Signer" means the person who signs a digitally signed communication with
the use of an acceptable technology to uniquely link the message with the
person sending it.
6. "Technology" means the computer hardware and/or software-based method
or process used to create digital signatures.

Note : Authority:

Government Code Section 16.5

Reference: Government Code Section 16.5
22001.

Digital Signatures Must Be Created By An Acceptable Technology
a. For a digital signature to be valid for use by a public entity, it must be created by a
technology that is accepted for use by the. State of California.

Note: Authority:

Government Code Section 16.5

Reference: Government Code Section 16.5
22002.
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for Use By Public Entities
a. An acceptable technology must be capable of creating signatures that conform to
requirements set forth in California Government Code Section 16.5, specifically,
1. It is unique to the person using it;
2. It is capable ofverification;
3. It is under the sole control of the person using it;
4. It is linked to data in such a manner that if the data are changed, the digital
signature is invalidated;
5. It conforms to Title 2. Division 7. Chapter 10 ofthe California Code of
Regulations.

Note:

Authority:

Government Code Section 16.5

Reference: Government Code Section 16.5
22003.

2 of6

List of Acceptable Technologies
a. The technology known as Public Key Cryptography is an acceptable technology
for use by public entities in California, provided that the digital signature is
created consistent with the provisions in Section 22003(a) 1-5.
1. Definitions-- For purposes of Section 22003(a), and unless the context
expressly indicates otherwise:
A. "Acceptable Certification Authorities" means a certification authority
that meets the requirements of either Section 22003(a)6(C) or Section
22003(a)6(D).
B. "Approved List of Certification Authorities" means the list of
Certification Authorities approved by the Secretary of State to issue
certificates for digital signature transactions involving public entities
in California.
C. "Asymmetric cryptosystem" means a computer algorithm or series of
algorithms which utilize two different keys with the following
characteristics:
1. one key signs a given message;
11. one key verifies a given message; and,
m. the keys have the property that, knowing one key, it is
computationally infeasible to discover the other key.
D. "Certificate" means a computer-based record which:
1. identifies the certification authority issuing it;
11. names or identifies its subscriber;
111. contains the subscriber's public key; and
iv. is digitally signed by the certification authority issuing or
amending it, and
v. conforms to widely-used industry standards, including, but not
limited to ISO x.509 and PGP certificate standards.
E. "Certification Authority" means a person or entity that issues a
certificate, or in the case of certain certification processes, certifies
amendments to an existing certificate.
F. "Key pair" means a private key and its corresponding public key in an
asymmetric cryptosystem. The keys have the property that the public
key can verify a digital signature that the private key creates.
G. "Practice statement" means documentation ofthe practices,
procedures and controls employed by a Certification Authority.
H. "Private key" means the key of a key pair used to create a digital
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signature.
l. "Proof of identification" means the document or documents presented
to a Certification Authority to establish the identity of a subscriber.
J. "Public key" means the key of a key pair used to verify a digital
signature.
K. "Subscriber" means a person who:
i. is the subject listed in a certificate;
ii. accepts the certificate; and
iii. holds a private key which corresponds to a public key listed in
that certificate.
·
California Government Code § 16.5 requires that a digital signature be
'unique to the person using it'. A public key-based digital signature may be
considered unique to the person using it, if:
A. the private key used to create the signature on the document is known
only to the signer, and
B. the digital signature is created when a person runs a message through
a one-way function, creating a message digest, then encrypting the
resulting message digest using-an asymmetrical cryptosystem and the
signer's private key, and,
C. although not all digitally signed communications will require the
signer to obtain a certificate, the signer is capable of being issued a
certificate to certify that he or she controls the key pair used to create
the signature, and
D. it is computationally infeasible to derive the private key from
knowledge of the public key.
California Government Code § 16.5 requires that a digital signature be
'capable ofverification'. A public-key based digital signature is capable of
verification if:
A. the acceptor of the digitally signed document can verify the document
was digitally signed by using the signer's public key to decrypt the
message; and
B. if a certificate is a required component of a transaction with a public
agency, the issuing Certification Authority, either through a
certification practice statement or through the content of the
certificate itself, must identify which, if any, form( s) of identification
it required of the signer prior to issuing the certificate.
California Government Code § 16.5 requires that the digital signature remain
'under the sole control of the person using it'. Whether a signature is
accompanied by a certificate or not, the person who holds the key pair, or
the subscriber identified in the certificate, assumes a duty to exercise
reasonable care to retain control of the private key and prevent its disclosure
to any person not authorized to create the subscriber's digital signature
pursuant to Evidence Code Section 669.
The digital signature must be linked to the message ofthe document in such
a way that if the data are changed, the digital signature is invalidated.
Acceptable Certification Authorities
·
A. The California Secretary of State shall maintain an "Approved List of
Certificate Authorities" authorized to issue certificates for digitally
signed communication with public entities in California.
B. Public entities shall only accept certificates from Certification
AutJlorities that appear on the "Approved List of Certification
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Authorities" authorized to issue certificates by the California
Secretary of State.
C. The Secretary of State shall place Certification Authorities on the
"Approved List of Certification Authorities" after the Certification
Authority provides the Secretary of State with a copy of an
unqualified performance audit performed in accordance with
standards set in the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Statement on Auditing Standards No. 70
(S.A.S. 70) "Reports on the Processing of Service Transactions by
Service Organizations" (1992) to ensure that the Certification
Authorities' practices and policies are consistent with the
Certifications Authority's stated control objectives. The AICPA
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 70 ( 1992) is hereby
incorporated by reference.
i. Certification Authorities that have been in operation for one
·year or less shall undergo a SAS 70 Type One audit - A Report
of Policies and Procedures Placed in Operation, receiving an
unqualified opinion.
n. Certification Authorities that have been in operation for longer
than one year shall undergo a SAS 70 Type Two audit - A
Report Of Policies And Procedures Placed In Operation And
Test Of Operating Effectiveness, receiving an unqualified
opinion.
iii. To remain on the "Approved List of Certification Authorities" a
Certification Authority must provide proof of compliance with
Section 22003(a)(6)(C)(ii) to the Secretary of State every two
years after initially being placed on the list.
D. In lieu of completing the auditing requirement in Section
22003(a)(6)(C), Certification Authorities may be placed on the
"Approved List of Certification Authorities" upon providing the
Secretary of State with proof of accreditation that has been conferred
by a national or international accreditation body, that the Secretary of
State has determined utilizes accreditation criteria that are consistent
with the requirements of Section 22003(a)(l)-(5).
i. Certification Authorities shall be removed from the "Approved
List of Acceptable Certifications Authorities" unless they
provide current proof of accreditation to the Secretary of State
at least once per year.
ii. If the Secretary of State is informed that a Certification
Authority has had its accreditation revoked, the Certification
Authority shall be removed from the "Approved List of
Certification Authorities" immediately.
b. The technology known as "Signature Dynamics" is an acceptable technology for
use by public entities in California, provided that the signature is created
consistent with the provisions in Section 22003(b)(l)-(5).
1. Definitions- For the purposes ofS.e ction 22003(b), and unless the context
expressly indicates otherwise:
A. "Handwriting Measurements" means the metrics of the shapes, speeds
and/or other distinguishing features of a signature as the person writes
it by hand with a pen or stylus on a flat surface.
B. "Signature Digest" is the resulting bit-string produced when a
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signature is tied to a document using Signature Dynamics.
C. "Expert" means a person with demonstrable skill and knowledge
based on training and experience who would qualify as an expert
pursuant to California Evidence Code §720.
D. "Signature Dynamics" means measuring the way a person writes his
or her signature by hand on a flat surface and binding the
measurements to a message through the use of cryptographic
techniques.
California Government Code § 16.5 requires that a digital signatures be
'unique to the person using it.' A signature digest produced by Signature
Dynamics technology may be considered unique to the person using it, if:
A. the signature digest records the handwriting measurements ofthe
person signing the document using signature dynamics technology,
and
B. the signature digest is cryptographically bound to the handwriting
measurements, and
C. after the signature digest. has been bound to the handwriting
measurements, it is computationally infeasible to separate the
handwriting measurements and bind them to a diffeJ;ent signature
digest.
California Government Code § 16.5 requires that a digital signature be
capable of verification. A signature digest produced by signature dynamics
technology is capable of verification if:
A. the acceptor of the digitally signed message obtains the handwriting
measurements for purposes of comparison, and
B. if signature verification is a required component of a transaction with
a public entity, the handwriting measurements can allow an expert
handwriting and document examiner to assess the authenticity of a
signature.
California Government Code §16.5 requires that a digital signature remain
'under the sole control of the person using it'. A signature digest is under the
sole control ofthe person using it if:
·
A. the signature digest captures the handwriting measurements and
cryptographically binds them to the message directed by the signer
and to no other message, and
B. the signature digest makes it computationally infeasible for the
handwriting measurements to be bound to any other message.
The signature digest produced by signature dynamics technology must be
linked to the message in such a way that if the data in the message are
changed, the signature digest is invalidated.

Note: Authority:

Government Code Section 16.5

Reference: Government Code Section 16.5
22004.

Provisions for Adding New Technologies to the List of Acceptable Technologies.
a. Any individual or company can, by providing a written request that includes a full
explanation of a proposed technology which meets the requirements of Section
22002, petition the California Secretary of State to review the technology. If the
Secretary of State determines that the technology is acceptable for use with the
state, the Secretary of State shall adopt regulation(s), pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, which would add the proposed technology to the
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list of acceptable technologies in Section 22003.
b. The Secretary of State has 180 calendar days from the date the request is received
to review the petition and inform the petitioner, in writing, whether the technology
is accepted or rejected. If the petition is rejected, the Secretary of State shall
provide the petitioner with the reasons for the rejection.
1. If the proposed technology is rejected, the petitioner can appeal the decision
through the Administrative Procedures Act (Government Code Section
11500 et seq).

Note : Authority:

Government Code Section 16.5

Reference: Government Code Section 16.5
22005.

Criteria for Public Entities To Use In Accepting Digital Signatures
a. Prior to accepting a digital signature, public entities shall ensure that the level of
security used to identify the signer of a document is sufficient for the transaction
being conducted.
b. Prior to accepting a digital signature, public entities shall ensure that the level of
security used to transmit the signature is sufficient for the transaction being
conducted.
c. If a certificate is a required component of a digital signature transaction, public
entities shall ensure that the certificate format used by the signer is sufficient for
the security and interoperability needs ofthe public entity.

Note: Authority:

Government Code Section 16.5

Reference: Government Code Section 16.5
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11Jigital $tQJlJturcs
Approved List of Digital Signature Certification
Authorities
Verisign, Inc.
1350 Charleston Road
Mountain View, California 94043
Ph: 650.961.7500
Fax: 650.961.7300
www. veri sign. com

Digital Signature Trust Co.
1095 East 2100 South, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Phone: 801-246-4380
Fax: 801-246-4361
www.digsigtrust.com
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Frequently Asked Questions
About California's Digital Signature Law and Regulations
1 California

Secretary of State 1 Digital Signatures

1
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What is the Definition of a Digital Signature?
Why Are Digital Signatures So Important?
What Are Some Potential Applications of the Technology?
Who is Affected by California's Digital Signature Regulations?
We want to use digital signatures to help us computerize our
employees' filing of time-cards. Where do we start?
How Do We Choose Between a "Public Key Infrastructure" (PKIJ
System and a "Signature Dynamics" System?
Other states have prepared much more detailed legislation than
California Government Code Section 16.5 and these proposed
regulations. Why?
Why has California decided to allow signatures created by Signature
Dynamics companies? If the signature has to be verified by a
handwriting analysis, doesn't that remove some of the most important
security components of a digital signature as defined by other states?
How did the Secretary of State Arrive at These Proposed
Regulations?

What is the Definition of a Digital Signature?
Under California law, a digital signature is defined as "an electronic identifier, created
by computer, intended by the party using it to have the same force and effect as the
use of a manual signature."
Government Code Section 16.5 states that a digital signature shall have the same
force and effect as a manual signature if and only if it embodies all of the following
attributes:
1.
2.
3.
4.

It is unique to the person using it.
It is capable of verification.
It is under the sole control of the person using it.
It is linked to data in such a manner that if the data are changed, the digital
signature is invalidated, and
5. It conforms to regulations adopted by the secretary of state.

These proposed regulations , when adopted, will define the types of technologies that
are acceptable for creating digital signatures for use by public entities in California.
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They· also provide guidance to public entities that wish to utilize digital signatures for
certain transactions.

Why Are Digital Signatures So Important?
Digital signature will dramatically alter the way the world communicates. Essentially,
this technology will allow us to conduct legally-binding paperless communication. With
digital signatures, we can virtually throw away our "original to follow by mail" stamps
and conduct instantaneous communications and commerce around the world.

What Are Some Potential Applications of the Technology?
Digital signatures can be used for almost any transaction that currently requires a
signature. Potential uses include anything from on-line college applications to the filing
of state income tax forms to applications for business permits at the local level.
Almost any transaction that requires a signature can be replicated electronically with
the inclusion of digital signature technology.

Who is Affected by California's Digital. Signature Regulations?
.
Government Code Section 16.5 and these proposed regulations affect public entities
in California, which are defined by the Government Code as: the State, the Regents of
the University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and
any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State.

We want to use digital signatures to help us computerize our
employees' filing of time-cards. Where do we start?
Government Code Section 16.5 specifies that the use of digital signatures shall be at
the option of the parties involved in the transaction. So, before beginning a full
transition from paper documents to electronic ones, public entities should be sure that
all the parties to the transaction are willing to use digital signatures. Initially, it would
make sense to keep the paper option available for those who are not willing to utilize
digital signatures yet.
·
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When adopted, these regulations will allow public entities to utilize digital signatures
that are created by one of two different technologies - "Public Key Cryptography" and
"Signature Dynamics."
Public entities can receive some guidance regarding certificate-based signatures from
the California Department of Information Technology in Sacramento. Much information
on companies that provide digital signature services is also available on the Internet.
For a public entity to get started, the first step is to determine the amount of security
necessary to conduct the transaction. Some issues to consider are:
o
o

o
o
o

o
o

Are the documents containing signatures going to be transmitted over an
"open" or a "closed" network?
Does the signature on the document need to be verified?
How much time and resources can be allocated to verification?
Does the signature need to be compared to a manual signature on paper
or can a digital certificate adequately provide one-stop verification?
Will immediate verifiability reduce the potential of fraud?
Will the documents containing digital signatures need to be reproduced for
public access to the records?
Will the documents containing digital signatures need to be utilized by
another local, state or federal agency? If so, is the technology compatible
with the other agency's needs?

Answering these and countless other questions can help public entities identify the
appropriate technology to use for each application that includes a digital signature
component.

How Do We Choose Between a "Public Key Infrastructure" (PKI)
System and a "Signature Dynamics" System?
PKI signatures have a greater degree of verifiability than signature dynamics
signatures. Although both signatures are more secure than traditional handwritten,
paper-based signatures, PKI allows for a third party verification of the signature, while
signature dynamics signatures require additional steps (including handwriting analysis)
to verify the signer of a document.
PKI is designed to have immediate verifiability. Signature dynamics is designed to
allow future verification of the signature (similar to a non-notarized, paper-based
signature).
PKI signatures are affixed to documents using software enhancements to existing
applications and web-browsers. Signature Dynamics signatures require additional
hardware to create the signatures.
Signature Dynamics
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they do not provide the level of security that is inherent in PKI signatures which are
immediately verifiable with a third-party issued certificate.
Public entities should conduct an extensive review of their needs and match them to
the appropriate technology approved for use in proposed regulation Section 22003.
Potential vendors can also be a valuable source of information in identifying the most
appropriate technology for public entities.

Other states have prepared much more detailed legislation than
California Government Code Section 16.5 and these proposed
regulations. Why?
True, other states have developed more regulatory-intensive proposals to oversee the
implementation of digital signature technology. However, the California secretary of
state's office believes that over-regulation of an industry that has yet to fully evolve
would only serve to stifle the natural market forces that are crucial to the thorough
evolution of any emerging technology.
With digital signatures, a sort of chicken or egg dilemma has developed. Potential
users and vendors of the technology are waiting for laws and regulations to authorize
digital signatures, however, lawmakers have found it difficult to identify the regulatory
needs for an •ndustry that is still in its infancy.
Consequently, many jurisdictions have sought to regulate any potential component of
this technology which may eventually present a problem. The result of this
over-burdensome regulatory approach has been continual delays in getting this
important technology placed in use.
Rather than create a regulation or legislation to specify every minute policy and
practice of potential certification authorities or other digital signature vendors, the
primary focus of these regulations is to provide assurances to the people of California
that the digital signature technologies and vendors they utilize meet the basic
requirements established by the legislature in Government Code Section 16.5.
Additionally, these regulations admonish public entities to tak~ steps to ensure that the
level of security used to identify the signer of the document and the level of security
used to transmit the signature is sufficient for the transaction being conducted.

Why has California decided to allow signatures created by Signature
Dynamics companies? If the signature has to be verified by a
handwriting analysis, doesn't that remove some of the most
important security components of a digital signature as defined by
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other states?
Signatures created by Signature Dynamics technology are certainly different than the
public-key based signatures that many other: public entities have sought to employ.
However, signatures created using this technology can meet the requirements of
Government Code Section 16.5, and as such need to be included in these regulations.
Although Signature Dynamics signatures require the lengthy process of handwriting
analysis to achieve certain verification of a signature, it is still"capable of verification"
as required by the Government Code. Additionally, some degree of certainty can also
be obtained by a Jay-comparison of manual handwritten signatures which may already
be on file within a particular agency.
If a public entity needs immediate absolute verification of a signature, then this
technology may not be the best option for those transactions. However, the secretary
of state can foresee instances where the level of security and verifiability of signature
dynamics signatures could suffice for communications with public entities.

How did the Secretary of State Arrive at These Proposed
Regulations?
California Secretary of State Bill Jones convened a Task Force of both public and
private sector experts in digital signature technology. The Task Force was chaired by
Alfred Charles from the Secretary of State's office and included representatives from
the American Electronics Association, Silicon Valley's Software Industry Coalition, ·
Wells Fargo Bank, Netscape, Intuit, Verisign, Certco, the California Department of
Information Technology, the Department of General Servic~s. the Secretary of State's
Information Technology Division and others. The project was facilitated by Deloitte &
Touche, LLP.
The Task Force was charged with studying and preparing a proposed draft of these
regulations to the Secretary of State. The Task Force also reviewed proposed and
legislation in several other states and countries in compiling their recommendations to
the Secretary of State. Upon review of the Task Force report, the Secretary of State
made some relatively significant modifications to the proposed regulation. Although
most members of the Secretary of State's Task Force support the final draft of these
regulations, membership on the Task Force does not necessarily equate to an
endorsement of the final draft of these regulations.

1 California Secretary of State
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December 6, 1996

Back

Last week,

I answered the questions-what's a digital signature and what's its purpose. This week~s
question-in what ways is a digital signature better than a traditional penned signature?

With a traditional penned signature, proving a forgery is a subjective art and not a science. A well done
forgery can be extremely difficult to prove. It's a nightmare for me as a litigator.
With a digital signature, assuming that you:
a. Keep your password or key a secret; and
b. Use state-of-the-art software to create your digital signature, then for all practical purposes, it is
impossible for anybody to forge your digital signature. The software is that good.
If you are interested in a more technical explanation of why it can't be forged and more information about
public key/private key encryption, send me an e-mail. If enough people are interested, I will go into
greater technical depth in a future Computer Law Tip of the Week.
For present purposes, just press the "I believe" button and accept that nobody can forge a digital
signature. Pressing the "I believe" button may not feel that comfortable, but I point out that you probably
drive a car without understanding how an automatic transmission works.
With computers, sometimes we get lost trying to understand how things work. "How" is not always
important. Accept that digital signatures work and start using them. What you should worry about is the
"ease of use" issue for the digital signature software. (In my opinion, here lies the problem. The software
is horrendously difficult to learn.)
With a traditional paper agreement, a person can improperly alter the contents and the signature at the
bottom is oblivious to the change. A digital signature is clearly superior here because a digital signature
allows the recipient of a digitally signed agreement to detect whether anybody changed the
communication after it was digitally signed.
Now, once again, press the "I believe" button. If a document is altered, the recipient can detect the
change. How is not important. Leave that to the software developers.

Does the law recognize the validity of digital signatures?
Disclaimer: The advice given in the Computer Law Tip of the Week should not be considered legal advice. This newsletter only provides
general educational information. You must never rely upon the advice given here Your individual situation may not fit the generalizations
discussed. Only your attorney can evaluate your individual situation and give you advice.
Except as provided below, you may feel free to forward, distribute and copy the Computer Law Tip of the Week if you distribute and copy it
without any changes and you include all headers and other identifying information. You may not copy it to a Web site.
This is the digital version of his nationally syndicated Computer and Internet Law column which appears in the South Florida Daily Business
Rev1ews, Washington's Legal Times, San Francisco's Recorder and other publications. He is also a regular contributor to PC World Magazine,
the Florida Bar's Computer Law Journal and other publications.
. He has extensive experience as a speaker. If
Mark Grossman leads the Computer and E-Commerce Law Group of
you would like him to speak before your group or corporate meeting, or if you would like information about retaining his legal services you can
contact him at
• or call him at (305) 260-1018.
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Mark Grossman's onlme research source is Lexis-Nex1s. He thanks Lexis-Nex1s tor their suppon of this column. Research assistance provided
by Andrew Chulock. Michael Cummings. Adam Feinsilver. Christopher O'Rand. & Sarah Santoro.
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Electronic Commerce and Financial Services Regulatory Challenges

The Internet is profoundly altering the way in which all industries do business, including the financial services
industry. It is now possible to conduct business without meeting customers face-to-face or even without a physical
location. The primary objective of electronic commerce is to increase productivity and decrease costs and to protect
relationships with customers.
The Department recognizes that in order to promote a safe and sound financial services industry, we must adapt our
regulatory methods to allow our licensees to react to the changing economic environment. The Department is
currently reevaluating our regulatory methods to adapt to the industry's innovations and technological changes. This
article discusses some of the challenges posed by Internet banking and electronic commerce!l!l._..'-"!!!!11
8

Digital Signatures
Many provisions of the California law require that documents be signed before they
are considered valid. Methods must be developed to allow for the legal recognition of
documents which are generated and sent solely in an electronic format. Such
methods must include a mechanism by which the receiver of the document can verify
the identity of the person sending the document.
Electronic commerce over the Internet is unlike any other form of business. If
someone were to enter an office of a firm and propose to conduct business, the firm
could check the identification and references of that person and be reasonably certain
of his or her identity. However, if that firm begins to deal with a person over the
Internet, the chances are that it will have no idea who the person is at the other terminal. Recently, there have been
numerous stories of impersonators on the Internet attempting to traffic off the good name of another person. Thus,
users of the Internet have developed several methods of assuring the identity of the persons with whom they are
dealing. The most common method of verifying identity over the Internet is with digital signatures.
The term "digital signature" is a shorthand method of saying that the electronic message a person receives from
another has a unique identifier attached which assures the receiver that the sender is indeed the person he or she
claims to be, as though the sender had "signed" the message. That "signature" does not have to be a reproduction of
a physical signature, although such a reproduction is used in some circumstances. What is important is the
"signature" be an identifier that is unique to the person who uses it.
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Presently, the two most common technologies used to create digital signatures are Signature Dynamics and Public
Key Infrastructure ("PKI"). Signature Dynamics uses a digitized version of the sender's physical signature. The
person sending the message literally signs his or her name on a pad which digitally records the speed, pressure and
emphasis of that signature. A digest of that signature is created by the software program. The digest is sent through
a "hash" program which encrypts the digest. The encrypted digest is then electronically affixed to the message. At the
same time, a digital reproduction of the signature may be added to the message. If the message or the signature is
altered in any manner. the signature is invalidated through the encrypted digest. Signature Dynamics does not
provide immediate confirmation of the sender's identity. However, Signature Dynamics does provide an effective
method to confirm that a person did sign the message in question. Further, that confirmation may be made at
anytime after the message has been received, thereby making Signature Dynamics a useful tool in litigation.
PKI is a system by which a person wanting to send a message with a digital signature creates two related encryption
keys. The first key, the private key, is kept secret, and is used to encrypt all or part of a message. The second key,
the public key, is used to decrypt that message. The public key is distributed to the person or persons to whom the
sender wishes to send electronic messages. Since the public key can "unlock" the message but only the person with
the private key can "lock" it, the person receiving the message can be assured that the sender sent the message.
How can the receiver be assured that the public key was created by sender? The solution is to use a trusted third
party which certifies that the sender is the person he or she claims to be and that the public key which is provided to
the receiver belongs to the sender. That trusted third party is known as a certification authority ("CA"). The benefit of
using the PKI system is that the receiver is immediately informed by the CA whether the receiver may rely on the
message as being from the sender.
The use. of a trusted third party works well if both the sender and receiver are familiar with the CA. However, if the
receiver has no relationship with the CA, the receiver may be just as leery of trusting the CA as he or she is leery of
trusting the sehder. To provide some assurances to the receiver that theCA is reliable, either a well-known private
institution vouches for theCA, or the government steps in to register and regulate the CA. In either case, the receiver
should feel more comfortable relying on the CA's assurances regarding the sender.
California enacted legislation regarding the acceptance of digital signatures by departments of the state government.
Government Code Section 16.5 provides that if a department so chooses, some or all communications with that
department may be conducted electronically. The use of a digital signature will have the same legal force and effect
as if the person who used the digital signature had physically signed a paper document. Although added to the
Government Code in 1996, Section 16.5 did not have any practical effect until the Secretary of State finalized the
regulations which were required by the law. The regulations were adopted on June 12, 1998 as Chapter 10
(commencing with Section 22000), Division 7, Title 2 of the California Code of Regulations. These regulations
provide that a department may accept digitally signed documents provided the digital signature is created by either
PKI or Signature Dynamics. Additionally, the regulations require that any person using the PKI digital signature
process use a CA registered with the Secretary of State.
With the Secretary of State's regulations in place, there is nothing a state department need amend in either the law or
regulations to begin to accept documents "signed" with digital signatures. There are, however, two issues that must
be addressed before a department may implement a complete digital signature filing program. First, the department
must obtain the proper software and hardware necessary to accept either form of digital signature. Second, there
must be at least one CA registered with the Secretary of State. At this time, no CA is so registered, perhaps due to
the relatively recent enactment of the Secretary of State's regulations.
The Department is addressing both implementation issues. We will work with licensees and the digital signature
industry to develop standards and procedures for digital signature documents filed with the Department by licensees.
Additionally, we will encourage several companies to register as CAs with the Secretary of State. The Department's
efforts to inform licensees and the public regarding the use of digital signatures is part of the Department's
newly-instituted general outreach program to educate the public regarding current banking, regulatory matters and
mergers. This Department may be one of the first departments to accept digital signatures and could become a
model for other agencies to follow when implementing their own digital signature programs.

Automated Teller Machines

The Commissioner adopted parity regulations on December 4, 1998 pursuant to Financial Code Section 753. The
parity regulations, among other things, have the effect of deregulating the establishment and operation of ATMs by
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state-chartered banks. [Editors' note-For more information about the parity regulations, please reftr to the article entitled
&gulatory Reform in this issue.]
Prior to the adoption of parity regulations, an automated teller machine (A TM) was treated as a branch office by the
Banking Law (Division 1 (commencing at Section 99) of the Financial Code).
Before parity regulations were adopted, Article 4 (commencing with Section 550), Chapter 4, Division 1 of the
Financial Code regulated the establishment and operation of ATM branch offices by state-chartered banks. Those
provisions treated ATMs as branch offices subject to the regulation of the Department.
At the same time that a customer of a state-chartered bank may use the ATM branch office for some limited
transactions, that customer may conduct many of the same banking transactions, and more, through the use of his or
her home computer. However, even though the transactions may be similar to those conducted at an ATM, the home
computer is not considered by the Department to be a branch office of the bank. In addition, there are several
unregulated electronic devices to conduct various banking transactions. Customers may use a cash dispensing
machine to obtain cash, or use a point-of-sale terminal in a retail store to access their bank accounts to purchase
goods and services and to obtain cash. Thus, through the use of the various unregulated devices discussed above, a
bank customer is able to conduct many of the activities that may be conducted at an ATM branch office. Thus, the
question is whether, with all of the alternative unregulated electronic devices available to banking customers, the
Department should regulate ATM branch offices used to conduct banking transactions simply because they are
owned by state-chartered banks.
From a policy standpoint, it was deemed inconsistent to regulate ATMs in a manner different from other electronic
devices which allow bank customers to conduct banking- related transactions. Federal law was rewritten to
deregulate the establishment and operation of ATMs by federally-chartered banks. With the adoption of parity
regulations, this disparity between California state-chartered and national banks has been eliminated.

Notices to Customers

Variou~

sections of the law require that banks provide certain written notices to customers who open or maintain

accounts, or apply for loans. To the extent that such requirements mandate that those notices be given in writing at
the time the account is opened or the application is submitted, the requirements present an impediment to electronic
banking.
Many banks are interested in allowing Internet customers to electronically open accounts through wire-transfers or to
apply for loans. Financial Code Sections 861, 864, and 866.2 all require that certain notices regarding the accounts of
customers be provided in writing to those customers. In addition, Financial Code Section 1664 requires that if a bank
moves to sell the contents of a safe deposit box the rent of which has not been paid, the bank is required to provide
written notice to the customer that such a sale is proceeding. There is no provision in any of those statutes which
allows the requisite notice to be provided electronically.
In addition, the provisions of the Holden Act (Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 35800), Part 6, Division 24 of the
Health and Safety Code) complicate electronic banking. Health and Safety Code Section 35830 requires that a
financial institution post a written notice informing potential loan customers of the prohibitions found in the Holden Act
and informing customers where to report violations of that law. The law and the regulations promulgated by the
Business, Transportation and Housing Agency indicate that the notice must be in writing and that the notice must be
posted in each office of the financial institution. Again, there is no provision in the law which allows the notice to be
provided electronically.
The requirement of providing the requisite notices is not an issue. I believe that a customer makes a better decision
when he or she is provided with the necessary information to fully inform the customer of his or her rights and
responsibilities. The Department supports the notice requirements discussed above. The problem with the notice
requirements is that they are rigid with regard to the delivery of the notices. I believe that the law needs flexibility to
accommodate the dawning of electronic banking.

Unlicensed Internet Banking
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W i t h the advent of Internet banking, the likelihood increased that members of the public will inadvertently come
across, and possibly conduct business with, unlicensed banking entities. What can be done to reduce the risk of the
public dealing with unlicensed businesses?
The Internet. for all of its promise of providing an efficient and rapid forum for commerce, may also be a forum for
criminal activities. Much like the situation regarding digital signatures discussed above, users of the Internet are often
dealing with persons with whom their only contact is through the Internet. Users are at risk when they begin to
conduct business on the Internet.
The Department's licensees include state-chartered banks, savings associations, trust companies and credit unions,
state-licensed offices of foreign banks, industrial loan companies, issuers of travelers checks and money orders, and
transmitters of money abroad, many of which operate and maintain Web sites. Additionally, many of those licensees
are conducting business with the public via the Internet. Further, there are many federally- licensed financial
institutions which may be found on the Internet. The challenge is to be able to provide the public with a resource to
confirm the licensing status of financial institutions while ferreting out businesses which are conducting unlicensed
financial activities.
The Department's approach to the issue of unlicensed Internet financial institutions has been to implement two
programs. Through the first program, the Department has provided confirmation that a particular financial institution
is legitimate to the public. The Department operates and maintains a Web site which is available on the Internet at:
www.dfi.ca.gov. The added features of the Web site were increased to include a complete list of the Department's
licensees with links to the web addresses of those licensees which maintain their own Web sites. By using the
Department's links, the public can be assured they are dealing with licensed financial institutions.
For those persons who do not want to conduct business over the lnternet'but do use the Internet as a source of
information, the Department's Web site also provides a comprehensive directory of our licensees which includes a
listing of each institution's head office, its principal officer, and its general telephone number. To help a user to
determine whether a financial institution is a licensed national bank, federal savings institution or bank in another
state, our Web site provides a link to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Institutions Directory. Our Web site
also provides a link to the National Credit Union Administration, which allows a user to determine whether a
purported federal credit union is licensed. If the institution claims to be a licensee of the Department of Real Estate or
the Department of Corporations, our Web site also provides links to those state agencies.
The second program consists of an ongoing effort to halt the operations of unlicensed entities. The Department's
Consumer Information Program provides tracking and notification of unlicensed banking Web sites. Users of the
Internet are encouraged at our Web site to provide the Department with information on a Web site that they believe
may be falsely representing itself as a legitimate financial institution, or one that appears to be masquerading as a
legitimate California institution by using the name of an authentic institution. The Department investigates any report
submitted by members of the public. If appropriate, regulatory action may be taken against the unlicensed entity. If
the person submitting the information so requests, the Department communicates the results of our investigation to
that person. If the person prefers, he or she can telephone that same information to the Department through our
toll-free phone number (1-800-622-0620). Finally, the Department's Web page provides instructions to Internet users
for filing similar reports with federal agencies.
The challenges presented by electronic banking and commerce are many and change with each new innovation. To
fully respond to those challenges, the Department continues to be flexible and responsive. The Department must .
also continue to look forward and anticipate what will be needed in the future to satisfy the private sector's desire to
use those innovations to increase their efficiencies while helping the Department to fulfill its regulatory
responsibilities.

Regulatory Reform

The so-called "parity regulations" were approved by the Office of Administrative Law on December 4, 1998 and
were filed with the Secretary of State on December 4, 1998 at which time they became effective. The parity
regulations apply to California state banks certain provisions of federal law that relate to national banks, thereby
achieving parity between California st~te and national banks. In particular, the parity regulations:
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• reform the establishment, relocation, and closing of automated teller machines and remote service units by
California state banks;
• broaden the authority of California state banks to acquire the stock of a banker's bank; and
• permit a California state bank to engage in fiduciary business not only at its head office or branch office, but
also at a place of business.
Under Financial Code Section 753, the Commissioner is authorized to adopt a parity regulation without complying
with various requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, including publishing notice of the proposal and
providing an opportunity for public comment. However, a parity regulation which does not comply with all the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act automatically terminates, or sunsets, at the end of the calendar
year following the calendar year in which it takes effect. Thus, the parity regulations which take effect this year will
automatically terminate on December 31, 1999.

Consumer Assistance
DFI's Consumer Information Desk

The Department of Financial Institutions has long assisted consumers through its Consumer Information Desk. In
recognition of its important role in providing consumer assistance, the Department recently expanded the Mission
Statement to include "protect the interests of depositors, creditors, customers and security holders of licensees."
With this enhanced view of its mission, DFI is looking for more ways to help consumers.
Every consumer complaint received by mail is reviewed on a case-by-case basis. If the complaint involves a
DFI-Iicensed financial institution, the Department forwards a copy of the complaint to the president of the financial
institution with a cover letter from the Consumer Information Desk requesting that the complaint be reviewed and
responded to within 20 days. The Department asks that the financial institution respond to the consumer as wei~ as
the Consumer Information Desk regarding their findings. If the complaint involves an institution we do not license, the
Department will refer the consumer to the correct federal or state regulator to contact.
One important way the Consumer Information Desk assists consumers is to track down the successors to financial
institutions that have gone out of business. In this way, the Consumer Information Desk helps numerous consumers
with information so that the consumer may obtain lien clearances, deed reconveyances and account records from
financial institutions that no longer exist. Due to the number of mergers among financial institutions that have taken
place in the last few years, this has become a major aspect of the service the Consumer Information Desk provides.
The Department acts as a facilitator in resolving consumer complaints by helping the consumer and the financial
institution to communicate. If the Department finds a violation of law, the Commissioner of Financial Institutions will
order the financial institution to discontinue the practice. If the complaint involves an unlicensed or illegal entity, the
Department may order that it cease and desist from doing business.
Consumers may contact the Department through our toll-free number (1-800-622-0620). Consumers can also reach
the Department through the Internet at www.dfi.ca.gov. The Consumer Information Pamphlet published by the
Department also assists consumers in determining which governmental agency licenses and regulates various
financial institutions, including finance companies, escrow companies, mortgage bankers and brokers and which
agency they should call for consumer information.
California's Financial Center

A s the seventh-largest world economy, California needs to maintain a financial services structure that is able to
finance the capital investments necessary to develop and expand the diverse California economy, including
agriculture, high technology and the export and import of goods and services to the Pacific Rim and other important
trading partners. The financial services sector must also meet the needs of the public, including providing financial
support for the development of the infrastructures necessary to provide goods and services to the people of this
state.
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The Department of Financial Institutions has established the "California's Financial Center'' Web site on its
Homepage to enable the public to gain access to information concerning California's vast financial marketplace. The
California's Financial Center Web site contains information not only about financial institutions licensed by the
Department and other financial service providers, but also access to information about financial businesses licensed
in other states and information about federally-chartered financial institutions doing business in California.
The California Financial Center site provides:
• information about the 336 licensed banks in California which maintain total assets of over $518 billion (and a
loan and lease portfolio of $321 billion), including $96 billion in assets maintained by California's 213
state-chartered banks. The site provides a link to the Department's list of bank licensees, including the 73
foreign banks operating state-licensed branches· and agency offices. For national banks operating in California
and foreign (other state) banks that may have branch offices in California, the Web site has established a link
with the FDIC data bank which contains demographic data and financial profiles for these institutions and all
other FDIC insured institutions;
• access to a detailed list of California's 195 state-licensed credit unions who hold over $17 billion in assets, and
a direct link to the National Credit Union Administration Web site to provide information about the 520 federal
credit unions with assets of $35.5 billion doing business in California;
• access to detailed lists of the Department's other licensees including, industrial loan companies (thrift and
loans), premium finance companies, trust companies, issuers of payment instruments, issuers of travelers
checks, transmitters of money abroad and business and industrial development corporations.
• direct access to information concerning California's six state-chartered savings associations with over $2
billion in assets and a link to the Office of Thrift Supervision to provide information concerning the 48 federal
savings associations that maintain $277 billion in assets in California;
• information about mortgage brokers (all those engaged in the business of negotiating or performing any act as
broker in connection with mortgage loans) through a link to the California Department of Real Estate, which
licenses and regulates mortgage broker activities.
• a direct link to information on finance companies (companies engaged in making loans to individuals and
businesses and who obtain their financing through sources other than deposits or investment certificates),
escrow companies, and mortgage bankers (a company that originates mortgage loans, sells them to other
investors, services the monthly payments, keeps related records and acts as escrow agent to disperse funds
for taxes and insurance) who are regulated by the Department of Corporations, Financial Services Division;
• a link to the California Department of Corporations, Securities Regulation Division to provide access to
information on broker-dealers, broker-dealer agents, and investment advisors; and
• a link to the Department of Consumer Affairs which licenses more than 180 professions ranging from doctors
to accountants to contractors.

[Editor's note: Figures as of 6I 30I 98.}
Commissioner Mix Addresses California Jump$tart Coalition Meeting

Commissioner Mix was a guest speaker at the California Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy
meeting on October 27 in Los Angeles. California is one of only five states to have its own state-level coalition to
provide local support to educators. Jump$tart, a non-profit organization based in Washington, DC, encourages
curriculum enrichment to insure that basic personal financial management skills are attained during grades K-12.
Jump$tart is comprised of federal agencies, universities, non-profit associations and sponsors of education
programs.
Financial literacy is vital for America's students to succeed in the next century. Disturbing trends such as rising
personal bankruptcies and consumer credit delinquencies, as well as inadequate savings for retirement, point to the
need for personal finance management as a fundamental life skifl. Today, consumers are facing many more personal
finance decisions. Adults bear primary responsibility for funding their own retirement, and must have a working
knowledge of 401 (k) plans, mutual funds and Individual Retirement Accounts. As technology grows, so will the
selection of sophisticated, high-tech financial products and services for consumers. Expecting students to get
through this financial maze without training is inviting disaster.
The Department under Commissioner Mix's direction has recognized the importance of financial literacy and is
prepared to work with Jump$tart and other programs to achieve these ends.
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DFI Donates Computers to California's Public Schools

0

ver the last several months, DFI has donated laptops, CPUs, monitors, desktop expansion bases and an

assortment of other computer components to California Emergency Foodlink's (CEF) Computer for Schools
Program. This unique program was developed in conjunction with CEF's Computer Repair Technician class.
Students in CEF's Computer Repair Technician class troubleshoot, repair and upgrade donated computers which are
then in turn donated free to California's public schools throughout the State. Foodlink is a nonprofit organization with
the mission of preventing hunger and providing jobs and training.
By don~ting computers and computer components to Food link, California's school children will be able to take
advantage of computer technology in enhancing their education. The donation of computer equipment to Foodlink is
part of DFI's Mentoring Program efforts and is in support of Governor Pete Wilson's California Mentor Initiative.

Non-Deposit Services and Products

Surve~

Results

The Department received 391 responses to the 1998 Non-Deposit Services and Products Survey which was
mailed to all of its licensees. The survey sought information in four non-deposit product and service categories:
mutual fund sales, annuities, insurance, and stock and bond sales.
The licensees responding to the survey offer the following services: insurance (20%), mutual funds (19%), annuities
(16%), and stocks and bonds (14%). Sixty-two percent of the licensees responding to the survey indicate they do not
offer any non-deposit investment services or products to customers. Those institutions with the highest percentage
offering non-deposit services and products were institutions with total assets of $100 million to $500 million (50%)
and those with assets of $2 billion and over (48%).

Mutual Fund Sales

Licensees offer mutual fund sales through third parties (64%) and affiliated broker-dealers (35%). Seventy-five
percent of the licensees offer only third party mutual funds and 24% offer both "proprietary" and third party mutual
funds.
Licensees report that 64% sell mutual funds through a third-party vendor and 35% through an affiliated broker-dealer.
Only 63% of the licensees indicate that the board of directors have adopted written policies and procedures regarding
mutual fund sales. Eighty percent of the licensees sought an opinion from counsel on the vendor agreement.
Eighty-six percent of the responding licensees believe that the mutual fund service have helped to retain customers
and 74% believe that the services have generated new customers.

Annuity Sales

Ninety-six percent of licensees offering annuity sales offer both fixed-rate and variable-rate annuities. Fifty-two
percent of the licensees solicit annuity sales through third parties and 40% through an affiliated broker-dealer. While
93% of the licensees solicit sales on the premises of the licensee location, 50% also solicit sales through telephone
call or written communication from the licensee premises. Fifty-four percent of the licensees sell annuities through
employees or agents of a third-party vendor and 41% sell annuities through "dual employees."
Licensees who sell annuities report th~t 80% have had the board of directors adopt written policies and procedures
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regarding annuity sales, and 80% sought the opinion of counsel on vendor agreements to sell annuities.
Eighty-four percent of the licensees believe that annuity sales have helped to retain customers and 67% believe that
annuity sales have generated new customers.

Insurance Sales

The licensee survey results show that insurance products are offered to customers through numerous
agents/brokers, with 24% offering such products through an independent agent/broker, 24% through an affiliate
agent/broker, 23% through a licensee agent/broker and 18% through other means, including third party vendor and
licensed employees.
Insurance products offered by licensees are varied, with 61% offering disability coverage, 60% credit life, 58% life
and health, 36% long-term health care, 25% mortgage life and 15% personal property/casualty.
Licensees indicate personnel who sell insurance include: licensee employees (43%), employees or agents of a third
party or an affiliate agent/broker (36%) and "dual employees" (25%).
Only 56% of the licensees who offer insurance indicate that the board of directors have adopted written policies and
procedures regarding insurance sales, and only 63% of the licensees sought an opinion from counsel on vendor
agreements.
Only 63% of the licensees offering insurance sought the opinion from counsel on the vendor agreement.

Stock, Bond and Other Securities Activities

Securities activities are usually offered by licensees through third parties (50%) or affiliated broker/dealers (41%).
Securities sold by licensees include bonds (97%), stocks (94%), options (24%), and other securities, which include
commercial paper and Euro CO's (13%). Sales are generated by licensees on the premises of the licensee (91 %),
telephone call/written communication from the licensee premises (48%) and through the solicitation of retail deposit
customers (39%).
Personnel who sell securities include employees or agents of a third-party vendor or affiliate broker-dealer (48%),
"dual employees" (37%) and employees of the licensee (19%).
Eighty-three percent of the licensees selling securities indicate that the board of directors have adopted written
policies and procedures regarding securities sales. Seventy-six percent of the licensees sought an opinion from
counsel on the vendor agreement.
Eighty-seven percent of licensees believe that the sale of securities have helped to retain customers and 67%
believe that the sale of securities have generated new customers.
The Department thanks the licensees for their response to the Non-Deposit Services and Products Survey. The
survey provides the Department with an overview of the non-deposit services available to the public by our licensees.
The information collected will assist the Department in developing and improving the quality and efficiency of
regulatory oversight.
·
Department licensees are encouraged to review the complete results of the Department survey. Information
concerning board of director policies and procedures, and the content of licensee vendor agreements, among other
things, will provide Department licensees with additional information about licensee oversight of non-deposit
products, how they are marketed, and provide a guideline for those licensees who are considering offering such
products in the future. Licensees offering such products should adopt written, Board-approved policies and
procedures. The complete results of the "1998 Non-Deposit Services and Products Survey" can be found on the
·
Department of Financial Institutions Homepage, located at www.dfi.ca.gov.
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Legi~lation

State-Chartered Credit Union Modernization Bill (Senate Bill1439) Effective In 1999

Sen ate Bill 1439 sponsored by the Department and approved by Governor Wilson on September 16, 1998, will
modernize and streamline the Credit Union Law by repealing certain out-of-date requirements. This bill represents
the first phrase of the Department's efforts to streamline current statutes and eliminate unnecessary restrictions and
requirements for state-chartered credit unions. Effective January 1, 1999, SB 1439 will also eliminate those sections
of the Credit Union Law that are not necessary to the support of the Department's mission of ensuring the safety and
soundness of California's state-chartered credit unions. The bill requires the Commissioner to examine a credit union
as often as deemed advisable, but in no case less than once every two years, thereby conforming the examination of
credit unions to the same cycle as other financial institutions.
The bill also changes, effective July 1, 1999, the assessment tiers and assessment rate set by the Commissioner in
an amount sufficient to meet the expenses of the Department to administer the laws relating to credit unions plus a
share of the Department's overhead expenses. The base assessment rate for each annual assessment fixed by the
Commissioner shall not exceed $2.20 per $1,000 of total assets.

Department Accreditation Update
NASCUS Accreditation

The Department has begun the voluntary process to gain accreditation by NASCUS (National Association of
State Credit Union Supervisors). It is expected that the accreditation process will be completed by mid-January 1999.
NASCUS has reviewed and evaluated the policies and procedures of the Department and in particular the Credit
Union Division. To be accredited, the Department was tested against approximately 65 specific criteria in the
Self-Evaluation Report. In the scoring process, the Department must receive a total combined score of not less than
75% on the Self-Evaluation Report for Accreditation.
The NASCUS Accreditation Program was developed and implemented by the Board of Directors in November of
1986. This is the first time DFI has sought accreditation due to the addition of credit unions as licensees of the
Department of Financial Institutions in July 1997.

Continued Accreditation by CSBS

The Department of Financial Institutions was re-accredited by the CSBS (Conference of State Bank Supervisors)
Annual Review Team after reviewing a self-study questionnaire on July 22, 1998. The questionnaire covers all areas
of the Department's operations, from employment and training practices to statutory authority and budget allocations.
The Department originally was accredited by CSBS on April7, 1990 and re-accredited on December 13, 1995 for
another five years subject to an annual review.
Receiving accreditation from NASCUS and re-accreditation from CSBS demonstrate a high level of performance in
supervision and regulation shown by the Department of Financial Institutions.

Technology Comer

I n order to be fully Year 2000-comp[iant, DFI is converting its network operating system from Banyan Vines to
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Microsoft Windows NT. New hardware has also been orde~ed as part of this overall system upgrade. Office staff will
each receive a Hewlett-Packard Vectra VL7, with a Pentium II 333 Mhz processor, a 4.3 GB hard drive, 64MB RAM,
a 24X speed CD drive and a 15" monitor. Operating software will be Microsoft Windows NT and desktop software will
be upgraded to Microsoft Office 97, Professional Version. The mail system will be converting from BeyondMail to
Microsoft Outlook. Information Systems staff and DFI consultants are hard at work getting ready for a First Quarter
1999 rollout of the new system. Fifteen new notebooks have been ordered for DFI field staff. They are 300 Mhz Dell
Latitudes with 64MB of RAM, a 24X CD ROM and a 4.3 GB Hard Drive. They have a 13.3" TFT XGA Display and
weigh approximately 6.1 pounds with the floppy diskette drive installed and weigh approximately 6.4 pounds with the
CD-ROM installed.
The GENESYS General Examination System for the joint FDIC/State examination report was used recently to
facilitate a joint examination at Mid State Bank, Arroyo Grande. Examiners Scott Cameron, Trace Ehrig, Michael
Kientz, Anson Kwan, Albert Marquez and John Ross participated. Said Examiner-in-Charge Scott Cameron: ''This

waJ" ourjirJI e.\.pt:nen,·e with ming GENESYS ajter attmding training with the FDIC. Thirteen examiners received the training
on GENESYS at the same time as 1-lJIC examiners in order to partitipate in two joint examinatioiiJprior to statewide
implementation.
"We all see the potential in the GENESYS program. There should be greater uniformiry in our product, more efficient
examinations, and greater compatibiliry with federal counterparts.
As expected, we experienced some problems using GENESYS at the Mid State examination. Br1t, those problems should be
resolved in upgrades to the program and are expected to diminish as examiners become more familiar with the program. "
One more joint examination is scheduled before DFI implements the program statewide.
A big thanks goes to Mid State Bank for participating in this "field test" of GENESYS.
In addition to Lana Muna and John Ross, who helped out on the development of the GENESYS program with the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors and other federal agency personnel, we will be sending three examiners back
to Washington in January and two in February for GENESYS facilitator training. The graduates of these "Train the
Trainer" sessions will be conducting classes for our entire examination staff on this new examination tool. It is
anticipated that we will make the conversion to a full GENESYS examination system late in the first quarter of 1999.

Results of DFI Information Technology Questionnaire

The Department received 389 responses to the 1998 Information Technology Questionnaire sent to our licensees
in September. The 1998 technology questionnaire sought information in two areas: licensee access to the Internet
and on-line financial services offered by licensees.
Of the institutions that responded to the survey, 84% indicated that they had access to the World Wide Web.
Twenty-six percent of those that indicated no access to the World Wide Web plan to have access within the next
twelve months.
Employee access to the World Wide Web is centered around management, with licensees indicating that 45%
provide Executive Staff access, 42% provide Management and Supervisory Staff access and 33% provide access to
the Information System Staff. Seventeen percent of the financial institutions provide the entire staff with access to the
World Wide Web.
Forty-four percent of the licensees who responded to the survey indicate their institutions have a Homepage. Many
gave the Department permission to add their Homepage address to the information contained in the Department's
Directory of Licensees. Twenty-nine percent of those institutions that do not have a Homepage indicate they plan to
have a Homepage within the next year.
Thirty-two licensees suggested over one-hundred banking-related Web sites to the Department. Licensees should
visit the Department of Financial Institutions "California's Financial Center" Web site (www.dfi.ca.gov) where they will
find links to many of the suggested federal regulatory Web sites.
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Survey results show that only 19% of the institutions that responded to the questionnaire currently offer online
banking to customers. An additional14% indicate they plan to offer on-line services within the next year. On-line
services that are currently offered or plan to be offered are centered in the following services: account balance
inquiries, funds transfer between accounts, direct communication to the organization via e-mail, checkbook balance,
and electronic/online bill payment.
The Department thanks the licensees for their response to the Information Technology Questionnaire. The
responses provide the Department with information about trends and related issues in the industry. In addition, your
input provides the Department with comments and suggestions for improving the Department's Homepage by telling
us what information and services are of use to you. The complete results of the DFI "1998 Information Technology
Questionnaire" can be found on the Department of Financial Institutions Homepage, located at www.dfi.ca.gov.

The Year 2000
by Commissioner Walt Mix

Much has been discussed of late concerning the Year 2000 computer problem, also known as the Y2K
problem. Recent front-page newspaper articles have examined this problem in depth, and most citizens and
businesses are certainly now aware of it. However, it may be incumbent upon financial institutions to inform those
customers who are not aware of the Y2K problem.
Briefly, many older computers, appliances and other equipment that use electronic chips computationally represent a
year by the last two digits. Newer chips have been programmed to represent a year in four digits. However, in
existing older equipment and software, 1999 will be shown as 99 and the Year 2000 will be represented as 00. Those
households and businesses with older equipment or software may, on January 1, 2000, have the year 2000
interpreted as the year 1900, potentially creating chaos in financial transactions and other day to day business such
as telephone, electric power, medical treatment, travel, etc.
Government agencies, computer manufacturers, financial institutions, utilities and other large business have been
addressing this concern for the past several years. For example, the Department of Financial Institutions together
with federal bank regulators have initiated a Y2K examination program that will inspect regulated institutions and
each institution's progress in correcting any internal system that is not Y2K compliant. In addition, the Department
itself has instituted a project to bring all of its internal systems into Y2K compliance. This project will be completed on
or about March 1999.
The Department of Financial Institutions is generally satisfied with the progress of state-chartered institutions in
conforming their internal systems. We do make an additional request that all institutions extend their Y2K program to
cover important borrowing customers. Should a considerable portion of a loan portfolio consist of businesses that
could fail due to Y2K problems, the institution itself may very well fail. Significant customers should be visited by loan
officers to assess the Y2K status of the customer. New loans or loan renewals of a significant amount should require
certification of Y2K compliance by the borrower or its CPA firm. It would even be useful to send notices to all of your
customers alerting them to the possible ripple effect brought about by the new millennium.
Other concerns that have been expressed include a possibility that as January 1, 2000 approaches, consumers will
question the safety and accessibility of their deposits and stampede to banks and ATMs to withdraw their funds. The
Federal Reserve System has requested an additional $50 billion in currency be printed and held in reserve for such a
contingency. Most officials, however, have expressed confidence in the ability of the financial services sector to
successfully address the Y2K problem, and depositors are urged to withdraw only a modest amount of currency prior
to January 1, 2000.
To summarize: all automated systems, yours and your customer~. should be tested and brought into compliance to
avert any Y2K malfunction. Check your vault time locks, security systems, computer software and hardware among
other things. Ask customers what plans they have to check for compliance. Be proactive.

Fremont Bank Donates Clock Tower
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This quarter, we salute Fremont Bank, which donated a clock tower at the Fremont Bay Area Rapid Transit
(BART) Station. The clock tower was dedicated in an October ceremony to the memory of George M. Silliman, a
33-year employee and director of Fremont Bank who died last year.
Silliman, who was president of the BART Board of Directors when the system opened in 1972, served on the BART
board from its inception in 1962 through 1974. Previously, he had been a member of the Bay Area Rapid Transit
Commission starting in 1957.
He also served on the Fremont City Council and was a former mayor of Newark, California. George Silliman's civic
activities set an example for California's community bank directors. [Editors' Note: Some of this information originai!J

appeared in the November 1998 issue of BART Times, a publication of the Jan rramisco Bcry Area Rapid Transit District.}

Credit Union Comer
Regulatory Reform

0

ne of the first tasks tackled by the Credit Union Division when it moved to DFI was regulatory reform. The

Credit Union Law Reform Bill introduced by Senator Brulte, SB 1439, was signed by Governor Pete Wilson. Except
for the new assessment requirement, the changes will become effective on January 1, 1999. The assessment
section will become effective on July 1, 1999. There are many changes that will affect reporting, accounting and
operating requirements for credit unions. A technical letter providing specific details will be sent to credit unions as
we approach the effective date. The text of SB 1439 is available through the Internet at www.leginfo.ca.gov. You may
also request a hard copy from Jan Owen, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Policy, by writing her at 801 K Street, Suite
2124, Sacramento, CA 95814, by phone at (916) 322-0282 or by e-mail at jowen@dfi.ca.gov.
The proposed changes to the Credit Union Rules and Regulations likewise include many provisions that will affect
credit unions. Each credit union was recently mailed a copy of the Notice of Proposed Regulatory Action concerning
the credit union regulations. The comment period ended October 30, 1998. The text of the proposed changes is
available through the Internet at www.dfi.ca.gov, under Regulatory Developments.

Quality Assurance Survey

Early in 1998 the Department began sending Quality Assurance Surveys (QAS) to credit unions after each
examination. Every survey is personally read by Commissioner Mix and Deputy Commissioner Conrad. The results
of the QASs are reviewed with the examiners at staff meetings. While we seem to be doing well in most areas, there
is room for improvement and we are responding to those areas.

Y2K Program

Though we met the examination requirements in the Credit Union Law, our regular examination program was
delayed a bit because of the added burden of Y2K review procedures. We feel our Y2K program is a success and we
believe the majority of the credit unions in California are making adequate progress toward compliance. The
Department will continue to monitor Y2K progress through quarterly reports and special examinations.
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Your Thoughts, Ideas and Suggestions
The State Charter is for our licensees, employees and the industry. We
are always on the lookout for ways that we can improve this publication
to serve you better. Our readers' suggestions are one way we can
accomplish this task. Please, if you have any suggestions how we can
improve this report in terms of type of content, depth of coverage, ease
of readability or overall appearance feel free to contact Editors Kathy
Tescher or Patrick Carroll at the address or numbers below.

Department of Financial Institutions
111 Pine Street, # 1100
San Francisco, CA 94111-5613
Kathy Tescher: (415) 263-8536
email: ktescher@dfi.ca.gov
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INTERNET lAW & POliCY FORUM

Survey of State Electronic & Digital Signature
Legislative Initiatives

The Full Report and the appendices are available in .pdfformat.

PROJECT OVERVIEW
The Internet Law & Policy Forum ("ILPF") commissioned Perkins Coie to
survey current legislative efforts by individual states in the United States
and drafting committees concerning digital and electronic signatures to
assist the ILPF Digital Signature Working Group in considering model state
legislation. This report provides a state-by-state comparison of electronic
authentication initiatives and a summary and analysis oftrends. The terms of
reference ofthe Working Group and project schedule are available on ILPF's
web site. The text of all of the state initiatives and related resources have
been collected oh ILPF's web site as well. ILPF seeks public comment on
this report, particularly in regard to the categorization of state initiatives,
information on any new initiatives, or corrections to the report. Any
comments should be forwarded for consideration to the ILPF via its web site
or to the authors of this report, John P. Morgan and Albert Gidari.

I. BACKGROUND
Legislators are faced with unique and fundamental policy choices regarding
the role of government in the development of electronic commerce.
Recognizing that government must play a role in enabling electronic
commerce by removing traditional barriers, nearly every state has sought to
eliminate barriers caused by traditional writing and signature requirements
by drafting legislation designed to permit the authentication of documents
and signatures through electronic means. In the electronic environment,
however, the authentication of documents and signatures is considerably
more difficult than in the traditional written environment. An original
message may be virtually indistinguishable from a copy, and the potential
for fraud is heightened by the ease of alteration.
New challenges, therefore, arise in determining government's function, if
any, in solving problems unique to electronic authentication such as issues
of data integrity, non-repudiation, evidentiary standards, choice of
technology, liability standards, contractual freedom, consumer protection,
and cross-border recognition of electronically signed documents.
In the international arena, numerous governments and organizations have
called for private sector leadership in developing electronic commerce
principles rather than premature government regulation. However, these
policy initiatives also recognize that government may serve an essential
facilitating role by eliminating barriers and providing a broad legal
framework to protect the interests of the public.
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In the United States, 40 states either have considered or enacted electronic
authentication laws. Thirteen states have initiated task forces to study the
various impacts of electronic commerce and traditional writing and
signature requirements. See Appendices A & B. Although the numbers
suggest that there has been a flurry of substantive activity, in fact, most
legislation has been narrow in scope. While 21 states have proposed 31 laws
that encompass public and private sector communications ("general" laws),
only ten states have enacted 13 such laws. Instead, most legislative activity
has involved laws that have a "limited" transactional scope; that is, laws that
apply only in a government or narrow private sector context such as the use
of electronic signatures by health care providers or for motor vehicle
registration. Indeed, twenty-eight states have introduced 48 limited statutes.
Ofthese, 23 states have enacted 36limited laws. See Appendices B & C.

II. AUTHENTICATION MODELS
A variety of authentication models have been considered or enacted by the
states. The vast majority of all legislative initiatives enacted by state
legislatures were electronic signature laws while only a handful have
enacted digital signature laws.
While the distinction between an electronic and digital signature is an
important one, the terms frequently are used interchangeably. For purposes
of consistent analysis here, "electronic signature" means any identifiers such
as letters, characters, or symbols, manifested by electronic or similar means,
executed or adopted by a party to a transaction with an intent to authenticate
a writing. A writing, therefore, is deemed to be electronically signed if an
electronic signature is logically associated with such writing.
In contrast to an electronic signature, a "digital signature" is an electronic
identifier that utilizes an information security measure, most commonly
cryptography, to ensure the integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation of the
information to which it corresponds. Cryptography refers to a field of
applied mathematics in which digital information may be transformed into
unintelligible code and subsequently translated back into its original form.
In public key cryptography or asymmetric cryptography, an algorithmic
function is used to create two mathematically related or complementary
"keys." One key is used to code the information while the other is used to
decode it. Cryptography can be used to ensure the confidentiality of data
(i.e., encryption) and to verify the authenticity and integrity of transmitted
data. The advantage of public key cryptography is that it allows the
confidential transmission of information in open networks where parties do
not know one another in advance or share secret key information.
In an open network context, public key encryption depends on the public
and private use of these complementary algorithmic keys.
The "public" key is associated with a particular party and is made readily
available in a direc!ory. A trusted third party or certification authority can
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authenticate the relationship between a public key and its owner thereby
ensuring public confidence in the use of the readily available key. This
public key is then used to encrypt a message or data to be sent to the person
associated with the key. The recipient ofthe encrypted message then uses
his or her "private" key to decrypt the information. The "private key" is so
named because it must remain secret in order for the process to be secure,
for while the public key of a particular party is known to the public, only the
private key can be used to decrypt. With strong encryption, it is virtually
impossible to derive the private key from its public counterpart.
In the context of "digital signatures," the process essentially is reversed.
First, a signer uses a "hash" function to create a compressed form of the
message to be sent. This "message digest" is unique to the message and can
be used subsequently to verify the authenticity of the document once
received. Before sending the document electronically, the signer applies the
private key to the message digest thereby encrypting it and creating a secure
digital signature. The document may then be sent (perhaps encrypted with
the receiver's public key) along with the digital signature. Upon receipt, the
digital signature can be decrypted with the signer's public code and the
message digest can be used to verify the contents of the electronic
document. The creation of an open public cryptographic system has
commonly been referred to as public key infrastructure ("PKI").
Thirty-three of 49 electronic signature statutes introduced (23 of28 states)
were enacted. Nearly all of these laws were "limited" in scope. With respect
to digital signature laws, only ten of21 initiatives introduced (7 of 14 states)
were enacted. Florida, New Hampshire, and Oregon have approved
legislation for both. See Appendices B & E.
Most ofthe electronic and digital signature initiatives fall into three
categories: prescriptive, criteria-based, and signature enabling. See
Appendix D. The prescriptive states delineate specific PKI schemes for
digital signatures and typically have "general" applicability. Utah's model is
predominant among the prescriptive states, accounting for ten of the 18
states using a prescriptive PKI digital signature approach. The criteria-based
states recognize the authentication of digital or electronic signatures,
provided the signatures satisfy certain criteria of reliability and security.
California is the leading model and has been uniformly followed by states
utilizing the criteria-based approach. The signature enabling states take the
most modest approach by recognizing electronic signatures and documents
in a manner that is parallel to traditional signature and writing laws. These
laws are technology-neutral in that they adopt no specific technological
approach or criteria. Massachusetts has taken the representative lead in this
area. These various approaches are discussed in more detail below.
A. Prescriptive Approach
The prescriptive approach is a comprehensive effort that seeks to enable and
facilitate electronic commerce with the recognition of digital signatures
through a specific regulatory and statutory framework. It establishes a
detailed PKI licens~ng scheme (albeit voluntary), allocates duties between
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contracting parties, prescribes liability standards, and creates evidentiary
presumptions and standards for signature or document authentication.
On the whole, I8 states have adopted or considered PKI-based digital
signature laws. Of these, I4 states have addressed digital signatures alone
while four states have considered giving effect to both electronic and digital
signatures. See Appendix E. California may also be included in this latter
category with the recent promulgation of proposed regulations by the
Secretary of State that approve of PKI and digital signature use.
The leading model for the prescriptive approach is the Utah Digital
Signature Act. Utah Code§ 46-3-I01 et seq. Utah's digital signature law
originally was enacted in I995 and significantly amended in I996 by Utah
Senate Bill I88. This legislation was influenced heavily by the efforts of the
American Bar Association Information Security Committee (the "Security
Committee"). Over a four-year period, the Security Committee had sought to
draft a model law for digital signatures. However, given the diverse views
on several key areas such as a subscriber's duty of care, the Security
Committee produced the Digital Signature Guidelines (the "Guidelines") in
the summer of 1995 in lieu of a model law. The Utah Digital Signature Act
and the Guidelines have been very influential in shaping other states'
legislative initiatives (together "Utah/Guidelines" model).
The Utah/Guidelines model attempts to delineate a comprehensive scheme
for the recognition of digital signatures in a PKI environment utilizing
state-licensed certification authorities ("CAs"). The model can be divided
into four main categories: (I) licensing of CAs; (2) issuance, suspension,
and revocation of certificates issued by CAs; (3) duties, warranties, and
obligations of licensed CAs, subscribers, third parties, and key repositories;
and ( 4) rules regarding the recognition and validity of digital signatures.
Some key attributes ofthese areas include:
• Regulatory authority is vested with the Secretary of State or other
agency and may serve as a CA;
• "Voluntary" licensing scheme for CA--unlicensed CAs lose
evidentiary presumptions of authenticity and civil liability limitations;
• CAs liability limited by certificate statements; statutorily liable only
for direct, compensatory reliance damages;
• A digital signature is self-authenticating if ( 1) it is verified as valid by
a public key listed with a licensed CA; (2) it was affixed with the
intention of signing a message; and (3) the recipient has no knowledge
of either a breach of duty by the subscriber or does not rightfully hold
the private key affixed to the message;
• Writing requirements are met if (I) the message bears a digital
signature and (2) that signature is verified by a valid licensed public
key;
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• Auditing and bonding requirements for CAs;
• Cross-border recognition for states whose licensing or authorization
requirements are substantially similar if the Secretary of State
recognizes the CAs by rule; and
• Subscriber-s have a duty of reasonable care in control of private keys
and must indemnifY CAs.
Although the Utah/Guidelines model has received considerable attention, it
has not, in fact, been widely followed. Seven states have considered but not
adopted the Utah/Guidelines model: Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New
York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. Although incorporating most of
the model, draft legislation in Virginia and Hawaii notably deleted the
cross-border recognition provision. Numerous other states have adopted or
considered Utah's definition of a digital signature without adopting the
model itself. Minnesota and Washington are the only states to enact the
Utah/Guidelines model with some variation. See Appendices C & D. For
example, Washington has enacted legislation that allows the parties, with
some exception, to alter the terms of the statute by contract.
B. Alternatives to the Prescriptive-PKI Model
The Utah/Guidelines model likely has not had more impact due to its
inherently regulatory and prescriptive nature. By selecting PKI as the
baseline for electronic authentication, the model may be viewed as
technology-forcing. Although it is ostensibly "voluntary," the favorable
liability limits and evidentiary presumption associated with state licensing
likely will impair alternatives. No presumptions or liability limits are
afforded to other technological solutions that may have comparable or
superior security or trustworthiness. For this reason, many states have
sought legislative alternatives that more broadly address electronic
authentication and have more flexibility. Generally, these alternatives utilize
a technology-neutral approach and eschew any specific liability regime in
order to avoid market-distorting effects in the emerging technology fields of
electronic commerce.
Thirty-one states have or are considering 58 statutes that address electronic
signature or electronic authentication standards. See Appendix E. Fifty-five
of these initiatives representing 29 states may be divided between the
criteria-based and enabling categories. See Appendix D.
1. Criteria-Based Approach
The predominant model for criteria-based laws is the "California"
authentication standard. Akin to an evidentiary standard, the California
model incorporates some requirements into the definition of an electronic
signature in order to satisfY security and trustworthiness concerns. An
electronic signature is legally effective if it is:
a. Unique to th~ person using it;
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b. Capable of verification;
c. Under the sole control of the person using it;
d. Linked to the data in such a manner that if the data is changed the
signature is invalidated; and
e. In conformity with regulations adopted by the appropriate state agency
usually the Secretary of State.
Cal. Gov't Code § I6.5(a) ( I995). Prior to the model's enactment, the
California legislature explicitly considered and rejected the Utah/Guidelines
model, in part, due to concerns of market distortion and technological
neutrality.
The California criteria-based approach has proven quite flexible for various
state legislators. The broad criteria may apply both to electronic and digital
signatures since it is designed to lay the requirements for trustworthiness
and security. For example, the California Secretary of State has recently
published its Proposed Digital Signature Regulations, in which it adopts two
acceptable technologies: PKI digital signatures and signature dynamics.
Indiana has adopted the California criteria as a prerequisite for the
recognition of digital signatures. Illinois is considering the criteria as a basis
for evaluating whether an electronic signature may be deemed "secure." The
first four elements ofthe California standard also have been used in
legislation from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Virginia as optional
criteria that the trier of fact may consider when evaluating the authenticity of
an electronic signature.
On the whole, II states have I9 initiatives that incorporate the criteria-based
approach. Ten states have adopted the California standard into law. See
Appendix D. Nine of the enacted laws, California's among them, are
"limited" in scope. See Appendix A. Georgia, Kansas, New Hampshire and
Virginia have enacted "general" statutes that use the California
criteria-based approach. Electronic signature laws enacted in Georgia and
Kansas are unique because the criteria is incorporated into the definition of
an electronic signature.

2. Signature-Enabling Approach
The remaining legislative initiatives fall within the signature-enabling
category. The "general" laws permit any electronic mark that is intended to
authenticate a writing to satisfy a signature requirement. See Appendix D.
The net effect of this approach is to give legal recognition to both digital and
electronic signatures for statutory and common law writing and signature
requirements.
An early example of this approach is Florida's Electronic Signature Act of
I996, Fla. Stat.§ l.OI (I996 Fla. H.B. 942). The key elements ofthe
operative terms are;
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• The word "writing" includes handwriting, printing, typewriting and all
other methods and means of forming letters and characters upon
paper, stone, wood, or other materials. The word "writing" also
includes information which is created or stored in any electronic
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
• "Electronic signature" means any letters, characters, or symbols,
manifested by electronic or similar means, executed or adopted by a
party with an intent to authenticate a writing. A writing is
electronically signed if an electronic signature is logically associated
with such writing.
• Unless otherwise provided by law, an electronic signature may be
used to sign a writing and shall have the same force and effect as a
written signature.
Massachusetts also is representative. Massachusetts has put forward the
most modest position regarding electronic authentication due to similar
concerns voiced in California regarding the potential for market distortions
and the need for technological neutrality. Massachusetts, however, does not
adopt any particular authentication criteria like California in removing
signature and writing barriers. Massachusetts' draft legislation provides, in
part:
Section 1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter, the following terms have the following
meaning:
"Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable form. The term "record" includes,
without limitation, electronic records and written records.
"Signed" or "signature" includes electronic and digital signature
methods.
Section 2. Electronic Records and Signatures.
(a) Where the law requires information to be in writing, that
requirement is met by a record. In any legal proceeding, a
record shall not be inadmissible in evidence on the sole ground
that it is an electronic record. Any duplicate record that
accurately reproduces the original record shall be admissible in
evidence as the original itselfunless in the circumstances it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.
(b) Where the law requires a signature of a person, that
requirement is met by that person's electronic signature. Where
any rule of law requires a signature to be notarized or
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acknowledged for filing, that rule is satisfied by an electronic
signature that meets standards established by the secretary of
the commonwealth.
(c) This section shall not apply:
(i) when its application would be inconsistent with the manifest
intent ofthe parties;
(ii) when its application would involve a construction of a rule
oflaw that is clearly inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
law making body or repugnant to the context of the same rule of
law, provided that the mere requirement that a record be "in
writing" or "written" shall not by itself be sufficient to establish
such intent.
Massachusetts' approach also differs from Florida's in its use of a "record" to
address writing and signature requirements, which derives from the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law's Model Law on
Electronic Commerce ("UNCITRAL Model Law") and is consistent with
language used by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") in revising the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") Articles 2B and 4B.
On the whole, 27 states have or are considering the enabling approach.
Twenty-two states enacted legislation of which five had "general"
applicability. The bulk of the initiatives considered remain in the "limited"
class. See Appendix D. In general, all of these states are silent regarding
such issues as certification authority standards, cross-border recognition,
and liability issues. The marketplace and existing laws are left to resolve
unanswered questions. Although electronic signatures are recognized, n<?
evidentiary presumptions attach to the use of either electronic or digital
signatures. This is in sharp contrast to those states that have addressed
digital signatures alone. Thus, this approach is merely "enabling" in that the
policy objective simply is to remove writing and signature barriers without
endeavoring to facilitate any form of development.

C, Hybrid Approach
Of all the legislation introduced over the past two years, only Florida,
Illinois, New Hampshire, and Oregon authored electronic authentication
statutes that addressed both electronic and digital signatures. All four give
general recognition to electronic signatures and authorize digital signatures
in varying degrees of specificity.
The comprehensive draft legislation being circulated by the Illinois Attorney
General Commission on Electronic Commerce and Crime falls between the
Massachusetts and Utah/Guidelines model approach and incorporates
aspects of California's criteria-based model. The Illinois draft gives broad
recognition to electronic signatures, adopting many provisions of the
UNCITRAL Mode~ Law. The legislation creates a new category of
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electronic signature based on the California criteria model called "secure
electronic signatures." Signatures that qualify are accorded rebuttable
evidentiary presumptions regarding the genuineness and integrity of the
signature. Parties to a transaction may select from a security procedure that
is defined by the statute or one that is commercially reasonable and agreed
to by the parties.
The "secure status" of a secure electronic signature may be challenged (1) by
evidence indicating either that a security procedure authorized by the statute
is generally not trustworthy or a security procedure agreed to by the parties
is not commercially reasonable or implemented in an untrustworthy manner,
or (2) by evidence suggesting that the relying party's reliance was not
reasonable. Factors affecting the "reasonableness" of a recipient's reliance
upon a signature also may be considered, including the relying party's
knowledge, course of dealing, and trade usage. The security procedure
authorized by the statute is the use of digital signatures. Electronic records
that are signed with digital signatures may constitute a secure electronic
record if the digital signature is created and verified by a valid certificate
that is considered trustworthy.
The lllinois draft is more flexible and less restrictive than the
Utah/Guidelines model in creating a PKI scheme, allocating presumptions,
and authorizing the use of digital signatures. The Secretary of State is
authorized to take several steps to ensure the quality of certificates issued
including the adoption of certain security standards for CAs, voluntary
licensing, and third party accreditation. Compliance with the Secretary of
State's quality control measures will give rise to a rebuttable presumption of
trustworthiness, but a default rule also permits trustworthiness to be found
by the trier of fact. Like the Utah/Guidelines model, the ultimate burden of
going forward with some evidence (burden of persuasion) is placed upon the
party challenging the integrity of the record or the genuineness of the
signature. The important distinction between the Illinois draft and the
Utah/Guidelines model is that the presumptions generically apply to secure
electronic signatures rather than digital signatures exclusively.
There are no express CA auditing or bonding provisions and the Secretary of
State is not authorized to serve as a CA. CA liability is not statutorily
limited but may be limited by the CA's certification statements. Subscribers
have a duty of care (reasonableness) in holding their private keys secure.
CAs have a similar duty to use trustworthy methods and may be bound by
certain warranties. Like the Washington law, the Illinois draft also has a
blanket authorization to vary its terms by agreement, the only other
legislative initiative to do so.
NCCUSL al.so is drafting its Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. The
current draft adopts many of the initial enabling provisions of the
UNCITRAL Model Law that give legal recognition to electronic signatures
and documents (records). In addition, the NCCUSL draft has adopted the
Illinois concept of a "secure electronic record" and "secure electronic
signature" and utilizes the California criteria as a litmus test before
according any evid~ntiary presumptions. Its definition of "security
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procedure" is broad and encompasses the familiar UCC concept of
commercial reasonability. Unlike the Illinois draft however, the NCCUSL
draft makes no attempt to facilitate the development of the prescriptive
digital signature/PIG model by linking evidentiary presumptions with digital
signatures. The determination of "security" with its associated presumptions
stands independently. Overall, the NCCUSL draft endeavors to be more
technology-neutral.

III. CONCLUSIONS
There is no uniformity in state approaches to electronic authentication.
States have been most active in deciding appropriate authentication
standards for limited transactions with government or discrete areas of
private law such as medical records. No electronic authentication model has
come to dominate the legislative marketplace and experimentation
continues.
This report finds that legislative efforts have been focused predominantly on
enacting limited electronic signature laws as opposed to general laws. In the
"general" class of statutes, seven states have enacted legislation adopting
PKI with three using the Utah/Guidelines model; four states have enacted
legislation utilizing the California-criteria model of which two use the
criteria permissively; and five states have enacted signature- enabling
legislation. See Appendix D. This contrasts sharply with the 36 limited laws
enacted of the 48 proposed during the same time period. See Appendix E.
As evidenced by the hybrid approaches ofNCCUSL and Illinois, the recent
trend is toward legislation that: (a) at a minimum, enables electronic
commerce by recognizing that the primary objective of electronic
authentication is the removal ofbarriers associated with traditional writing
and signature requirements and (b) establishes evidentiary presumptions in
favor of the electronic signature user based on security and trustworthiness
standards. The pattern suggests that as security measures increase and
provide a heightened indicia of trustworthiness, stronger evidentiary
presumptions may attach.
The trend analysis also reveals what is absent from the various state
initiatives. For example, only the prescriptive model addresses cross-border
recognition of electronic or digital signatures. The Utah/Guidelines model
only recognizes digital signatures originating in states that have
"substantially similar" authentication and licensing standards and that are
recognized by the state regulatory authority by rule. Florida is the only state
with a prescriptive statute that requires less and authorizes reciprocity.
Additionally, no 'state initiative addresses choice oflaw or choice of forum
issues with tpe exception ofthe NCCUSL draft which essentially adopts
conflict of laws common law principles. Thus, there is a legislative gap and
no certainty as to whether an electronic signature will be given full force and
effect outside of the state on which it was affixed and what law will be used
to determine its effect if it is recognized.
Finally, states that ~ave considered or adopted the prescribptive model have
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uniformly looked to state licensing schemes to ensure trustworthiness. By
contrast, Illinois is the only state to consider recognizing the role of
non-governmental or private sector third-parties in establishing through
accreditation the trustworthiness and security of an electronic
authentication.
The Full Report and the appendices are available in .pdf format.
Albert Gidari, Esq.
(gidaa@perkinscoie.com)
John P. Morgan, Esq.
(morgo@perkinscoie.com)
Perkins Coie
1201 Third Avenue, 40th Floor
Seattle, WA 981 0 I
+1 (206) 583-8888
+ 1 (206) 583-8500 (fax)
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The "paperless office" concept has been around for well over a decade. It
has failed to move from theory to reality, however, because of cultural
reticence, unequal access to technology, and the lack of an adequate legal
and service infrastructure to support such a paradigm shift. Conspicuously
missing from this list of impediments is the technolo.gy itself, because the
technology has been available for the last 20 years or so. Ours is a
paper-based society. We are comfortable with paper, it is tangible, and we
feel secure about the integrity and source of the information it conveys. In
short, we trust it. In traditional commerce, this trust comes from the use of
secure paper, watermarks, letterhead, handwritten signatures, sealed
envelopes and personal contact. In our initial efforts to "go digital," we have
tried to mimic the paper-based world by attempting to protect the medium
through which communications are conveyed. We have moved to Local Area
Networks and Wide Area Networks within our organizations, and Value
Added Networks, T1s and leased lines to communicate with the external
world. The problem with these private networks is their inability to scale to
the proportions necessary to satisfy the demands of the "global economy."
They are based on existing relationships and require cost-prohibitive
connectivity .
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The Internet is the obvious solution to this problem. Relatively unnoticed until
the past 5 years, the explosion of Internet use has been tempered only by
the lack of sufficient information security and a legal framework to enable
electronic commerce via the Internet to flourish . Despite these shortcomings,
governments, businesses and individuals are using the Internet more and
more as an inexpensive and ubiquitous means to disseminate and obtain
information, goods and services. With the advent of public key cryptography
technology and the legal recognition of digital signatures at both the state
and federal level, the full potential of the Internet is just beginning to be
discovered. With adequate security and an appropriate legal and service
infrastructure, the Internet may now be used as a Global Area Network
(GAN). The ultimate objective for this GAN is to enable real-time electronic
transactions with strangers that are reliable, provable and enforceable. While
the Internet and public key cryptography have been around for decades, the
legal and service infrastructure to support their widespread implementation
has not. With the establishment of such a legal framework and infrastructure
now underway, the GAN -and the elimination of paper- is finally becoming a
reality.
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paper-based, must meet these fundamental requirements: (The first
requirement is that the message provide for sender authenticity to enable the
recipient (or relying party) to determine who really sent the message and if
that individual is, in fact, authorized to commit his organization to the
transaction. (The second major requirement is that there be some means to
ascertain that the message has integrity. The recipient must be able to
determine whether or not the message received has been altered en route or
is incomplete. (The third, and most critical, requirement addresses the ability
to "prove up" the message in court. Referred to as non-repudiation, this
requires some way to ensure that the sender cannot falsely deny sending the
message, nor falsely deny the contents of the message. (Finally, certain
signature formalities must be satisfied. For example, the statute of fraud
specifies "in writing" and signature requirements for transactions over a
certain dollar value or time period.

Satisfying the requirements
. '
.
In electronic commerce, the focus to date has been on securing the medium
through the use of private leased lines and networks. This is prohibitively
expensive and, in some cases, unfeasible for potential parties to a
transaction. For the Internet to offer an inexpensive and ubiquitous solution,
the focus must be on information security. The goal here is to protect the
message, not the medium. The Internet is insecure - potentially millions of
people have access and "hackers" can intercept anything traveling over the
wire. There is no way to make it a secure environment; it is, after all, a public
network, hence its availability and affordability. In order for it to serve our
purposes as a vehicle for legally binding transactions, efforts must be
directed at securing the message itself, as opposed to the transport
mechanism. Public key cryptography, a data encryption technique, provides
just that kind of message protection. Originally recognized within the context
of electronic funds transfer and UCC Article 4A, digital signatures- which are
based on public key cryptography - have been thrust into the legal limelight
as the solution to the problem of guaranteeing secure electronic commerce.
The Utah Digital Signature Act was the first legislative initiative to address
secure electronic commerce, with efforts by other states and the federal
government trailing close behind.

Digital signatures and

-·

..

In defining digital signatures and how they work, it is helpful to begin by
clarifying what they are not. A digital signature is not a digitized image of a
handwritten signature. We are all familiar with the electronic pad a person
signs upon receiving a package from a delivery service such as Federal
Express. In these cases, the handwritten signature is digitized and the image
transferred to the electronic document. Once captured, these digitized
signatures can be cut and pasted on to any electronic document, making
forgery a simple matter. Digital signatures on the other hand are an actual
transformation of an electronic message using public key cryptography.
Through this process, the digital signature is tied to the document being
signed, as well as to the signer, and therefore cannot be reproduced.
Furthermore, digital signatures are legally admissible in a number of states
already, and will be legally recognized nationwide and worldwide in the near
future.
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The principles underlying the use of cryptography in electronic
communications are as follows:
1. All data entered into a computer is read as a binary
number. For example, when "Jack and Jill went up the hill"
is typed in, the computer reads it as
"1 000111010100111000101," etc.
2. Because electronic messages are represented numerically
in the computer, it is possible to perform mathematical
functions on them.
3. Electronic messages can thus be transformed into
alternate representations that are unique to the original

Public key cryptograpt~·
There are two distinct encryption techniques. Symmetric cryptography is the
most familiar. It is based on a shared secret, or key, and works well within
isolated environments. An example of symmetric cryptography is the
automated teller machine (ATM) at a bank. When you use an ATM, you gain
access to your account by entering a personal identification number (PIN).
You are, in effect, authenticating yourself to the bank. You and the bank
share a secret, in this case your PIN, and, as such, can communicate
securely upon revealing knowledge of this secret. The inherent problem with
symmetric cryptography is one of scalability. In order for the communications
to be confidential, the exchange of the key, or shared secret, must be done
securely. Obviously, this type of secure distribution is not feasible when the
number of different people with whom you want to communicate securely
escalates beyond a manageable number. The other encryption technique is
asymmetric cryptography - also known as public key cryptography - because
it involves an asymmetric key pair. This key pair is comprised of what is
referred to as a public key and a private key. The public key, as its name
suggests, may be freely disseminated. This key does not need to be kept
confidential. The private key, on the other hand, must be kept secret. The
owner of the key pair must guard his private key closely, as sender
authenticity and non-repudiation are based on the signer having sole access
to his private key. There are several important characteristics of these key
pairs. First, while they are mathematically related to each other, it is
impossible to calculate one key from the other. Therefore, the private key
cannot be compromised through knowledge of the associated public key.
Second, each key in the key pair performs the inverse function of the other.
What one key does, only the other can undo.

D1g1ta1 s1gnature components
Digital signatures are based on asymmetric, or public key, cryptography. In
addition to a key pair and some type of electronic communications, the digital
signing and verification processes involve something known as a hash
algorithm and a signature algorithm. The hash and signature algorithms are
extremely complex mathematical equations. The hash algonthm is
performed on the original electronic message's binary code, resulting in what
is referred to as a message digest, which is a 160-bit string of digits that is
unique to the original message. The signature ~gorithm is then performed
on this message digest. The resultant string of digits is the digital signature.
The signer's private key is incorporated into the signature algorithm during
the signing process, and the public key is incorporated into the signature
algorithm during the verification process. An extremely rudimentary
mathematical exampie of this would be as follows:
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For the sake of simplicity, assume that the binary number 100 represents the
original message. Again for simplicity, assume the hash algorithm is simply
to multiply the binary by two. The result of passing the binary of the original
message through the hash algorithm is the message digest, or the unique
fingerprint of the message, which is 200 in this example. This message
digest is then passed through the signature algorithm, of which the signer's
private key is a component. In this example, the signature algorithm has
been drastically simplified to multiplying by two to the *, where * equals the
signer's private key, in this case 2. The resulting number of 800 is the digital
signature . In contrast to a digitized signature, a digital signature has nothing
to do with the signer's name or handwritten signature. It is an actual
transformation of the message itself that incorporates a "secret" known only
to the signer, and is therefore tied to both the signer and the message being
signed. A signer's digital signature will be different for each different
document he signs.

Digital signature processes
The following are graphical representations of the digital signing and
verification processes, respectively:

Creating a
~
: . . .- :.

: -~ r· , . .

Verifyi~g a
-
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Public l<ey
It is now possible for an individual to purchase digital signature software, or
download it from a browser, and install it ·on his computer. He can then
generate a key pair and release his public key to the on-line world, using any
identity he chooses, with no guarantee that the identity is authentic. This
scenario underscores the need for some type of entity to serve as a trusted
third party (TTP) to vouch for individuals' identities, and their relationship to
their public keys. This entity, in public key infrastructure (PKI) terminology, is
referred to as a certification authority (CA) . TheCA is a trusted third party
that issues digital certificates to its subscribers, binding their identities to the
key pairs they use to digitally sign electronic communications. Digital
certificates contain the name of the subscriber, the subscriber's public key,
the digital signature of the issuing CA, the issuing CA's public key, and other
pertinent information about the subscriber and his organization, such as his
authority to conduct certain transactions, etc. These certificates have a
default life cycle of 1 year, and can be revoked upon private key
compromise, separation from an organization, etc. These certificates are
stored in an on-line, publicly accessible repository. The repository also
maintains an up-to-date listing of all the unexpired certificates which have
been revoked, referred to as a certificate revocation list (CRL). The
repository also maintains an electronic copy of the certification practice
statement (CPS) of each CA that publishes certificates to it. The CPS
outlines the policies and procedures of each CA's operations from
registration of a subscriber to the physical security surrounding their CA
system .
The following is a graphical representation of the PKI process flow:
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PKI Prc•::ess Flow
Step 1. Subscriber applies to Certification Authority for Digital
Certificate.
Step 2. CA verifies identity of Subscriber and issues Digital
Certificate.
Step 3. CA publishes Certificate to Repository.
Step 4. Subscriber digitally signs electronic message with Private
Key to ensure Sender Authenticity, Message Integrity and
Non-Repudiation and sends to Relying Party.
Step 5. Relying Party receives message, verifies Digital Signature
with Subscriber's Public Key, and goes to Repository to check
status and validity of Subscriber's Certificate.
Step 6. Repository returns results of status check on Subscriber's
to Relying Party.

Certificat~
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Digital signature
Digital signatures are critical to the electronic conversion of any presently
paper-based process that requires strong authentication of both the sender
and the contents of the message, and/or non-repudiation . The number of
such applications is virtually endless, ranging from purchase order systems,
time cards and automated forms processing to contracts and remote
financial transactions or inquiries.
The first major implementation in the state of Utah is the electronic filing of
court documents. The pilot will begin with criminal filings, as these are filed
by the state prosecutors, and have no filing fee associated with them. As the
pilot moves into civil litigation, the Utah State Bar will· act as a CA on behalf
of its members, and will issue digital certificates that are tied to membership
status with the Bar This will enable a filing attorney's Bar status to be
automatically verified by the courts when the attorney attempts to file
electronically.

Obligations ~nd
.. . ---- ..._.- '- . --

·· ~
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The effective use of digital signatures imposes certain obligations on the
parties involved. The signers of electronic messages must protect their
private key from compromise. This is the fundamental building block of the
PKI. If a signer's private key is compromised, he must report it immediately
so the CA can revoke his certificate and place it on a CRL. Certification
authorities are obligated to use due diligence to verify the identity of their
subscribers and their relationship to their public keys. The CA must also
promptly suspend or revoke a certificate at a subscriber's request. Finally,
the reliant parties must actually verify the digital signature and check its
validity against the current CRL maintained by an on-line repository. The
legal presumptions involved in relying on a properly verified digital signature
are that the message is presumed not to have been altered since sent, and
that the signature is presumed to be that of the named signer. Furthermore,
a digitally signed electronic message meets all "in writing" and signature
formalities and is considered to be the original. Digital signature statutes
have been enacted in Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, New Mexico, Utah,
Virginia and Washington and are pending in approximately 30 other states.

Resources
For more information on the status of individual state legislation , please refer
to a Web site sponsored and maintained by the Electronic Commerce
Practice Group of the law firm Baker & McKenzie at
http://www.bakerinfo.com/ecommerce.
For more information, please contact:
Digital Signature Trust Co.
1095 East 21
South
Suite #201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 246-4380
Toll-Free: (888) 294-7831
Facsimile: (801) 246-4361
E-mail: info@digsigtrust.com
www.dtqsrqtrust.com

oo

IJ uf

06115/2000 I O:.t4 Al\.

Digital Signature Trust Co.

http://www .J igsigtrust. o.:om/pJsb.htm

[Home] [Site Map] r Press Release] [About DST] [Employment] [Contact DST]
[ Products & Serv1ces ] [ Support & Contact] [ DST Solutions at Work ]
[ PKI & Digital Signatures] [ DST Partners] [Company Information
©1999 Digital Signature Trust Co.
[ Pnvacy Statement] [ Legal Notices ] [ CPS
1095 East 2100 South
Suite#201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Phone: 888-294-7831/801-246-4380
Fax: 801 -246-4361

7 uf7

1

1

o6tl ;;:woo 1u:-'4 1\:-. 1

Digital Signature Use in California

Appendix 21

I A~sembly Committee on lntormation 1 echno logy

Paperless Real Estate Transactions- How Far Behind Can We Be?

w

http://www .eatonpeabody.com/art_paperless.htn

Paperless Real Estate Transactions - How Far Behind Can We Be?
by John A. Cunningham, Esq.
©Eaton, Peabody, Bradford & Veague, P.A. 1998. These materials are intended for educational purposes
only and do not constitute legal advice. No representation or warranty is made as to their accuracy or fitness
for any particular purpose.

§
As the paperless office is becoming an ever more attainable dream and various forms of
electronic commerce are commonplace and widespread, it is possible to envision truly
paperless commercial transactions. Even transactions involving real estate, which to some
people represent the most arcane and hidebound sector ofthe law, could become paperless
in the reasonably near future. In order for a real estate transaction to be paperless. three
basic areas need to be addressed: digital
signatures, digital payments, and record retention and retrieval.
Digital Signatures
It is interesting that digital signatures are simultaneously the most secure portion of the
current infrastructure for paperless transactions and also, at least arguably, the least trusted
by the public. This lack oftrust is almost certainly the result of insufficient experience with
and understanding of the technological basis of digital signatures. Of course, misleading
press reports of hackers' exploits do not help the situation. Equally distressing is the US
government's longstanding antipathy towards secure encryption algorithms. Nevertheless,
digital signatures can be employed today using systems which are readily available,
convenient, inexpensive, and provably more secure than physical signatures.
In order to serve in a commercial transaction, digital signatures must allow verification that
a document has been signed by the party purporting to sign it and that the signed document
has not been altered. The currently standard system for achieving this involves key pair
encryption. Every signer in such a system must have two digital "keys," which are really
just numbers. The two keys are mathematically related to one another, but it is
computationally infeasible to derive one key from
the other. The keys work in pairs so that a document encrypted with one of the keys can
only be decrypted with the other key ofthe pair. One of the keys is made public and the
other key is kept private by the signer. Thus, if the signer encrypts a document with his
private key, then it can only be decrypted with his public key. Conversely, if an encrypted
document is successfully decrypted using a person's public key, then it must have been
encrypted with that person's private key, which
constitutes proof of his digital signature.

Because key pairs can be created by anyone, the difficulty with this system is that there
must be a trustworthy method to insure that a public key identified as belonging to a
purported signer truly does belong to that person. In some transactions, the signer can
communicate his public key to the recipient using a secure medium. A more flexible
solution has arisen with trusted third parties known
as certificate authorities. In short, a certificate authority adopts procedures to assure the
identities of key holders and then verifies the validity oftheir keys to others. Note that the
certificate authority does not have knowledge of the private keys.
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In order to verify that a document has not been altered, it would be simple just to encrypt
the whole document using the foregoing procedure. This takes an undesirable amount of
processing time, so an alternative system has been widely adopted. First, a program called
a hash algorithm is used on the document. This generates a number which, although not
guaranteed unique, is computationally infeasible to generate from any other document.
This number is then encrypted. The
recipient then only needs to use the same hash algorithm on the document and compare the
result to the encrypted result. If they match, the document has not been altered.
The American Bar Association has prepared a detailed set of guidelines for the use of
digital signatures.
For legislation in this area, you should look at the model legislation proposed b)
UNCITRAL (the United Nations Commission on International Trade) and the proposed
draft ofthe Electronic Data Security Act of 1997. The Food and Drug Administration has
adopted regulations for the use of digital signatures, and, there is a helpful listing of state
legislation concerning digital signatures.

Digital Payments

Although of longer standing and more widely deployed, the systems in place for digital
payments are less secure than those for digital signatures. Payments by credit card, using
encryption methods to protect the card number, are common today, but may not be feasible
for larger transactions. Also, the credit card numbers themselves are relatively insecure,
since there is no truly private component known only to the card holder. Direct payments
authorized by PIN numbers are not sufficiently secure, because the PIN numbers are not
encrypted. Direct wire transfers are probably secure, but they are certainly not
instantaneous. Also, they usually require some "paper trail," although the statutory
. authority exists (in Article 4-A ofthe Uniform Commercial Code) for a bank and its
customers to create truly paperless and secure methods of initiating direct funds transfers.
No well adopted plan has yet arisen, but it is clear that a standard methodology for
introducing direct transfers into the payments mechanism requires little more than the will
ofthe
·
banking industry.
In the ideal payment system of the future, creditors would present invoices electronically.
Although not necessarily uniform in appearance, these invoices would present the amount
due and the payment routing information in some standard data format. The recipient
would review the invoice and, if choosing to pay it, would simply make an appropriate
signal (will it still be a mouse click?). Funds would then be transferred from the recipient
to the creditor. Obviously, it would be very easy to track these transactions in accounting
systems for.the creditors, the recipients, and the banks. Bills in the mail and checks could
(and should) become a quaint memory. Note that no part ofthis system requires any
technology not already in use today, and some forms of this system are already functioning.
Only the lack of standardization on a single secure protocol prevents this from being a
universal alternative to the current bank payments mechanism.
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Record Retention and Retrieval
Paper copies of documents are retained today (in amazingly vast quantities) for two main
purposes: to provide a record of transactions and to provide proof of agreements and facts.
There is clearly no barrier to storing records digitally other than the technical constraints.
The price of scanners, storage media, and related equipment has dropped so significantly
that for most high-volume storage needs the total cost of digital storage is likely to be less
than the cost of filing cabinets and rent for the storage area of the equivalent paper records.
It is also far easier with digital storage to provide security from accidental destruction and
from unauthorized access. The ease of creating multiple copies of digital storage in
separate physical locations virtually eliminates the risk of accidental destruction. This level
of protection can generally be achieved for paper records only through the use of
microfilming or some other optical system of copying, which is highly labor
intensive. Guarding against unauthorized access to digital storage involves little expense,
provided that sensible security protocols are implemented and maintained. Similar security
for paper records would require direct and constant supervision of access to and use of
paper files, which is unlikely to be cost effective in all but the most security-conscious
situations.
The chief cost involved in digital record storage today relates only to making digital copies
of non-digital source documents. Although this expense has been greatly reduced with the
introduction of low-cost scanners, the goal should be to eliminate non-digital source
documents so that scanning is unnecessary.
For the purpose of providing a record of transactions, digital storage is clearly superior to
paper. Even with today's document management programs, it is possible to organize, index,
and search digitally stored documents with an accuracy, thoroughness, and speed which is
just impossible to duplicate with paper records.
Using paper records as the proof of a transaction remains the single greatest impediment to
replacing paper storage with digital storage. As digital signature technology becomes more
widespread, this should change. It would appear to be a matter of fact that it is easier to
forge or materially alter a paper document than a digitally signed document. Various
efforts, noted above, are already underway to make digitally signed documents admissible
as evidence of a transaction for all
purposes.
In the world of real estate transactions, the most important record-keeping system is the
Registry of Deeds. The indices of the registries in Maine are already maintained in a digital
form, and there is no functional reason why all of the registry records could not be stored
digitally. The benefits are obvious, and the difficulties are all related to the implementation
of new systems and the cost of maintaining duplicate systems until digital storage becomes
the norm. These issues are not trivial, but could be solved at moderate cost even using
today's technology.

A Paperless Real Estate Transaction

Today, many docu!llents in real estate transactions can be transmitted digitally and
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negotiated to final form without ever having been printed on paper. In a closing of the
future, simultaneous physical presence of the parties would not be necessary. Each party
would digitally sign the agreed documents. Funds would be transferred electronically, and
all documents would be digitally stored. Any recording at the Registry of Deeds would be
done by digital transmission, and the title search
would have been accomplished by accessing digitally stored records. This may seem
far-fetched, but it requires the invention of no new technology, only the implementation of
already existing systems and protocols. While it is possible that real estate transactions
may be the last, reluctant entrants to be dragged into the modem era, it seems inevitable
that they will get there eventually.
For an analogous consideration of these issues in the context of transactions involving
chattel paper, you may wish to read the article available from the American Bar
Association.
(Click here for a list of the URLs associated with the
online resources cited above.)
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Legislating Market Winners
Digital Signature Laws and the Electronic Commerce Marketplace
C. Bradford Biddle
Abstract
This paper argues that certain enacted digital signature laws are premised upon false assumptions, and
inappropriately enshrine a business model which would not evolve naturally in the marketplace. In
attempting to solve an unsolvable liability allocation problem, such legislation harms consumers and the
future evolution of electronic commerce. The article points out that alternative business models can solve
the liability allocation problem. Despite obvious flaws, legislation of this type continues to be proposed,
partly because the infrastructure created by these laws coincides with the needs of key escrow proponents.
Ultimately the article argues that digital signature laws, which impose a particular view of electronic
commerce, should be abandoned in favor of laws that remove specific, well-defined barriers to electronic
commerce and that allow the electronic commerce marketplace to evolve unfettered.
The argument goes something like this: Internet commerce is hampered by the authentication problem.
There is no reliable way to ensure that the sender of an electronic transmission is in fact who they purport
to be. Though digital signatures, supported by a "public key infrastructure" (PKI) of certification authorities
(CAs) and certificate databases can solve this authentication problem, CAs will not emerge under the
current legal regime because they face uncertain and potentially immense liability exposure. Additionally,
the legal status of digitally signed documents is unclear. Therefore, legislation is needed to define and limit
CA liability and to establish the legality of digitally signed documents. Lil.
This argument has captured an influential segment of the legal community, and has led to the enactment of
"digital signature legislation" (described later in the article) in several U.S. states and foreign nations.
Unfortunately, the argument is built on fundamentally flawed assumptions, and the legislation enacted
based upon it is correspondingly flawed. Much (but not all) of the digital signature legislation enacted to
date presumes a vision of electronic commerce that simply is not tenable, and which would not "naturally"
evolve in the marketplace. This legislation poses the risk of profoundly distorting an infant market and
locking in business models which are harmful to consumers and to the future development of electronic
commerce.
The type of public key infrastructure (PKI) envisioned by many of the existing digital signature laws is not
viable. The problem is liability. Digital signature legislation drafters have assumed that the potential
liability exposure faced by CAs is somehow a flaw of the existing legal regime. This is an erroneous
assumption: the liability exposure faced by CAs under the "open PKI" model envisioned by legislation
drafters is a product of a business model that cannot internalize the costs associated with its
implementation. Moreover, in attempting to limit the liability exposure of CAs, current digital signature
laws shift an immense liability burden onto consumers who use the infrastructure envisioned by these laws.
Putting this type of liability burden on consumers violates long-held tenets of public policy, and is a result
which consumers would reject in any truly "bargained for" transaction.
Digital signatures will undoubtedly play a significant role in electronic commerce. However, rather than
being implemented in the "open PKI" model envisioned by various digital signature laws, digital signatures
are more likely to be utilized under a "closed PKI" system. Under a closed PKI system, the liability
problems associated with digital signatures become much more manageable. This article describes the
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differences between open and closed PKI, and suggests that, in the absence of legislative displacement,
certain marketplace trends indicate that closed PKI is indeed the likely market winner.
The open PKI model can and should compete against closed PKI and other authentication technologies, and
should not be accorded special legal status via legislation. Such legislation is unnecessary: the "contractual
privity problem" which is used to justify open PKI legislation is a red herring. Commercial CAs utilizing
the open PKI model can compete in the marketplace without special PKI legislation. These CAs are
unlikely to succeed, not because of flaws with the legal system, but because the open PKI model is not a
winning business model.
Despite raising the very peculiar specter of regulating an essentially nonexistent industry (CAs), and despite
increased recognition of the problems associated with the very specific vision of electronic commerce
embodied in these digital signature laws, laws based on the open PKI model continue to be proposed and
implemented. This article suggests that one of several factors behind the continued momentum ofthis
legislation, particularly at the federal and international levels, is its synergy with cryptographic "key
escrow" proposals. While digital signature legislation ostensibly addresses the use of cryptography only for
the purposes of authentication, and not for confidentiality, the infrastructure created by these laws is ideal
for implementing a key escrow scheme.
Ultimately this article argues that digital signature laws which impose a particular view of electronic
commerce should be abandoned. Laws which remove specific, well-defined barriers to electronic
commerce--such as unnecessary "writing" or handwritten signature requirements--and which allow the
electronic commerce marketplace to evolve unfettered should be encouraged.

Background: Digital Signatures and Public Key
Cryptography
Digital signatures are a particular application of public key cryptography. No attempt will be made here to
explain the rather complex underlying technology in any detail; readers who ·are unfamiliar with basic
cryptographic terminology and techniques should consult some of the many excellent so.urces available
which can provide the relevant technical background. The importance of understanding the technology
cannot be overstated: at least some ofthe flaws in cryptography-related legislation can be attributed to
inadequate technical knowledge on the part ofpolicymakers. At the risk of oversimplifying to the point of
inaccuracy, creating a digital signature involves encrypting a numerical representation of an electronic
message with a private encryption key, which the owner keeps secret; verifying a digital signature involves
decrypting the encrypted data using a related public encryption key, which can be made widely available.
Lawyers have largely focused on what digital signatures can accomplish, if implemented in a particular
ideal setting. If Alice signs an electronic document with a digital signature and sends it over the Internet to
Bob, ideally Bob can be assured of the following:
• First, that the message really came from Alice. Digital signatures can provide assurance that a
message has in fact come from its purported sender, a quality called "data origin authentication."
• Second, that the message he received is the exact message that Alice sent. A digital signature enables
a recipient of a message to verify that a message has not been intentionally or accidentally altered
during transmission, a quality known as "message integrity."
• Third, that Alice cannot later deny that she sent the message. No one else could have sent the
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message but Alice, and Bob can prove it unequivocally. This quality that digital signatures provide is
known as nonrepudiation .
Two difficult problems must be overcome in order to actually fulfill the promise of digital signatures:
identification and the security of private key.

Identification
What if Alice never sent the message to Bob at all? Instead, a forger may have generated a cryptographic
key pair, and entered the public key in a public key database under the name "Alice." "Alice" and Bob may
have entered into some business arrangement whereby Bob performed some service for "Alice," and
"Alice" promised to pay Bob. When Bob attempts to enforce his electronic contract, however, he will find
that he has been the victim of fraud. Digital certificates, issued by "trusted third parties" called certification
authorities, are one attempt to solve this problem of identification.
Certificates are digitally-signed electronic documents issued by CAs that attest to the connection of a public
encryption key to an individual (or other entity). Consider this scenario: Alice generates her public and
private key pair. She then presents her public key to a CA, along with some form of identification. The CA
checks the identification and takes any other steps necessary to assure itself that Alice is indeed who she
claims to be. The CA then gives Alice a certificate attesting to the connection between Alice and her public
key.
TheCA must also somehow provide assurance that it is bound to its public key, which is used to verify
Alice's certificate. Thus, the CA could have its own certificate, signed with the digital signature of a "higher
level" certification authority. This higher level certification authority might be (as under some of the
enacted digital signature laws) a government agency.
When Bob received a message from Alice signed with Alice's digital signature, he could obtain Alice's
certificate either directly from Alice or from an online database. If the signature on the message could be
verified using the public key listed in the certificate, and the CA's signature verified as well, Bob would
know that a CA had authenticated Alice's identity, and that he was not dealing with someone else posing as
Alice.

Security of Private Keys
The second vexing problem presented by public key cryptography is the security of private keys. If a forger
somehow discovers Alice's private key, that forger can digitally sign Alice's name on documents. If a
criminal discovered a certification authority's private key, that criminal would have the means to commit
widespread fraud. As a practical matter, in any large-scale system utilizing public key cryptography, some
private keys will become compromised and the certificate containing the corresponding public key will
need to be revoked. Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are designed to prevent people from relying on a
compromised or otherwise revoked public key/private key pair.
A CRL is a list of public keys that have been revoked prior to their expiration date. If the private key is
compromised, or the key pair is no longer in use for some other reason, the public key would be placed on a
CRL. Thus, before Bob relied on the message that he received from Alice, he would check to make sure
that Alice's certificate was not on a CRL.

Digital Signatur~ Legislation
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A segment of the legal community, noting authentication problems associated with the Internet, became
increasingly enamored with the possibilities of digital signatures. Beginning in 1992, efforts began in
earnest to develop legal rules to support the type of public key infrastructure described above. Many of
these efforts took place within the framework ofthe Information Security Committee ofthe American Bar
Association's Section of Science and Technology (the "ABA Committee").
A primary assumption of this group of lawyers was that the specter of large, uncertain liability exposure
would prevent the emergence of commercial CAs. The liability problem has several aspects. first, if a
criminal defrauded a CA and induced the CA to issue a false certificate, the criminal could impose losses
on a large number of third parties who would rely on the erroneous certificate. TheCA could take every
reasonable step--or even extremely costly, exceptional steps--to confirm identity, but still issue an
erroneous certificate. If every party who relied on the certificate had a claim against the CA for any
consequent losses, the CA's potential liability could be staggering. CAs would be forced to go to
extraordinary lengths to confirm identity in every situation in order to avoid potential liability exposure,
even when parties to a given transaction may have been satisfied with a less rigorously-procured (and thus
less expensive) certificate.
Additionally, CAs face potential liability for claims by parties who rely on a certificate after the private key
associated with the public key listed in the certificate is stolen by a criminal, who then creates forged
digitally-signed documents. This type ofharm would be difficult for CAs to prevent: they have little or no
control over the care a "subscriber" takes in protecting their private key from misappropriation. If CAs bear
this risk, it will be reflected in the price of certificates, which might then be uneconomically high.
CAs face catastrophic liability exposure iftheir private key is compromised. If a criminal obtained a CA's
private key, they could commit widespread fraud. Additionally, once the compromise was discovered, all
certificates issued by that CA would have to be revoked and new certificates issued, imposing costs on all
ofthe subscribers of that CA. If CAs face liability for these potentially immense losses, entrepreneurs might
choose not to enter the CA business at all.
The liability problem was perceived to be particularly intractable because of a "contractual privity
problem." CAs could presumably enter into contracts with their subscribers, and allocate risk between the
CA and subscriber via contract mechanisms: for instance, theCA could offer certain limited warranties to
the subscriber, and limit potential liability to an agreed-upon amount. However, the lawyers looking at this
issue believed that CAs would typically not be able to establish a contractual relationship with the parties
who would rely on certificates, in order to allocate risk by contract. Therefore, these lawyers concluded,
legislation was needed that set out the duties of all parties in this public key infrastructure, and that
allocated liability appropriately.
The ABA Committee planned to release a "U.S. Model Digital Signature Act" in June of 1995.
Increasingly, however, some members of the committee grew dissatisfied with the planned legislative
approach; ultimately, for a variety of reasons, the plan to release model legislation was dropped. In October
1995, the ABA Committee did release its "Digital Signature Guidelines," which it described as:
... general, abstract statements of principle, intended to serve as long-term, unifying
foundations for digital signature law across varying le·gal settings.
The Guidelines set out duties for CAs, subscribers, and relying parties, consistent with the vision for a PKI
described above. The ABA Guidelines avoid taking positions on certain detailed issues that legislation in
this area would address, however.
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In collaboration with the ABA Committee, the state of Utah began developing digital signature legislation,
and the Utah Digital Signature Act was enacted (with considerable fanfare) in March of 1995. One of the
reporters in the ABA effort was the primary drafter of the Utah Digital Signature Act. Under the Utah Act,
a government agency assumes the obligations of being a "top level" CA and, as such, is charged with
policymaking, facilitating implementation of digital signature technology, and providing regulatory
oversight of private sector CAs through a comprehensive licensing scheme. Licensing under the Utah Act is
voluntary; however, licensed CAs are offered certain legal benefits (primarily limited liability). The Utah
Act imposes detailed duties on CAs, subscribers, and relying parties that are consistent with the ABA
Guidelines. In addition, it allocates liability among these parties and accords special legal status to digitally
signed documents created using the services of a licensed CA.
A number of states turned to the Utah Act as model digital signature legislation, a process encouraged by
the drafters of the Utah law. In several public communications, a prominent ABA Committee member (who
was also involved in the drafting of the Utah Act) indicated that the Utah Digital Signature Act was
substantively identical to the unreleased ABA Model Digital Signature Act. In the wake of the enactment of
the Utah Act, digital signature legislation based on the Utah law was proposed in nearly a dozen states. By
mid-1997 Washington and Minnesota had enacted laws that closely tracked Utah's, and similar bills remain
pending in many states. The Utah Act proved influential even when not explicitly followed: for instance,
California considered and then rejected the Utah model, enacting a non-technology-specific bill designed to
address transactions with government entities. Early drafts ofthe regulations designed to implement the
California law closely followed the Utah model, however.
The "Utah!ABA Guidelines" model has also proven influential at the international level. Malaysia recently
enacted legislation based upon the Utah Act; similar legislation is under consideration in Australia, Canada,
Germany, Singapore, and at the European Union. The United Nations Committee on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) is also studying Utah-style model legislation.
Recent legislation proposed at the federal level in the United States and in the United Kingdom adopts the
Utah/ABA Guidelines model with an added twist: key escrow. Under these proposed laws, CAs (or
TIPs--trusted third parties--as they are called under the U.K. bill) not only serve to bind subscribers to their
public encryption keys used for authentication purposes, but also serve as key escrow agents, verifying the
·
escrowing of keys used for confidentiality purposes.
Not all legislative bodies have jumped on the Utah!ABA Guidelines bandwagon. Several U.S. states
enacted legislation that addressed "electronic signatures" and other non-public key methods of
authenticating electronic transmissions. The most thoughtful legislative effort to date has occurred in
Massachusetts, where concerns over the market-distorting effects of Utah-style legislation led to a proposed
minimalist bill, aimed simply at removing existing legal barriers to electronic commerce. Similarly, the
influential National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is considering a
uniform law on electronic contracting and has not been receptive to arguments in favor of a Utah-style law.

Open PKI: The Liability "Trilemma"'
The Utah Act and its progeny, and the ABA Guidelines, are premised on an "open system" or "open loop"
model of a PK.I. The open PK.I model envisions that subscribers will obtain a single certificate from an
independent third-party CA, which certifies that subscriber's identity. Certificate holders will then use that
certificate to facilitate transactions with potentially numerous merchants and/or other individuals.
As discussed above, the open PKI scenario implicates considerable liability risk. Proponents of the open
model, enamored with what digital. signatures can potentially accomplish, have attributed this risk to flaws
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in the existing legal regime that must be addressed legislatively. This conclusion is wrong. The liability
exposure faced by CAs under the open PKI model is the product of a business model that cannot internalize
the costs of the inevitable fraud that will result under any public key-based system. The resulting liability
problem is unlikely to be solved at all in the open PKI model, and certainly cannot be solved with any
one-size-fits-all legislative solution.
Here's one aspect of the problem: if criminals can obtain something valuable by expropriating an
individual's private key, they will. Commentary accompanying existing digital signature laws frequently
mentions the concept of storing private keys on tamper-proof smart cards. While such cards would
undoubtedly promote the security of private keys, this is simply wishful thinking at this point: sman cards
are not commercially deployed in any meaningful way. There is currently no practical way to truly secure
private keys, and this problem is going to get worse before it gets better.
Private keys will be expropriated, and third parties will rely on ostensibly valid but fraudulent documents
and suffer losses. The aggregate losses could be quite sizable, judging from analogous contexts: Mastercard
and Visa lose over $1 billion per year to fraud; phone companies claim to lose $3 billion a year to fraud; in
the city of Los Angeles alone fraudulent real estate document filing is said to have cost $131 million in a
twenty-seven month period. Who will bear these losses? The relying party? The individual whose key was
used to sign the document? The CA who performed the initial binding?
Under the Utah Act, the individual whose key was used to sign the document bears unlimited liability if
they failed to exercise "reasonable care" to protect their private key. The Act also imposes difficult
evidentiary burdens on the individual. So, if a subscriber (let's call her "Grandmom," just to put things in
perspective) doesn't exercise due care, and her key is stolen resulting in losses totaling $25,000 prior to
revocation of her key, that subscriber bears the loss--i.e., Grandmom loses her house. Or, if Grandmom
does exercise due care and her key is still misappropriated, she must present a court with "clear and
convincing" evidence (the standard under the Utah Act) to overcome the presumption that a document
signed with her digital signature was in fact signed by her. In either case, the result doesn't comport with
well-established consumer protection laws (compared with the legislatively imposed $50 consumer liability
limit for credit card losses, or the fact that one cannot be bound by a fraudulent handwritten signature).
Moreover, no rational consumer would agree to accept this level of risk in a marketplace transaction. The
benefits ofhaving a certificate simply do not outweigh the very real possibility of facing. extraordinarily
large unreimbursed losses.
Yet ifthe subscriber doesn't bear full liability under this scenario, where else would the loss fall? On the
CA? They couldn't prevent the harm, and couldn't realistically insure against such indeterminate losses via
pricing mechanisms. CAs presumably wouldn't know whether a particular certificate was going to be used
in a purchase of a piece of clip art or in a real estate closing. Thus, the CA couldn't charge a price that
would be commensurate with the CA's corresponding risk of loss if the CA were to bear liability for fraud
involving the certificate.
Could the loss fall on the relying party? The goals of a PKI would be undermined, and an opportunity for
fraudulent collusion would be presented, if the relying party bears the risk.
While the issues are perhaps less stark, this "liability trilemma" plays out similarly for each liability
scenario present under open PKI. If CA liability is limited for erroneous certificates issued through no
"fault" of theCA, who bears the risk ofloss when fraud does occur? The relying party? The individual
whose name is on the certificate, despite the fact that they may have no connection to the situation at all?
What if CA liability is limited in the event of a compromised CA private key? Will the loss fall on any
relying parties who are consequently defrauded? On subscribers who must revoke and replace certificates?
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The fundamental assertion of this article is that there is no satisfactory solution to this problem under an
open PKI model. Certainly there is no one-size-fits-all solution that can be imposed via legislation. As
further described later in the paper, it is conceivable that market mechanisms may be able solve this
"liability trilemma" via contracts, and the "contractual privity problem" is no barrier to this result.
However, this result is nonetheless unlikely: the open PKI model is an inherently flawed business model.

The "Contractual Privity" Red Herring
The "contractual privity problem" as a justification for open PKI-oriented legislation is a red herring. At
least one commercial CA, VeriSign, has emerged unsupported by legislation, and is largely pursuing the
open PKI model. This CA is betting a substantial investment that they can form "webwrap" contracts with
relying parties when the relying parties verify certificates. That is, when relying parties connect to the
VeriSign web site to determine whether a particular certificate has been revoked (placed on VeriSign's
CRL), they are presented with a "click through" or "webwrap" agreement. This agreement defines the
limited warranties VeriSign offers on certificates and strictly limits VeriSign's potential liability. VeriSign
enters into a similar agreement with subscribers when the subscriber first obtains a certificate.
Webwrap agreements are not without their problems. The question of whether they are enforceable at all is
not definitively settled, and there can be other potential problems depending on specific circumstances.
However, this issue is not unique to the CA industry. Most online businesses are forced to rely on webwrap
agreements. Several recent court decisions have strongly suggested that they will be enforceable; a
legislation-drafting effort underway is close to settling the question. Webwrap agreements present a
mechanism by which CAs can attempt to allocate risk contractually. illl
Accordingly, the open PKI model can compete in the marketplace in the absence of any special legislation.
Independent commercial CAs can form enforceable contracts with both subscribers and relying parties, via
webwrap agreements, and thus allocate risk contractually. Various CAs utilizing this model would
presumably compete on warranty, indemnification, liability limitation, and other contractual terms. This is
not a winning business model, however.
Even utilizing the flexibility and dynamism of the market, CAs practicing the open PKI model will not be
able to solve the "liability trilemma." In the long run, CAs will not be able to simultaneously offer
certificates at low prices along with contract terms acceptable to both subscribers and relying parties. The
open PKI model simply poses too much inherent risk of loss that must be borne by one of these three
parties.

The Closed PKI Model
To assert that open PKI is not viable is not to say that public key cryptography won't play an important role
in electronic commerce. The closed PKI model offers some significant benefits, and will likely
compete--and win--for a variety of applications in the marketplace.
A closed PKI has been defined as a system "wherein a contract or a series of contracts identifies and defines
the rights and responsibilities of all parties to a particular transaction." This definition came about in
response to the assumption that the "contractual privity problem" prevented contract formation with relying
parties in an open system. As discussed above, this is an erroneous assumption: CAs can form contracts
with relying parties in an open system. Thus, a better definition of a closed system is one where public key
mechanisms are used within a specific, bounded context.
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Risk management is the critical area of difference between closed and open PK.l. Within a bounded context,
the liability allocation problems that are intractable under the open model become manageable, primarily
because potential liability exposure is quantifiable and limited in scope.
For example, the proprietor of an online "mall" might issue certificates to potential customers and to
merchants. The proprietor, acting as a CA, has the opportunity to enter into contractual relationships with
both consumers and merchants who will rely on the certificates, and thus can allocate risk contractually.
Moreover, the risk to be allocated is relatively small. Unlike under the open model, the CA knows exactly
what the issued certificates will be used for. TheCA can accurately predict and manage potential losses,
and either absorb this cost via pricing mechanisms or assign it to either subscribers or merchants by
contract.
Similarly. a merchant might issue certificates directly to its customers. The owner of an online magazine,
for example, might mail diskettes containing certificates directly to subscribers of the paper version of the
same magazine. Such certificates could be installed the subscriber's Web browser and used to access the
online magazine, and perhaps to order related merchandise. The magazine vendor would be well positioned
to determine whether such certificates would be sufficiently trustworthy for the purposes for which they
were being used. Again, such a scenario does not implicate the difficult risk allocation questions associated
with the open model.
Another example might be a business-to-business trading network. Businesses may have processes and
equipment in place, enabling them to carefully manage private encryption keys. They may thus be quite
willing to agree to contract terms much more "onerous" than the terms imposed by the Utah Act, for
example. A business might agree to be strictly liable for all documents signed with its private key, under
the appropriate circumstances. A closed PK.I system preserves this type of flexibility.
Stephen Kent gave a fascinating talk last year entitled "Let Ten Thousand CAs Bloom." His central theme
deserves repeating: let anyone who wants to be a CA be a CA, certifying their own customers, employees,
members, and so on. Individuals don't need one overarching identity certificate, to be used in every
conceivable circumstance. People can have many certificates, inconspicuously installed in a Web browser,
each of which is used in a specific, narrow context. Within the confines of such a bounded context the risk
allocation questions that are insurmountable under an open PK.I model become much, much easier.
Moreover, unlike the rigid, hierarchical structure of an open PKI, such a scenario embraces the chaotic,
fast-paced environment of the Internet.
Market trends appear to support the conclusion that the closed model will be the winner in the marketplace.
Recall the flurry of announcements concerning commercial CA services which took place in early 1996:
VeriSign was spun off from RSA. GTE CyberTrust announced its imminent competing "CyberSign"
service. Norte! began issuing demonstration sever certificates, and was rumored to be on the verge of
launching full-blown CA activities. MCI, AT&T, and IBM all hinted at planned CA services.
Look at the state of the commercial CA marketplace now. CyberTrust finally started issuing certificates in
early 1997--but only for SET, illwhich presumably will leverage the risk allocation mechanisms already
present in the bank card industry. The CyberSign service, based on the open PK.l model, has evidently been
abandoned in favor ofCybe.rTrust's emphasis on their "customer branded service." The rumors ofNortel's
(now Entrust) impending entry into the CA business proved false. Entrust's services focus exclusively on
back-end support for other companies that want to offer CA services. Likewise, IBM's offerings focus on
back end support. All of these developments are consistent with the dominance of the closed PKI model.
Industry players are focusing their attention on "letting ten-thousand CAs bloom."
VeriSign is the only North Americ~n company that is actively pursuing the classic open PK.l model as a
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business model. Indeed, judging from their press releases, they are doing so with some success--they are
planning innovative ways of addressing problematic aspects of their business model, such as via a
recently-announced limited insurance plan for subscribers. However, even VeriSign used the high-profile
forum provided by the 1997 RSA Data Security Conference to announce its "Private Label Digital ID
Services," which are back-end support for companies that want to offer CA services. Thus, even VeriSign
is focusing on offering its services to other companies on an outsourcing basis, consistent with the closed
PKI model.

Open PKI Legislation Lives On
Despite increased recognition of the problems associated with the open PKI model, legislation enshrining
this model in law and regulation continues to be proposed and enacted. This can partly be attributed to
factors that could be labeled "psychological." The rigid, straightforward hierarchies inherent in the open
model are likely deeply appealing to the sensibilities of lawyers and legislators as they contemplate the
often chaotic and inscrutable Internet. Moreover, enacting legislation--including legislation that is not well
understood--satisfies the legislative urge to "do something" in the face of a rapidly changing economic
environment.
Additionally, legislators may be under the mistaken impression that special legal rules are needed to
accommodate electronic commerce. In fact, however, the law is quite flexible and supportive of new
commercial methods. As a general matter, legislation is not needed in order to accommodate public key
cryptography or other emerging authentication technologies. The few areas where existing legal rules
impede electronic commerce can be addressed with narrow, targeted legislation.
Another factor behind the continued momentum of open PKI digital signature legislation is less benign: the
infrastructure created by such legislation is ideally suited for implementation of a key escrow scheme.
Indeed, such an idea was initially broached by the Clinton Administration in a report released in May of
1996. This report described a vision for a PKI consistent with the Utah/ABA Guidelines model, and noted:
... To participate in the network a user needs a public key certificate signed by a CA which
'binds' the user's identity to their public key. One condition of obtaining a certificate is that
sufficient information (e.g., private keys or other information as appropriate) has been
escrowed with a certified escrow authority to allow access to a user's data or communications.
(As noted before, this might be the CA or an independent escrow authority) ....
Draft legislation designed to implement such a plan was released in April. Similar legislation was
introduced in the United Kingdom. The profound civil liberties concerns implicated by such legislation,
and the negative effects on commerce of the policies underlying key escrow, are well documented.

Conclusion
The open PKI model envisioned by many existing and proposed digital signature laws is not viable. This
legislation presumes a business model that cannot internalize the costs associated with its implementation.
In attempting to solve an unsolvable problem, current digital signature laws shift an immense liability
burden onto consumers who use the infrastructure envisioned by these laws. Consumers would reject this
result in any true marketplace transaction.
Digital signatures will play a significant role in electronic commerce, but under a closed PK.I system where
the liability problems associated w!th digital signatures become manageable. The open PKI model can and
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should compete against closed PK.I and other authentication technologies without the benefit of special
legislation. It will not, however, be the winning business model.
Digital signature laws which impose a particular view of electronic commerce on the marketplace should be
abandoned. The time for legislation and regulation is after identifiable problems exist in a mature industry,
not before an industry even exists. The existing legal infrastructure can accommodate new technologies
without dramatic new legislation. Premature legislation and regulation risks creating market distortions
which can prevent the market from arriving at much better results than can be envisioned by governmental
policymakers. Certainly this is true in the case of open PKI: digital signature legislation based on the
Utah!ABA Guidelines model imposes a business model that could not survive under the discipline of the
marketplace
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[A] For more information on certificate authorities, see the article entitled "Introducing SSL and
Certificates Using SSLeay," by Frederick Hirsch. Digital signatures and public key infrastructure are
described in the article "Cryptography and the Web," by Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford. In addition,
the digital signature specification, "DSig 1.0 Signature Labels," can be found in the "W3C Reports" section
of this issue.
Return to text
[B] One potential hitch is if a court honors a relying party's claim against a CA in a circumstance where the
relying party failed to check a CRL, and thus enters into a contract with the CA. This result seems unlikely,
however, in light of the "unreasonableness" of not checking a CRL; if this result were to consistently occur
it could be dealt with in focused legislation.
Return to text

[C] See "Cryptography and the Web" for more information on SET.
Return to text
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TRUST IN THE WIRED AMERICAS
Background: The Necessity of Trust
As the Internet develops and matures, its success will largely depend on gaining and maintaining
the trust of visitors. Such trust will be paramount to sites that depend on consumer commerce.
The concept of trust is crucial because it affects a number of factors essential to online
transactions, including security and privacy. Trust is also one of the most important factors
associated with branding. Without trust, development of e-commerce cannot reach its potential.
In a joint research project conducted by Cheskin Research and Studio Archetype/Sapient and
released in January 1999, the factors that produce a sense of trustworthiness on a website were
identified. In a follow-up study begun early in 2000, Cheskin Research probed the dimensions of
online trust across the Americas.
While the US leads the way in terms of growth ofe-commerce, the rest ofthe world may only be a
few clicks behind. Little is known about the online population in Latin America and Brazil except
that they are entering the online world rapidly. IDC projects that the online population in Latin
America will more than double to 29.6 million by 2003. By linking the learnings in both studies,
our understanding of the nature and dynamics of website trust can be dramatically enhanced.

® 2000 Cheskin Research
Pre-release copy Reproduction. dwnbutwn. and/or publtcallon of any mjormauon contamed 111 tills report is stnctly prol11b11ed wuhortt
wrmen com·ent ojCireskm Research.

ITrust ill tile Wired Americas

May 2000

Research Objectives

The new Cheskin "Trust in the Wired Americas" study was undertaken to extend the learning
from the initial Trust Study, where the specific elements that communicate trustworthiness in ecommerce sites were identified. The new research explores the dimensions of online trust in the
US, Spanish-speaking Latin America and Brazil. Specific objectives include:
•

Exploration of how trust online is viewed among the online population in the Western
Hemisphere:

•

Identification of the most trusted websites in the Americas;

•

Investigation of the most recognizable and trusted symbols of online security in the Americas;
and

•

Comparison of online behavior between users in the US, Spanish-speaking Latin America and
Brazil.

This report brings together the information acquired in the new Trust study with that from the first
study. The ultimate goal is to provide a comprehensive picture of consumer attitudes about trust,
and thl! ways in which a sense of trustworthiness can be enhanced. Like our first Trust study in
1999, we offer this current study as a pioneering piece examining this vital issue and inspiring
continued conversation.
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Research Methodology
The New Study • 2000
An online survey was conducted among 2.681 Internet users including 1,83 7 from the US, 522
from Spanish-speaking Latin America and 248 from Brazil. Respondents were asked a series of
questions about:
•

Privacy and trust online;

•

Their most trusted websites;

•

The most familiar seals of approval (e.g., VISA, TRUSTe etc.);

•

Their online behavior; and

•

Their demographic characteristics.

Note: For the purposes of this report, respondents from Spanish-speaking Latin America will be
referred to as "Latin Americans" and respondents from Portuguese-speaking Brazil will be
referred to as "Brazilians."

The First Study · 1999
A four-phase process was employed to acquire the understanding sought:
•

Phase I: Snapshot of Consumer Attitudes

•

Phase 2: Secondary Research

•

Phase 3: Expert ·Interviews. This and the first two Phases were used to develop a hypothetical
model of the building blocks of trust. Then, the model was validated in Phase 4.

•

Phase 4: Quantitative Evaluation. In this Phase, eight commercial Websites were selected by
Studio Archetype and Cheskin that represented the "strong" and the "weak" for the three key
components of Web trust identified in earlier Phases: brand, fulfillment and navigation.

In addition, respondents evaluated the trustworthiness of many additional sites, as well as "seals of
approval" such as VISA and VeriSign. Altogether, 463 Web users and a wide range of experts in
the worlds of e-commerce, website development and academia contributed to the 1999 study. To
access the study in its entirely, please see http://www.studioarchetype.com/cheskin/.
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Highlights of the Study
1. A Sense of Anarchy Permeates Attitudes about the Web
Across the Americas, consumers believe that there are essentially no rules to the way infonnation
is managed and protected across cyberspace. In the absence of such rules, consumers feel a
heightened sense of risk when engaging in transactions.

2. The "New Risk" in the Online World
In cyberspace, consumers encounter a new type of risk - identity nsk.. This risk involves the
possibility of misuse of personal information by -a wide variety of individuals and institutions. For
most consumers, the key concern involves hackers making their way into corporate and
governmental databases. People consider security of their identity as important as the security of
their money. Web commerce may never reach its true potential until this new risk, unknown to any
previous model of commerce, is successfully minimized.

3. Big Brother is Watching
Perceptions of online privacy vary slightly across the Americas. Online users in the US believe
privacy is mostly non-existent. Latin Americans and Brazilians are a little less cynical about
online privacy. Governments are widely believed to be able to easily monitor everyone's
activities. Those same governments are also seen as unable to protect anyone ' s privacy.

4. "Little Brothers" Can Ease the Fear
The perception that it's not the government who's overseeing our every move online, but rather,
marketers and advertisers, has given rise to the idea that it's not "Big Brother" but websites
themselves ("Little Brothers") who are really watching. In addition, they are seen as ineffectual in
the face of hackers. Websites can ease fear by stressing that personal information is treated with
care and by prominently displaying assurances of the use of secure technologies.

5.

Younger Expert Users Will Consider Trading Privacy for Lower
Prices

For the most part, people are not yet willing to sacrifice their online privacy for the sake of a better
price. However certain groups of consumers across the Americas are more willing to trade privacy
for lower prices. Those who consider themselves Internet experts, between the ages of 19 and 25,
particularly males in this category, were willing to make this trade.

6.

Private Institutions Enhance Financial and Functional
Trustworthiness

The Seals of Approval of some private institutions, including banks and privacy organizations,
significantly reduce the sense of financial risk, especially for newcomers to e-commerce. Credit
card companies are at the top of this list for those less comfortable with web commerce. VISA is
the most trusted symbol in Latin America, while TRUSTe ranks highest in the US. Websites
should consider clearly displaying credit card symbols on their homepages in order to enhance the
communication of trustworthiness.
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7. Cultural Differences Require Different Responses to Minimize Risk ..•
US and Brazilian consumers tend to be more cynical about the ability of governments and
websites to control identity and other forms of risk than Spanish-speaking Latin Americans. At the
same time, Latin Americans and Brazilians gain more from the presence of credit card symbols on
sites than US residents do. These differences in perception, as well as many other distinctions, will
require that website companies and other organizations concerned with security begin to tailor
their efforts to the specific perspectives of each region more fully .

.•• and A Global Market Requires Universal Symbols of Security
Some security-oriented seals of approval reduce the perception of at least some types of risk.
VeriSign is a recogmzed symbol of security, to a certain degree, across the Americas. It's likely
that the reason is in part due to the similarity of the name "VeriSign" to "verdad," the Spanish
word for "truth" ("verdade" in Portuguese, and in Latin "veritas"). TRUSTe. in contrast, isn't
nearly as readily recognized in Latin America and Brazil as it was in the US . Other symbols, such
as TRUSTe, will need to consider symbols that can be understood globally. All security symbols
need to do more to communicate an ability to provide some measure of identity security.

8. Six Design Elements Communicate Reduction of Functional Risk
Effective branding, navigation, fulfillment, presentation, up-to-date technology, and seals of
approval constitute the essential formal characteristics of sites that can be trusted to deliver what
consumers want. These fonns, in turn, can be divided into a total of28 components that can be
used to communicate functional trustworthiness.

9. Effective Navigation Must be Present to Communicate Trust •••
Effective navigation is a necessary pre-condition to successful communication of a site's
trustworthiness. Having a well-known brand is also tremendously important. Generally speaking,
effective navigation combined with a well-known brand is the best way of communicating
trustworthiness. Combining strong navigation with effective fulfillment can also achieve this .

••• and a Lesser-Known Brand Must Have Quality Navigation and
Fulfillment to Compete
For lesser-known brands, navigation of and fulfillment from their website play significant roles in
establishing trus~. Any new Web-based brand MUST build in excellent navigation and fulfillment
if it is to be trusted.
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10. Website Categories and Trust
A few key website categories are repositories of consumer trust. This trend cuts across geographic
boundaries. A few notable regional trends include:
•

Brazilians trust bank websites more than others types of websites;

•

Latin Americans trust search engines more than other sites;

•

Retail is emerging as the most trusted category online in the US; and

•

Retail ranks second in both Latin America and Brazil, suggesting they are on the heels of the ecommerce trend in the US

11.

Most Trusted Websites Across the Americas

Yahoo! is the clear winner in the US as the most trusted website, and ranks closely with
HotmaiVMSN in Latin America. In Brazil, however, the top two most trusted websites are banks,
possibly due to the fact that they often function as ISPs to account holders. Amazon makes a good
showing on all three lists. Across the Americas, over 600 different websites were mentioned as
most trusted.
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Detailed Findings
1. The Way Consumers See the Online World
The study of trust in commercial transactions long ago recognized four types of risk consumers
seek to reduce, as follows:
•

financial (risk of losing money or paying too much)

•

functional (risk of receiving the wrong or a mal functioning product);

•

social (risk of using a product that reflects poorly on its user); and

•

physical (risk that we might be harmed by the product).

It's generally recognized that, in order to comfortably purchase, consumers look for cues that tell
them risk has been reduced to tolerable levels. When risk reduction reaches a certain threshold.
trust becomes easier to give.
The perception of risk reduction can happen in a wide variety of ways, from government
regulation to the actions of market forces. Regardless of how it occurs, though, risk reduction
generally includes some sort of consistency and order in a marketplace.

Information A11arclly Onli11e
In the case of the current development of the web, there is a perception of anarchy when it comes
to information management regardless of age, gender, expertise or region. Web users generally
feel that the online environment is an uncontrolled place where almost anything goes. They also
feel that websites are not held to a very high standard of consumer protection. These attitudes are
consistent across all geographic regions.
Total Sample
Personal information I give on a website may be sold for
marketing purposes

6.3

The infonnation may be sold to another company or website

6.5

A great deal of infonnation about me is gathered without my
permission

6.2

Abuses of personal information are rampant

5.7

Note: Mean scores are based on an 11-point scale where 0 means "strongly disagree" and I 0 means "strongly
agree."
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Database security

One notable exception to the general consensus about anarchy in the online environment was
found in the perceptions about database security. There are significant differences by region in
perceptions of the security of personal in formation kept in databases. This may point to perceptual
differences in what a database is. and how information is stored.

us
"Personal information I give on a
website resides on a server or in a
database that is secure from
unauthorized people, such as hackers."

3.8

Latin
America
5.3

Brazil

Total
Sample

3.3

4.1

Note: Mean scores are based on an 11-point scale where 0 means "strongly disagree" and I 0 means "strongly
agree."

This finding suggests that a website can boost trust among users by clearly addressing how it
handles database security. Given the generally low level of trust in the security of databases,
websites that offer the security of a "banker's vault" will go a long way toward promoting trust.
Recommendations:

Websites should communicate to users that they take database security seriously, and that they
have measures in place to protect the information in their databases. It should be clear to website
visitors from their first contact with the site that database security is priority one.
One way websites might accomplish this is by developing specific seals of database security
which can be placed on the site to symbolize a high standard of protection of information.
Another way to communicate the seriousness of efforts to protect information stored in databases
is to place links to security statements on the site. These would be statements spelling out what
level of security is being offered. In this way, users can read more about what measures are being
taken to protect their personal information.
It will become increasingly clear that far more needs to be done to secure databases against
intrusions from hackers. lt may be that such efforts will ·require international cooperation. A forum
for discussing the issue needs to be established, if not by governments, then at minimum by the
major website and software players.
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The Perception of Surveillance
Privtlcy Olllille tiS compared to tile telepilo11e

There was a great deal of skepticism across the board about how much privacy exists on the
Internet, with a few notable exceptions.
People in the US don't believe that email and instant messages are as private as a phone call. But
among Latin Americans and, to a sl ightly lesser extent, those in Brazil, email and 1M's are
bel ieved to approach the privacy level of a phone call.

Ema11 is JUSt as pnvate as

us

Latin America

Brazil

Total Sample

4.8

6.8

5.8

5.3

4.8

6.9

5.8

5.3

a phone call
Instant message is just a
private as a phone call

Note: Mean scores are based on an 11-point scale where 0 means "strongly disagree" and I0 means "strongly
agree."

Internet access in Latin America is largely being provided by telephone companies. The recent
joint venture between Microsoft and Telmex. to expand Internet access in Mexico, may help
explain why Latin Americans associate the Internet more closely with the telephone than do
people in the US. Another explanation may be that Latin Americans are less exposed to the media
hype surrounding Internet and email privacy than are people in the US.
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-"Big Brotlter"
There is general agreement among users that one's activities online are monitored by the
government. Among those in the US, the belief that the government can track online activities is
signiticantly higher than among those in Latin America or Brazil.

us
The government is able
to track where we go on
the Internet

7.2

Latin America
5.3

When you are online
your activities are
monitored

5.9

5.1

5.5

5.7

Public office seekers and
holders can get
information about me

5.4

5.6

5.8

5.5

Brazil
6.0

Total Sample
6.7

Notr:: Mean scores are based on an It-point scalr: where 0 means "strongly disagree" and I 0 means "strongly
agree."

The differences found between people online in the US, Latin America and Brazil probably
represent basic cultural differences simply extended to the Internet.
People in the US have far more exposure to the Internet environment, from its early days to
today's rapid growth. Media reports in the US have often highlighted examples of online
monitoring and abuses of personal information. This may affect perceptions among users in the
US and may lead to a sense of being ''jaded" about the probability of online surveillance.
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"Little Brother"

The perception that it's not the government who is overseeing our every move online, but rather,
marketers and advertisers, has given rise to the idea that it's not "Big Brother" but ·'Little Brother"
who is really watching. Some have predicted that the value added through innovations such as
personalization may overcome ~onsumers' resistance to Little Brother's online surveillance. The
findings here do not support this prediction. For the most part, people are not yet willing to
sacrifice their online privacy for the sake of price or personalization.

us
The biggest threat online
comes from marketers and
advertisers who might sell my
name to other companies.

6.5

Latin America
6.5

Brazil
5.7

Total Sample
6.4

I would not mind giving more
personal information on a
website if I could get a better
price on purchase

4.4

4.1

4.3

4.3

Note: Means are based on an 11-point scale where 0 means "strongly disagree" and I 0 means "strongly
agree."

Younger Experts and Privacy
There are certain customer segments, however. that are more open to exchanging their personal
information for price reductions. Regardless of region, self-described Internet experts who are
between the ages of 19 and 25 are much more likely to make this trade; males of this segment
even more so.
"I would not mind giving more personal information on a website if I could get a
better price on a purchase."
Respondent profile

Mean

Beginner Internet users

4.0

Expert Internet users

5.1

Expert Internet users, 19-25 years old

5.8

Expert Internet users, 19-25 years old, male

6.1

Expert Internet users, 19-25 years old, female

5.3

Note: Means are based on an 11-pomt scale where 0 means "strongly d1sagree" and I0 means "strongly
agree."
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These respondents are among those with highest confidence in their online skills. Since they feel
less vulnerable than people with less experience, they may be more willing to make a trade of
personal information for price reductions because the risk seems manageable.
These people with more online experience may also represent early adopters. If this is the case, it
bodes well for the future of personalization online. It may be that, as people become more
comfortable online, they will feel less vulnerable and more willing to trade information for
personal benefits. It may also be the case that, because they grew up with the technology, they
simply have a greater degree of comfort with the "rules."

Recommendations:
The study identified two ways in which sites can ease fear. First, it should be made plain that
personal information is treated with care. In addition, sites can explicitly promise not to use
personal information for marketing or other purposes unless consumers agree to it, in exchange for
a tangible financial benetit. Clearly allowing users an opt-in/opt-out preference is important. Also,
several sites have already begun to give consumers access to a portion of their personal profile
data. An expansion of this policy could be highly beneficial.
Second, sites can stress their use of effective firewalls . Websites should consider developing seals
of database security and displaying them prominently on the homepage. There should also be links
to database security statements consumers can easily access and read. The key isn't the
elimination of risk; it's the reduction of risk.
It's worth noting the approach the Europeans are taking. Currently, their primary focus has been
on preventing misuse of personal data by the websites that collect such information. Although
such efforts may succeed in reducing identity risk to some extent, they ignore the more frightening
issue of hackers invading database security. In the future, the protection effort will clearly need to
be broadened in some way.
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A Strong Sense of Risk
Despite willingness among a small segment of consumers to trade personal information for lower
prices, the perceived. overall sense of risk posed by the Internet seems to be universal. There are
no signiticant differences found based on age, gender, income, online expertise or geographic
region.
However, not all threats are equal. The perceived threat from hackers is substantially greater than
the perceived threat from institutions. This threat primarily involves a risk to one's personal
information, though financial risk is close behind.

Predatory Imlividuuls
The biggest threat is from:

Total Sample

Hackers who will steal my personal
information

8.1

Hackers who will steal my money

7.6

Dishonest companies or people who might
cheat or con me

7.5

Politicians who will get personal info about me

4 .8

Not.:: M.:an scores are bas.:d on an 11-pomt scale wh.:re 0 m.:ans "strongly d1sagree" and I0 means "strongly
agree."

Predatory Institutions
The biggest threat is from:

Total Sample

Dishonest companies or people who might
cheat or con me

7.5

Marketers and advertisers who will sell my
name

6.4

"Unfulfillment" -- can't return an item you
bought

5.9

Insurance companies who will get personal
info about me

5.4

Not.:: Mean scores are bas.:d on an 11-point seal.: where 0 means "strongly disagree" and I 0 means "strongly
agree."

As noted earlier, users feel personal information is often sold to marketers and advertisers, and
that abuses are rampant. However, they don't worry about the threat from institutions as much as
the perceived threat from individuals. There may be a level of acceptance of institutional "threat,"
but a more visceral fear of the " threat" from individuals.
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Recommendations:

Websites that can offer users a sense of protection from the threat posed by .. individual" intruders
will go a lo.ng way toward c:nham:ing the1r trustworthiness.
One way they can do this is by telling c<,msumers what types of technology and legal protections
they offer. Another way involves periodically communicating any upgrades and enhanced
protections that are implemented on the site.
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Recommendations:

Websites that can offer users a sense of protection from the threat posed by "individual" intruders
will go a long \~U) tO\\ard enhancing their trustworthiness.
One way they can do this is by telling consumers what types of technology and legal protections
they otfer. Another way involves periodically communicating any upgrades and enhanced
protections that are implemented on the site.
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2. The Ways Websites and Others Try to Affect Trustworthiness
Within the fields of website development and e-commerce. a wide variety of efforts have been
made to reassure consumers about all tive types of perceived risk in the online world. The
consumer responses to those efforts are discussed below.

Laws and Government
There is little faith that the legal system or the government otTers protection to individuals online
However, as the chart below indicates, the primary reason for such low expectations of
government is a belief that protection simply isn't possible.
I believe that:

Total Sample

Protection of my personal information is impossible

6 .1

Websites are free to do what they like with my
personal information

4.o·

Personal information is protected by privacy laws

4.7

There are international laws governing how personal
info is handled
The legal system protects my personal information
online

I

4.1
3.4

Note: Mean scores are based on an It-point scale where 0 means "strongly disagree" and I 0 means "strongly
agree."
• The belief that websites are free to do what they want with personal info is higher (4.4) among people
in tho: US.
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Private Institutions

Although there is little evidence that people trust the government or the legal system to protect
them online, many respondents feel that private institutions. namely. credit card companies, lower
tinancial risk if not other types of risk.
If someone uses my
credit card online
without my
permission, I will be
liable for 100% of the
total spent

Internet Use
Light

Medium

Heavy

4.3

3.3

3.4

Have Purchased
Online
Yes
No
3.3

3.9

Total

Sample

3.4

Note: Means are based on an 11-pomt scale where 0 means "strongly d1sagree" and 10 means "strongly
agree."

Less than a quarter of the overall sample strongly believed they would be liable for 100% ofthe
amount if someone used their credit card online without their permission . There were no
signiticant differences in this belief based on age. gender, expertise or region.
Recommendations:

It appears that credit card companies play the biggest role in offering a sense of security and
protection in online financial transactions. Websites should clearly display credit .card symbols on
their sites in order to enhance trustworthiness. The credit card companies have a major
opportunity to be lead in building online trust, by emphasizing that they cover all of the risk.

Recognition of "Seals of Approval"

&_ ~ £xc/usives ·
~ - ONLINE

~~iSign·

•..,..

~,.,the......_.

..

Of the 5 seals tested, the Visa symbol was most recognized overall, followed by MasterCard,
TRUSTe. YeriSign, and BBBOnline.
Visa and MasterCard were universally recognized throughout the Americas. TRUSTe and
VeriSign, well-known "security symbols," were more highly recognized in the US than in Latin
America, and VeriSign was more highly recognized than TRUSTe in Latin America. BBBOnline
was also more highly recognized in the US than in Latin America, however it was the least
recognized symbol in all the Americas.
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This represents a change from 1999 for all seals. Recognition of Visa, TRUSTe. VeriSign and
BBBOnline all increased among US users, while recognition of MasterCard decreased . TRUSTe's
recognition increased most dramatically, by nearly 60 percentage points.
The numbers below represent the percentage of individuals who recognize seals of approval. As
the chart indicates, overall recognition of seals of approval increased rapidly from 1999 to :woo.

us 1999*

us 2000

70%

89

90

85

89

MasterCard**

79

63

77

67

66

TRUSTe

10

69

26

20

56

Veri Sign

36

59

39

40

53

BBBOnline

18

37

16

12

31

Have seen

Latin

Brazil

America
Visa

Total
Sample

• Data from the 1999 Trust Study conducted by Cheskin and Studio ArchetypetSapient.
•• The Visa and MasterCard symbols from year to year were not identical.

Privacy Statements Irrelevant
Very few respondents claimed to have read the privacy statements associated with each symbol.
Visa's statement recognition scored highest overall, with TRUSTe following. Credit card privacy
statements are read more in Latin American countries than security symbols' statements. This may
be due to the higher familiarity of these logos and institutions in Latin America.
The chart below indicates the relative insignificance of the statements attached to specific seals of
approval.

us

Latin America

Brazil

Total Sample

27%

29

18

27

TRUSTe

25

5

2

19

VeriSign

21

11

10

18

MasterCard

15

22

13

16

BBBOnline

10

3

0

8

Have read
Statement of:
Visa
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Effects 011 Perceived Trustworthiness

Compared to finding from the 1999 eCommerce Trust study, perceived trustworthiness has
increased significantly in the US for all Seals of Approval, particularly TRUSTe, VISA and
BBBOnline. While VeriSign elicited the highest trust response last year, TRUSTe now ranks
higher.
Significant differences are seen between the US and Latin America in perceptions of symbol
trustworthiness.
Security Symbols Matter in the US. Security symbols increase trust more than credit card symbols
in the US. Of these, TRUSTe rates highest, while MasterCard rated lowest.
Credit Card Symbols Matter in Latin America. VISA is significantly the most trusted symbol in
Latin America and Brazil. Security symbols have far less significance than credit card symbols. Of
the three security symbols tested. VeriSign did rate significantly higher than TRUSTe. This may
be due to the word itself, which in Spanish can appear related to the word "verdad" ("verdade" in
Portuguese), or the concept of truth.
The chart bt:IO\\ indicates tho;: pt:rcentage of people who feel the presence of a particular symbol
increases the trustworthiness of a site.
Percent Reporting Increased Trust

us 1999*

us 2000

Latin
America

Brazil

Total
Sample

11%

38

80

78

50

TRUSTe

9

55

19

19

45

MasterCard

13

27

72

65

40

VeriSign

25

38

25

32

35

BBBOnline

16

40

04

05

30

Symbol

VISA

• Pata derzved from 1999 study conducted by Cheskm and Studw Archetype/Sapient.
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The Greater the Experience, rite Less the Neetlfor Seals of Approval
As illustrated in the two charts below, one's experience online tends to be related to the amount of
trust a seal of approval offers. Light users, those with less expertise and those who have never
purchased online, agree that credit card symbols, especially VISA, would increase their trust.
Additionally, younger users, age 25 or less, report that credit card symbols inspire more trust than
security symbols. On the other hand, heavy users of the Internet agree that security symbols
would increase their trust, more so than for light or medium users.

% Increased Trust by Level of Use

DLight
II Medium

DHeavy

% Increased Trust by Level of Expertise

~g

BlBiCrit;;d

I
-Begin-ner
0
'!I

f~ rnlliiJI£{tff] !~~~:~:ed;ate ,;

Recommendation:
In order to attract newcomers to websites, the seals of approval need to be easily seen. In
particular, credit card symbols can be helpful. Over time, users may become somewhat inured, but
the seals are crucial for those coming online without prior exposure and experience.
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Design Options
Bllildi11g Blocks of Trustwortllilles:t;

The 1999 study identitied six primary components of websites that play a major role in
communicating trustworthiness when well-desigrted:

•

Seals of Approval

•
•

Brand
Technological sophistication

•

Navigation

•
•

Presentation
Fulfillment

The six primary components break down into a total of28 different ways in which trustworthiness
may be established. Each are briefly addressed in the following chan.
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SEALS OF APPROVAL
Network Level 1
Network Level 2
Technology Level1
Technology Level 2
Merchant Level 1
Merchant Level 2
BRAND
Overall Brand Eguity
Web Brand Equity
Benefit clarity
Portai/Aggregator Affiliations
Co-op Third Party Brands
Relationship Marketing
Community Building
Depth of Product Offering on the
Site
Breadth of Product Offering on
the Site
NAVIGATION
Navigation Clarity
Navigation Access
Navigation Reinforcement
FULFILLMENT
Protection of Personal
Information
Tracking
Recourse
Return Policy
Simplicity of Process
PRESENTATION
Clarity of Purpose
Craftsmanship
Resembles other Trusted
Sites
TECHNOLOGY
Functionality
Speed

May 2000

lnfonnation about other companies that specialize in assuring the safety of
Websites
Icons symbolizing security of the computer network as a whole, such as TRUSTe, or
VenSi n
Text accompanying the 1cons
Icons symbolizing commerce-enabling functions, such as MS Commerce Server, ICAT,
IBM e.business mark, and Browser compatibility marks
Text accompanying the icons
Icons symbolizing merchant service security like MasterCard, VISA, Amex
Text accompanying the icons
Importance of the company's reputation in choosing to do business with them
Consumer awareness of what this company does for consumers outside of the Web
How well the company's Website fits w1th consumers sense of what the company 1s
about generally
On ami's first visit to the s1te, how easy 1t is to discern what the site is promising to
deliver
Mention of an affiliation to portals and aggregators such as Yahoo!, eXcite, 1village,
L cos, etc.
Promotion of "third-party" guality brands
Sending updates and other notices to consumers
Facilitating interactions between individual shoppers
How many varieties of product types the site contains
How many types of products the site contains
The ease of finding what the visitor seeks
Terminologies for navigation and content are apparent for the user to differentiate
The navigation system placement is consistent, persistent and easy to find.
There are prompts, guides, tutorials, instructions to aid and inform the user to perform
transaction and or search task on the site.
The process one works through from the time a purchase process Is Initiated until
the product is received
The infonnation one provides is guaranteed to be used for no purpose other than
what one gave It for, without their approval
The site provides feedback or a confirmation number once the order is placed
The transaction process allows for recourse if one has a problem at any time during the
recess
How clearly the return policy is explained
How simple it is to buy something
Ways In which the look of the site, in and of Itself, communicates meaningful
lnfonnation to you.
The visuals/layout effectively convey the idea and the purpose of the site. Consumers
would know they can purchase products when they get to the site
The degree to which, when one first views the homepage, one believes that the Website
developers were skilled in their efforts
How much the site resembles others consumers have come to trust
The ways In which the site technically functions
Overall, how well the site seems to work
How guickly each page, text and images appears
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The six different major components that communicate trustworthiness interact with each other in
complex ways. The 1999 study sought to determine how three of them -brand, navigation and
fulfillment- interact. It's important to note that these six components. when handled correctly.
will largely defuse the four traditional risks of commerce. They don't, however, necessarily deal
with the issue of identity risk.
The findings from the 1999 study are summarized below.

Effective Navigation Is tlte Key to e-Commerce Trust
Effective navigation and a well-known brand, when viewed as isolated elements, both
communicate trustworthiness. Fulfillment, viewed in isolation. has relatively little impact.
When they are viewed as interacting elements, though, the picture changes. Strong navigation can
best be understood as the foundation of communicating trustworthiness. Generally speaking,
effective navigation needs to be joined to either a well-known brand or effective fulfillment if
consumers are going to perceive the site as trustworthy . As long as effective navigation is one of
two components in place, a site is significantly more likely to be considered trustworthy than a site
with only one component in place, or a well-known brand with strong fulfillment but weak
navigation.
However, even when a site has a well-known brand, is easily navigable and offers a simple
transaction process, it still may not be considered more trustworthy than sites without all three
components in place. For instance, a site with a well-known brand, strong navigation and strong
fulfillment was found to be less trustworthy than a site of another well-known brand with poor
navigation but strong fulfillment. In short, even if a company can combine a well-known brand,
strong navigation and strong fulfillment, it can't ensure that its site will be perceived as
trustworthy if its brand isn't considered trustworthy.

Lesser-Know11 Bramis Must Build Sites witlr Strong Navigation and Fulfillment
Since newer brands, by definition, are lesser-known, the only way they can compete with betterknown brands is to make sure that both navigation and fulfillment work well for visitors. For these
brands, navigation and fulfillment are equally important in building trust. As navigation or
fulfillment improves, so does trust.

Recommendations:
Any site, if it wa11ts to be perceived as trustworthy, must, at minimum, have effective navigation.
In addition, it needs to include either effective branding or simple fulfillment.
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3. The Ways Consumers Respond to Websites' Efforts
Comfort and Acclimation

Overall, users report high levels of comfort and acclimation when it comes to getting information
on the Internet. This finding holds true across all sub-groups.
However, when it comes to comfort when purchasing online, the US audience is significantly
more comfortable purchasing online than Latin American and Brazilian audiences.

us

Latin America

8.7

Researching products
Purchasing online

I am comfortable:
Getting information

9.1

Brazil
8.4

Total Sample
8.8

8.8

8.7

8.4

8.7

5.9

4.6

4.4

5.5

Note : !'vtean scores are based on an It-point scale where 0 means "strongly disagree" and I 0 means "strongly
agree."

Online Buying Behavior

In total, approximately 75% of the respondents have made purchases online. Books, music, video,
and software are among the most popular online products purchased. Financial services are the
least used, but may have the biggest potential, since financial service websites were among the
most trusted. It seems clear that the four traditional risks have been successfully addressed by at
least some e-tailers, who have made extensive use of effective branding, seals of approval, and
well-designed navigation or fulfillment.
The chart below shows the percentages of total respondents who made purchases of various types
of products.
Overall Online Purchase Behavior
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Demograplt ic Profiles of Onliue Buying
Five demographic characteristics are investigated in the survey, including age. gender. income
level. technical expertise and country of residence. Some demographic intluences are more
significant than others. Overall, gender and country of residence have a stronger intluence than
age, technical expertise and income on consumer purchase behavior. The role of"'trust" in
category purchase patterns seems less significant than the demographic differences themselves.
Age and Gender
The charts below show the intluence of age and gender on buying behavior online. Age and
gender are not strong factors, however. Slightly more men over age 38 buy computer hardware,
software and electronics, while women generally purchase more apparel and toys.

Average Age by Category

-

'-'ean Age of F\lrchasers (of Each Category) - - '-'ean Age across the

Sarfllle

Gender Differences in Online Buying Behavior

....0
Gl

til
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Countn of Residence
The chart below shows that US consumers are consistently more active in their online purchases
than Latin Americans and Brazilians for most product categories. This is not surprising given the
origins of e-commerce in the US

.l!l

Online Purchase by Country
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With a few exceptions, it appears the patterns of online buying beyond the US borders are
generally following the trail being blazed in the US. E-commerce in Latin America and Brazil
may likely evolve much the same as it has in the US in terms of consumer demand .
However, in terms or-facilitating the transactions for buying online, there may be substantial
differences due to the low levels of credit card activity in Latin American countries. To the extent
that e-commerce can find ways to facilitate the transactional side of e-commerce in Latin America,
the consumer demand for products and services will likely follow. The research strongly suggests
that, if credit cards don't become central to online buying in Latin America, e-tailers will need to
find another way to reduce financial risk. Understanding the differences in fulfillment issues
across cultures will be critical as well.
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Most Trusted Websites

Yahoo! is the clear winner in the US and shows up strongly in Latin America as does
Hotmail/MSN. In Brazil, however, the top two most trusted websites are banks. This may be due
to the fact that banks often serve as primary consumer ISPs to account holders in Brazil. Amazon
makes a good showing on all three lists.
The chart below indicates the relative ranks of the top most trusted sites in each of the major
regions. This was an open-ended question, allowing any possible choice to be mentioned. The
most significant finding to note is that while a few sites stand out, responses to this question
included a breadth of sites from a variety of categories. In total, over 600 different sites were
mentioned in the study. indicating that website trust may be more of a personal issue than
currently assumed. No individual site garnered over a I 5% response.

us

Latin America

Brazil

Yahoo!

Yahoo!*

Bradesco (bank)

Amazon

Hotmaii/MSN*

Bancobrazil

Hotmaii/MSN

Amazon

Hotmail

eBay

Starmedia

Zipmail

AOL

Microsoft

Amazon

iwon

ltau.com (bank)

Microsoft

Unibanco (bank)
Zaz mail

*The percentages ofrespondents in Latin America who mentioned Yahoo! and Hotmail/!v/SN as
most trusted site showed no significant difference.
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Most Trusted Website Categories

The most trustc:d wt:bs1tc:s are those with strong brand presence: in the online world. This suggests
that brand awareness and familiarity continue to drive website trust, a trend which cuts across
geographic boundaries.
The chart below presents, in descending order, the most trusted categories of services offered on
the web for each of the three regions studied. The dominant players in each category are noted in
parentheses.
Top Website Categories

us

Latin America

Brazil

retail (Amazon)

search engines
(Yahoo!)

banks (Bradesco)

search engines (Yahoo!)

retail (Amazon)

retail (Amazon)

financial services

email (Hotmail)

ISPs

banks (no dominant)

banks

email (Hotmail
Zipmail)

&

incentives (lwon)

search engines

auctions (eBay)

government

email (Hotmail)
ISPs (no dominant)

l

A number of interesting trends emerge, specific to particular regions, as follows:
•

Banks in Brazil have been highly active in cultivating the online banking category, which
explains the 'strong showing of banking websites among Brazilians.

•

Search engines are the most trusted category among Latin Americans, which may be an
indication of their early stage of experience online.

•

Retail emerges as the most trusted category online in the US, most likely reflecting the more
advanced stage of online experience.

•

Retail ranks second in both Latin America and Brazil, further suggesting they are on the heels
of e-commerce trends in the US.
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Appendix
Demographics of the Sample
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Demographics of the Sample in the Two Trust Studies
The First Study (1999)
•

56% male I 44% female;

•

Average age was 30 years:

•

Average income was $38,000;

•

Average Web usage was 20 hours per week and;

•

66% of the respondents had made at least one purchase online.

The New Study (2000)
•

52% male I 48% female;

•

Average age was 3 8 years;

•

A \~rag~ incomc:

•

61% of the respondents spend more than I 0 hours per week online; and

•

75% of the respondents have made at least one purchase online.

\\ilS

ovc:r S~O.OOO;

Note: Respondents who were more experienced users of the Web were specifically recruited for
the first study so they could easily evaluate navigational and design elements on the selected
websites. A broader base of respondents spanning several national borders were recruited for the
New Study in order to get a comprehensive read on perceptions and behaviors about trust on the
Web across the Americas.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As Robert F. Kennedy once observed, "Just because we cannot see clearly the end
of the road, that is no reason for not setting out on the essential journey. On the contrary,
great change predominates the world, and unless we move with change we will become
its victims. "1
The business world has taken this to heart when it has come to the Internet.
Companies have ventured onto the Information Superhighway in increasing numbers to
''reduce distribution and marketing costs ... eliminate the middleman ... increase
efficiency, promote impulse transactions and streamline distribution to far-flung locales"
as well as to "connect directly with consumers at home ... streamline operations and
internal transactions, and increase business-to-business sales."~ The value ofU.S.-based
1 THE QUOTABLE LAWYER§ 18 .19, at 38 (DavidS. Sharager and Elizabeth Frost, eds. 1986) (citing

Robert F. Kennedy's farewell statement, Warsaw, Poland, which was reported in the N.Y. Times, July 2,
1964).
~ Margaret Littman, Cyberspace Race: Online Sales Projected to Reach $368 billion in 2002, CRAIN'S

CHI. BUS., Nov . 30, 1998, at SRI.

2

e-commerce transactions was estimated to be $43 billion in 1998, and is projected to
grow to $1.3 trillion by 2003, over nine percent of total U.S. business sales.J More
importantly, electronic commerce ("e-commerce") stands on the threshold of broad global
acceptance. According to projections by one research firm, worldwide e-commerce sales
will reach as high as $3.2 trillion in 2003 , representing nearly five percent of all global
sales.~ Significantly, business-to-business transactions have been the most common form
of e-commerce, accounting for approximately eighty percent of online transactions.~
Likewise, governments around the world have enthusiastically embraced ecommerce as a positive development that should be encouraged. For example. numerous
governments have announced that fostering e-commerce is a major public policy
objective. 2 Indeed, governments themselves have benefited from thee-commerce
revolution by launching their own Web sites to better communicate with and serve
constituents while reducing transaction costs.!
State upon state, and country upon country, have noted this movement online and
responded by proposing, and in many cases enacting, e-commerce legislation and
regulations on a wide variety of topics: taxation of e-commerce transactions, jurisdiction
over online transactions, data protection and data privacy, confidentiality of e-commerce
transactions (including export controls of encryption products), unsolicited commercial
e-mail (sparn), information security, and the enforceability of e-commerce transactions.
In some cases, the legislation has been intended to promote and facilitate what is seen as a
desirable public policy. In other cases, however, it has been intended to control it.

Forrester Research. Inc .. US On-Line Business Trade Will Soar to S I.3 Trillion by 2003. according to
Forrester Research (visited Dec. 17, 1998)
<www.forrester.com/Press/ReleasesStandard/0,1184,121,00.html>.

J

Forrester Estimating Worldwide Internet Commerce Will Reach as High as S3.2
Trillion in 2003 (visited Nov. 5, 1998)
<http://www.forrester.com/er/press/releasesstandard/0, 1358, 144,ff.html> .

:! Forrester Research, Inc.,

~Anne Moore, A Medium That's Not for Everyone, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., Nov. 30, 1998, at SR5.
~See, e.g., A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (July I, 1997)

<http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm >(noting that the global information infrastructure "has the
potential to revolutionize commerce . .. by dramatically lowering transaction costs and facilitating new
types of commercial transactions" and stating that ''(t]o encourage electronic commerce, the U.S.
government should support the development of both a domestic and global uniform commercial legal
framework that recognizes, facilitates, and enforces electronic transactions worldwide"); European
Commission, Proposal for European Parliament and Council Directive on a Common Framework for
Electronic Signatures, (May 13, 1998) <http://www.ispo.cec.be/eif/policv/com98297.html> (stating that
"[e]lectronic commerce presents the European Union with an excellent opportunity to advance its economic
integration.")
1 See.

e.g.. U.S. General Services Administration, Access Certificates for Electronic Commerce (visited
Apr. 9, 1999) < http:. ,www.gsa.gov/aces >. This program is designed to facilitate public access to the
services offered by government agencies through use of information technologies, including online access
to computers tor purposes of reviewing, retrieving, providing, and exchanging information. /d.

.,
.)

The entorceability of e-commerce transactions is the most basic and fundamental
issue to be addressed bye-commerce legislation. Moreover, it is the subject that has seen
the most activity, generally in the form of electronic signature legislation.
Stimulated by the development of the American Bar Association Digital Signature
Guidelines,!! electronic signature legislation began with the Utah Digital Signature Act, 2
which was enacted in 1995 and focused solely on issues raised by cryptography-based
digital signatures. Soon thereafter, legislation was introduced in several other states. Yet.
the second state to introduce such legislation. California. quickly changed its direction by
adopting a very minimalist and technology-neutral approach limited to transactions with
state government agencies ..!.!! Subsequent legislation rapidly migrated from technologyspecific statutes focused on digital signatures to technology-neutral statutes that focused
generally on all types of electronic signatures.
At last count. forty-nine states, the U.S. Federal Government, and the
governments of over tifteen countries have enacted or are currently considering some
form of electronic signature legislation.ll In the U.S. alone, fifty-seven new electronic
signature bills were introduced in the state legislatures during the first two months of
1999.11 In addition, the National Conference of Commissioners on Unitorm State Laws
("NCCUSL") is completing a project to develop a Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
("UETA") in the U.S.;lJ the European Union has proposed a Directive on a Common
Framework for Electronic Signatures for the European Union; 1"' and the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Working Group on Electronic
Commerc~ completed work on its Model Law on Electronic Commerc~ in 1996, and

Information Security Committee, Electronic Commerce Division, Digital Signature Guidelines, 1996
A.B.A. SEC. SCI. & TECH. [hereinafter Digital Signature Guidelines), available at
www.abanet.org/scitechlec/isc/dsgfree.html.

!

2 See

UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 46-3-101 to 46-3-504 ( 1999).

!R See

CAL GOV'T CODE§ 16.5 (West 1999).

!! See Baker & McKenzie, Global £-Commerce Law Web site <http:/lwww.bakerinfo.com/ecommerce>

(providing a regularly updated summary of all enacted and pending electronic and digital signature
legislation).
!1 See Baker & McKenzie, Global £-Commerce Law Web site <http://www.bakerinto.com/ecommerce>.

The UET A project was completed in Spring 1999 and will be ready for approval by NCCUSL at its
annual mc:l!ting in thl! Summl!r of 1999. Accordingly, the UETA should be ready for enactment by the
states in early 2000.

ll

ll

See European Commission, supra note 6, at I.

UNCITRAL is the body within the United Nations primarily charged with oversight of international
commercial law. It was created in 1966 by General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) in order to enable the
United Nations to play a more active role in reducing or removing legal obstacles to the flow of
international trade. A list of its completed projects and their current status may be found at UNCITRAL's
home page http:/lwww.un.or.at/uncitral." Amelia H. Boss, Electromc Commerce and the Symbiotic
Relutiunship Between /nternatiunal and Domestic Law Rt!jorm, 72 TULANE L. REV. 1932, n.3 (1998).

il
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is currently drafting international legislation addressing digital signatures and certification
authorities. 17 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
is also addressing electronic signature legal issues,.!! as are several other public and
private organizations. 19
Yet a quick look at the electronic signature legislation currently enacted or under
considerationMI reveals that while there is agreement on where we ultimately want to go
(facilitating e-comrnerce), there is little agreement on how to get there. As discussed in
more detail below. legislation ranges from a minimalist approach that simply authorizes
the use of electronic signatures in very limited circumstances, to legislation that
establishes some evidentiary presumptions and default provisions that parties can contract
out of, to a very formal and highly regulatory approach governing the manner in which
digital signatures may be used and certification authorities may operate ..ll
The essential question with regard to electronic signature legislation is: How far
down the road will it take us? Can the various types of legislation move e-commerce in
the right direction, or might they cause unintended detours? Should we simply wait for
disputes to arise and leave it to judges to transform the legal landscape? Do the laws that
work remarkably well and provide predictability in the traditional, paper-based
commercial
world translate line for line and serve as adequate mile markers for companies blazing
trails to more efficient commerce on the new electronic frontier? Given the explosion of

United Nations. UNC!TRA L Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment 1996
(visited Apr. 19 1999) <www.un.or.at/uncitral/english/texts/electcom/ml-ec.htm >.

!! See
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1n 1996, UNCITRAL decided to place the issues of digital signatures and certification authorities on its
agenda. UNCITRAL's Working Group on Electronic Commerce was requested to examine the desirability
and feasibility of preparing uniform rules on those topics, and to provide UNCITRAL with sufficient
elements for an informed decision regarding the scope of the uniform rules to be prepared. As to a more
precise mandate for the Working Group, it was agreed that the uniform rules should address such issues as:
the legal basis supporting certification processes, including emerging digital authentication and certification
technology; the applicability of the certification process; the allocation of risk and liabilities of users,
providers, and third parties using certification techniques; the specific issues of certification through the use
of registries; and incorporation by reference. See United Nations Commission On International Trade Law,
Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session (AICN.

9/446 Feb. II, 1998) < http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/english/sessions/unc/unc-31/acn9-446.htm >.
!! See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, EMU- Facts, Challenges and Policies

(last modified Mar. 16, 1999) < http://www.oecd.org >. The OECD is an international organization with
twenty-nine member countries from North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific area. Based in Paris,
France, OECD is a forum permitting governments of the industrialized democracies to study and formulate
economic and social policies. Its sole function is direct cooperation among the governments of its member
countries. /d.
12

See, e.g. , ILPF, Internet Law and Policy Forum, (visited Apr. 9, 1999) < http://www.ilpf.org >.

1!! See Baker & McKenzie, Global £-Commerce Law Web site <http://www.bakerinfo.com/ecommerce>

(providing a summary of all electronic and digital signature legislation).
lltd.
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e-commerce activity. is legislation even necessary, or are there inherent limits to the
growth of e-commerce that legislation could help to overcome?
Enacting legislation designed simply to remove barriers, while an important and
worthwhile endeavor. may not move us far enough toward the ultimate goal. Conversely.
enacting laws or imposing regulations that force the market to use a specitic business
model or specific technology, or that protect against perceived problems that have not yet
surfaced, might preclude the pursuit of more promising e-commerce avenues.
Yet, if done properly, electronic signature legislation can, and perhaps should, be
designed and enacted to accomplish two goals: (1) to remove barriers (actual and
perceived) to e-commerce, and (2) to enable and promote the desirable public policy goal
of e-commerce by helping to establish the "trust" and the .. predictability" needed by
parties doing business online. These two goals might be best accomplished by enacting
legislation that preserves freedom of contract while recognizing that, because parties
don't always resolve all issues by prior contractual agreement, limited default rules
should apply when such unresolved issues arise. Although the judiciary will certainly
play a key role in establishing the rules that will govern online transactions, we should not
automatically discount the positive contributions and early guidance that legislation can
provide. Likewise, while the goal of technology neutrality is important from the
standpoint of not stifling development or unfairly favoring one technology over another,
we must be careful as we draft electronic signature legislation not to let neutrality become
an excuse to avoid addressing legitimate new issues raised by a unique technology, or
worse, use neutrality as a means to discriminate against the development of those
technologies seen by most as facilitating secure e-commerce. Finally, we must
continually be cognizant of the danger that the forty-nine different versions of electronic
signatUre legislation undertaken by the various states in this country might, despite our
best intentions. actually undermine the trust and predictability we are seeking to establish.
Toward that end, this article explores some of the questions we should be asking
ourselves in using electronic signature legislation as a vehicle for advancing ecommerce.ll First, we will define what we mean when we refer to electronic and digital
signatures. Second, we will examine the three fundamental legal issue~ raised by online
transactions that have fostered the felt need for electronic signature legislation.
Furthermore. for each issue, we will outline the underlying concerns, examine the primary
legislative approaches developed to date, and discuss the role that electronic signature
legislation - whether at the state or federal level - can play in allaying the identified
concerns. Third. we will conclude with some thoughts on legislation's role in promoting
the growth of e-commerce by reviewing some statutes that have historically been a
positive force in promoting economic growth.
II.

THE CORE LEGISLATIVE CONCERN: ELECTRONIC AND

Because our focus is primarily on business-to-business e-commerce, we do not address the additional
issues raised by consumers' concerns.

ll
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DIGITAL SIGNATURES
The core concern of electronic signature legislation has been electronic
documents, sometimes referred to as ·'records" or "electronic records," 23 and ·'signatures"
that are created, communicated, and stored in electronic form. 24 Generally, these
signatures are referred to as either "electronic signatures" or "digital signatures."
Unfortunately, these terms themselves have created considerable confusion.25 Thus, for
purposes of this article, we will define these terms as most commentators have: 26

•
"Electronic signature " is a generic, technology-neutral term that refers to
the universe of all of the various methods by which one can '·sign" an electronic record.
Although all electronic signatures are represented digitally (i.e., as a series of ones and
zeroes), they can take many forms and can be created by many different technologies.
Examples of electronic signatures include: a name typed at the end of an e-mail message
by the sender; a digitized image of a handwritten signature that is attached to an
electronic document (sometimes created via a biometrics-based technology called

ll See,

e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5-105 (effective July I, 1999). Under lllinois law, a ·•record" is
"information that is inscribed, stored, or otherwise fixed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an
electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." !d. Additionally, an "electronic record"
is a "record generated, communicated, retrieved, or stored by electronic means for use in an information
system or for transmission from one information system to another." ld See also Report of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Twenty-Ninth Session, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 17, at Annex l, U.N. Doc. A/51/17 (1996).
"Electronic" form refers generally to a variety of formats by which information can be stored, including
electrical, digital, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or any other form of technology that entails
capabilities similar to the foregoing technologies. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5-l 05.

ll

Because all forms of electronic signatures exist in digital form, many of the electronic signature statutes
erroneously use the technology-specific term "digital signature" to refer to the generic class of all methods
by which an electronic message can be signed - i.e., electronic signatures. Some statutes use the term
"digital signature" to refer to a public key cryptography-based signature, while other statutes use it to refer
to any type of signature in digital form (i.e., an "electronic signature"). Statutes in this latter category
include: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41-132 (West 1998); CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 16.5 (West 1999); GA.
CODE ANN. §10-12-4 (Michie 1998); 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/14/01 (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN.
STATE GOV'T § 8-504 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 86-l70·(Michie 1999); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 294-D: 4 (1999); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.§ 2054.060 (West 1999); TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN . § 201.933 (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN . §§ 59. 1-467,59. 1-468,59.1-469 (Michie 1998). See, e.g.,
CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 16.5 (defining a "digital signature" as "an electronic identifier, created by computer,
intended by the party using it to have the same force and effect as the use of a manual signature"). Cf FLA.
STAT. § 282.70 (West 1998) (defining an "electronic signature" more appropriately as "any letters,
characters, or symbols, manifested by electronic or similar means, executed or adopted by a party with an
intent to authenticate a writing").

ll

~Global information Infrastructure Commission, A Global Action Plan for Business With Governments

Toward Electronic Commerce (Sept. 9, 1998 draft)< http://www.giic.org/pubs.e_biaa.pdf>. A consensus
appears to be emerging to define "electronic signature" as the process of signing an electronic document or
transaction to obtain legal equivalence with the hand-written signature, and "digital signature" as one (but
not the only) technique to deliver the functions required of an electronic signature. !d
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signature dynamicsll); a secret code or PlN (such as that used with ATM cards and credit
cards) to identitY the sender to the recipient; a code or .. handle" that the sender of a
message uses to identify himself: a unique biometrics-based identifier, such as a
tingerprint or a retinal scan; and a digital signature (created through the use of public kt!y
cryptography).
•
··Digital signature ..~ is simply a term for one technology-specific type of
electronic signature. It involves the use of public key cryptographyll to "sign" a
message,~ and is perhaps the one type of electronic signature that has generated the most
business and technical efforts, as well as legislative responses.

A signature, whether electronic or on paper, is first and foremost a symbol that
signifies intent. Thus. the definition of"signed" in the Uniform Commercial Code
includes ·'any symbol" so long as it is ··executed or adopted by a party with present
intention to authenticate a writing."31 The primary focus, of course, is on the ''intention
to authenticate," which distinguishes a signature from an autograph. Yet, the nature of
that intent will vary with the transaction, and in most cases can be determined only by
looking at the context in which the signature was made. 32 A signature may, for example,
signify an intent to be bound to the terms of the contract, the approval of a subordinate' s
request for funding of a project. confirmation that a signer has read arid reviewed the
contents of a memo. an indication that the signer was the author of a document, or merely
that the contents of a document have been shown to the signer and that he or she has had
an opportunity to review them.
In addition to evidencing a person's intent, a signature can also serve two
secondary purposes. First, a signature may be used to identify the person signing.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 22003(b)( I)(D) ( 1998). Under the California Digital Signature Regulations,
"'Signature Dynamics' means measuring the way a person writes his or her signature by hand on a flat
surface and binding the measurements to a message through the use of cryptographic techniques." !d.

11

For purposes of this article, we assume that the reader is familiar with digital signatures and the
asymmetric (public key) cryptography used to create them. For an overview of this technology and the
process by which digital signatures are created, see THOMAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, Ed. ONLINE LAW
chs. 3, 4, 31 ( 1996); WAR WICK FORD AND MICHAEL BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE ( 1997); Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 8.

ll

ll Public key cryptography employs an algorithm using two different but mathematically related
cryptographic keys. One key for creating a digital signature or transforming data into a seemingly
unintelligible form, and the other key for verifying a digital signature or returning the message to its original
form
~ In more technical terms. a digital signature is the sequence of bits that is created by running an electronic

message through a one-way hash function to create a unique digest (or "fingerprint") of the message and
then using public key encryption to encrypt the resulting message digest with the sender's private key.
ll

U.C.C. Article l, § 1-201(39) (1999).

,u Some statutes, however, infer intent. See, e.g., CCA, Singapore Electronic Transactions Act 1998,
§ 18(2)(b) <http:// www.cca.gov.sg/eta/framecontent.htm >[hereinafter Singapore Electronic Transactions
Act].
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Second, a signature may serve as some evidence of the integrity of' a document. such as
when parties sign a lengthy contract on the final page and also initial all preceding pages
to guard against alterations in the integrity of the document through a substitution of
pages.
For electronic transactions, these secondary signature functions of identity and
integrity can be key. Especially to the extent that we automate electronic transactions,
and conduct them over significant distances using easily altered digital technology, the
need for a way to ensure the identity of the sender and the integrity of the document
becomes pivotal:
Unlike the world of paper-based commerce, where the requirement of a
signed writing most trequently serves the function of showing that an already
identified person made a particular promise. in the e-commerce world, a
requirement of an authenticated electronic message serves not only this function,
but the more fundamental function of identifying the person making the promise
contained in the message in the first place. This additional function is critical in
e-commerce because there are few other methods of establishing the source of an
electronic message. 33
Thus, while handwritten signatures in most cases serve merely to indicate the
signer's intent, signatures in an electronic environment typically serve three critical
purposes for the parties engaged in an e-commerce transaction - i.e., to identify the
sender, 34 to indicate the sender's intent (e.g., to be bound by the terms of a contract), and
to ensure the integrity of the document signed. 35
III.

THE FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
BY £-COMMERCE

Three fundamental legal issues arise when parties to a transaction use electronic
records to replace paper, employ an electronic medium as the mode of communication,
and use electronic signatures to authenticate their transactions:
• Is it legal? Both federal and state law contain many requirements that
transactions be documented in "writing" and be "signed." Many are concerned that this

R. J. Robenson, Jr., Electronic Commerce on the Internet and the Statute of Frauds, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 813
( 1998).

ll

See infra notes 60-65 ·and accompanying text. In apparent recognition of this fact, the electronic
signature statutes enacted in several states (e.g., California) require that an electronic symbol identify the
signer before that symbol will qualify as an electronic signature.

H

illt is, of course, possible to use a security procedure to preserve the integrity of an electronic record
without creating an electronic signature. Yet, regardless of whether an electronic signature or an alternative
security procedure are used, the issue of ensuring the integrity of electronic documents must be addressed.
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requires ink on paper and, thus, that electronic communications do not meet appropriate
legal requirements for writing and signature and will not be enforceable.
• Can I trust the message? Recipients of electronic messages must have some
basis for trusting the message (from a legal perspective), so that they can act in reliance
upon the message, often in real time, and without the need for out-of-band verification.
Achieving the key goals of e-commerce (including speed, efficiency, and economy)
requires that recipients of electronic messages be willing to act in reliance on messages
received (e.g., ship product, transfer funds. enter into binding contractual commitments,
change position in reliance on messages), and to do so promptly and in many cases
automatically. Yet. the indicia of reliability that usually accompany paper-based
communications (such as a paper document signed with ink signatures and delivered by
trusted third parties such as the U.S. Postal Service) are missing in electronic transactions.
Moreover, the ease with which digital documents can be altered without detection
increases the risk of fraud for electronic transactions.
• What are the rules of conduct? As with all legal transactions, the parties
should know the rules of the game. For example, what is the liability of a certification
authority or a trusted third party for inaccurate identification? What is the liability of the
signer of a message who loses the private key or other signature device used to create the
message? What is required for cross-border recognition of electronic messages?

The most difficult question of all is what role, if any, electronic signature
legislation should play in addressing such legal issues. The following sections will
explore these three legal issues, the extent to which electronic signature legislation
addresses these issues, and the direction in which such legislation should be moving.
A.

1.

IS IT LEGAL? REMOVING BARRIERS TO ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
The Issue

The first of these three issues- is e-commerce legal?- is the most fundamental,
because it involves questions regarding the enforceability of electronic transactions. This
issue raises concerns regarding whether electronic records and electronic signatures meet
legal fonnalities such as the writing and signature requirements imposed by a variety of
statutes and regulations; whether an electronic record constitutes an "original" for
evidentiary purposes;H whether electronic records and electronic signatures will be denied

The requirement that a document be "an original" occurs in a variety of contexts for a variety of reasons.
In many situations, documents must be transmitted unchange~ (i.e., in their "original" form), so that other
parties may have contidence in their contents. Examples of documents where an ·•original" is often required
include trade documents (e.g., weight certificates, agricultural certificates, quality/quantity certificates,
inspection reports, insurance certificates) and non-business related documents (e.g., birth certificates and
death certificates). When these documents exist on paper, they are usually only accepted if they are
"original," because alterations may be difficult to detect in copies.
H
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admissibility because of their electronic form; whether records can be maintained solely
in an electronic form; and whether the recordkeeper can establish the authenticity and
integrity of such records.
Yet, the concern that has generated the most discussion, and the one that we
examine here, is whether electronically signed records meet writing and signature
requirements. rn many cases, the law requires that an agreement be both documented in
37
"writing," and "signed" by the person who is sought to be held bound, in order for that
agreement to be enforceable. The Statute of Frauds is. of course. the best example of
such a law. 38 Nevertheless, thousands of other federal, state, and local statutes and
regulations also require a transaction to be documented by a writing and a signature. In
Illinois, for example. over 3,000 statutory sections contain such requirements. Likewise,
Georgia has over 5.500. and Ohio has over 8,000, such statutory sections.39
Statutes and regulations that require transactions to be "in writing" and "signed"
are generally perceived to constitute barriers toe-commerce- barriers that must be
removed if e-commerce is to flourish. Otherwise, an electronic record might not satisfy
statutory writing requirements, and an electronic signature might not satisfy statutory

The requirement that a document be "ap original" is also important from an evidentiary perspective. In
particular, the ''best evidence rule" (sometimes referred to as the "original document rule") requires that:
"filn proving the terms of a writing, where the terms are material. the original writing must be produced
unless it is shown to be unavailable for some reasons and other than the serious fault of the proponent."
EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 203 at 704 (3d ed. 1984). See also 6
JACK B. WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § I 002 (Joseph M. McLaughlin & Matthew Bender eds,
2d ed. 1998) (defining "Requirement of Original," which states that "to prove the content of a writing,
recording or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise
provided in these rules or by act of Congress").
rl Requirements that agreements be "in writing" serve a variety of purposes. These include:

(I) providing tangible evidence of the existence and nature of the intent of the parties to bind
themselves; (2) alerting parties to the consequences of entering into a contract; (3) providing a
document that is legible to all, including strangers to the transaction; (4) providing a permanent
record of the transaction that remains unaltered over time; (5) allowing the reproduction of a
document so that each party can have a copy of the same; (6) allowing for the authentication of the
data by means of a signature; (7) providing a document that is in a form acceptable to public
authorities and courts; (8) finalizing the intent of the author of the writing and providing a record
of that intent; (9) allowing easy storage of data in tangible form ; (I 0) facilitating control and
subsequent audit for accounting, tax, or regulatory purposes; and (II) bringing legal rights and
obligations into existence in those cases where a "writing" is required for validity purposes. See
Commission on Electronic Commerce and Crime, Final Report of the Commission on Electronic
Commerce and Crime (May 26, 1998) available at< http://www.bakerinfo.com/ecommerce >.
For the Statute of Frauds and contracts involving the sale of goods, see U.C.C. § 2-20 I (I) (1998); see
also U.C.C. § 1-206 ( 1998) (limited enforcement of unsigned, unwritten contracts for the sale of securities
for ~) . 000 or more) See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § II 0 statutory note, at 284-85
ll982) tor a state-by-state listing of state statutes of frauds .

!!

~See Report of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), Uniform

Electronic Transactions Act, Task Force on State Law Exclusions, (Sept. 21, 1998),
<http://www.webcom .com/legaled/ET AForum/docs/report4.htm I >.
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signature requirements. In other words, there is a concern that writing and signature
requirements are satisfied only by ink on paper. Interestingly, however, concerns over
whether electronic records and electronic signatures will satisfy these legal requirements
may not be warranted.:!!! As the discussion below indicates. the case law suggests that
courts would find that electronic records can meet the statutory writing requirements, and
that electronic signatures can meet the statutory signature requirements .

a.

Writing Requirement

The traditional definition of a "writing" is not limited to ink on paper. Rather, the
essence of the requirement is that the communication be reduced to a tangible form .!! As
early as 1869, a New Hampshire court found a telegraphed contract to be a sufficient
writing under the Statute of Frauds:
It makes no difference whether that operator writes the otTer or the
acceptance . . . with a steel pen an inch long attached to an ordinary
penholder, or whether his pen be a copper wire a thousand miles long. In
either case the thought is communicated to the paper by use of the finger
resting upon the pen; nor does it make any difference that in one case
common record ink is used, while in the other case a more subtle fluid,
known as electricity, performs the same office:n
Courts have also found telexes, Western Union Mailgrams, and even tape
recordings to be writings under the Statute of Frauds."43 Faxes have been assumed to be
writings under the Statute ofFrauds."~ 4 Magnetic recordings of data on computer disks
:!!! See Letter from Business Software Alliance to Professor Raymond T. Nimmer & Carlyle C. Ring, Jr.,

Artic:le 28 Drajiing Committee (Jan. 20, 1999) < http://www.2bguide.com/docsi0 199bsa.html >. According
to the Business Software Alliance, "billions of dollars of business is being successfully conducted on an
assumption of nondiscrimination [against electronic records and signatures] and there are no reported
decisions that could be fairly construed as systematically discrim inating against electronic records or
signatures in the context of contract law issues." /d.
:!.! The U.C.C. defines "written" or "writing" as "printing, typewriting or any other intentional reduction to

tungtble jurm ... U.C.C .

~

1-201(46) ( 1998) (emphasis added) .

:!! Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487 ( 1869). One commentator has noted that "the Whipple opinion was a

bit eccentric in its metaphors, to be sure, but was not maverick in its results." Douglas Morrison, Note, The
Statute of Frauds Online: Can a Computer Sign a Contract for the Sale of Goods? 14 GEO. MASON U.
L. Rev. 637 (1992).
Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (holding that a telex is a writing);
McMillan Ltd. v. Weimer Drilling & Eng. Co., 512 So.2d 14 (Ala. 1986) (holding that a mailgram is a
writing); Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972) (holding that a tape recording
is a writing). But see Roos v. Aloi, 127 Misc. 2d 864 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that a tape recording is
not a writing).
·

Q

~See Bazak International Corp. v. Mast Industries, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 633 (N .Y. 1989) (assuming faxes to
be writings under U.C.C. 2-20 I). In American Multimedia Inc. v. Dalton Packaging, Inc., 143 Misc. 2d

295 (N .Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), a faxed purchase order was assumed to be a writing for purposes of a federal
arbitration statute.
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have been held to constitute "writings" for a variety of purposes, including under forgery
statutes and copyright law. 45 Accordingly, it is likely that a court would find that
electronic messages recorded in a tangible medium would also satisfy the writing
requirement. 46

b.

Signature Requirement

Generally, a signature is "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present
intention to authenticate a writing."'47 Thus. the key requirement is not ink on paper, but
rather the presence of a "'symbol" coupled with the party's ·'intention."
The courts have found many symbols on a variety of media to be signatures:
names on telegrams, 48 names on telexes, 49 typewritten names,~ names on Western Union
Mailgrams,ll and even names on letterhead. 52 Faxed signatures have also been assumed
to constitute effective signatures. 53 Thus, any symbol or code on an electronic record that
~People v. Avila, 770 P.2d 1330 (Colo. Ct. App . 1988) (stating that recording on computer di~k was a
"writing" for purposes of forgery statute). See also Clyburn v. Allstate, 826 F.Supp. 955 (D.S.C. 1993).
~ Some courts may have concerns about reliability- i.e., whether magnetic media are more subject to
tampering than paper- but these concerns should not affect whether an electronic transmission is
considered a writing. Rather, they should only be relevant to the authentication, for evidence purposes, of a
particular transmission record. But see Morrison, supra note 42, at 637 (analyzing reliability of EDI
records in determining whether to consider them "writings" under the Statute of Frauds).
:U U.C. C. § 1-20 I (39) (1998).
:!.! Selma Savings Bank v. Webster County Bank, 206 S. W. 870 (Ky. 1918); Hillstrom v. Gosnay, 614 P.2d

466 Mont. ( 1989). Contra, Pike Industries, Inc. v. Middlebury Associates, 398 A.2d 280 (Vt. 1979); ajj'd
on other grounds, 436 A.2d 725 (Vt. 1980), cert denied, 455 U.S. 947 (1992). See Morrison, supra note
42. at637 .
:!2 Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 70 F. Supp. 117; Franklin County Coop. v. MFC Services, 441

So.2d 13 76 (Miss. 1983); Hideca Petroleum Corp v. Tampimac Oil Int'l Ltd., 740 S. W.2d 838 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987). But see Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank International Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(suggesting that there was a question as to whether test key on telex is a signature).
~In Watson v. Tom Growney Equip. Inc., 721 P.2d 1302 (N.M. 1986), a name typed on a purchase order

was found to be a sufficient signature, because the signatory had deliberately filled out other details on the
form. See In re Maner of Save-On Carpet of Arizona, Inc., 545 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that a
typewritten signature on a U.C.C. financing statement satisfied the signature requirement of the Statute of
Frauds). But see In re Carlstrom, 3 U.C.C . Rep. Serv. 766 (Bk. D. Me. 1966). See also A & G Const. Co.
v. Reid Bros. Logging Co., 547 P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1976) (holding that a typed name was sufficient).
ll Hesenthaler v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (focusing on intent to authenticate); McMillan

Ltd v. Warrior Drilling & Eng Co., 512 So. 2d 14 (Ala. 1986).
lltn Kohlmeyer & Co. v. Bowen, 192 S.E.2d 400 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972), a securities brokerage firm's name
was printed on a confirmation statement for the sale of securities. The court found that the printed name
was intended as authentication and met the signature requirement under the Statute of Frauds. See also
Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1966) (discussing
printed names on letterhead).
llJn Beatty v. First Exploration Fund 1987 and Co. Limited Partnership, 25 B.C.L.R.2d 377 ( 1988), a
British Columbia case, faxed signatures on proxy documents were sufficient to meet the signature
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is intended as a signature should also meet the requirement. Even a name typed at the
end of an e-mail should qualify as a signature,S:! so long as it was created with the proper
intent.
Yet, concerns have lingered not only because of a few contrary court decisions. 55
but also because of a lack of specific statutory authorization. Notwithstanding the
foregoing case law, a general concern about the "legality" of electronic records and
electronic signatures has persisted, leading to numerous calls for legislation to remove the
perceived barriers toe-commerce resulting from traditional writing and signature
requirements. The benefits of predictability in the law 56 argue in favor of legislation that
clearly and unambiguously states that electronic signatures satiszy legal signature
requirements and that electronic records can satisfy legal writing requirements.
2.

The Legislative Response

All electronic signature statutes enacted to date have a component designed to
remove these perceived barriers toe-commerce. In fact, for most electronic signature
legislation, that is the only issue that is addressed.
Unfortunately, the legislative approaches to what appears to be a simple issue of
merely removing barriers to e-commerce have been somewhat varied and inconsistent,
and may have actually made the situation worse. Specifically, in clarifying that electronic
records meet writing requirements and that electronic signatures meet signature
requirements, statutes have differed greatly regarding two fundamental issues: ( 1) what
qualifies as a signature; and (2) what types of transactions can be undertaken using
electronic records and electronic signatures. The following sections discuss the variety of
legislative approaches (and inconsistencies) regarding these two issues.

a.

What Qualifies as a Signature?

Perhaps the biggest issue that arises in legislation devoted to removing barriers to
e-commerce is the question of what type of electronic signature qualifies as a signature
(i.e .. meets statutory and regulatory signature requirements). Unfortunately, there is no
uniform answer to this question. Typically, legislation has taken one of three apparently
requirements under a limited partnership agreement. In Gilmore v. Lujan, 94 7 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1991 ),
the court upheld an agency's determination that a fax did not meet the regulation's strict requirement that a
document be "holographically signed in ink," but criticized the agency for its narrow-minded approach. In
Madden v. Hegadon, 565 A.2d 725 (N.J. Super. 1989), ajj'd 571 A.2d 296 (N.J. 1989), a faxed signature
was deemed effective for filing a nomination petition.
~See BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, (1994) at 102.
ll See, e.g., Department of Trans. v. Norris, 474 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. Ct. App . 1996), rev 'd sub nom., Norris v.

Georgia Dep't of Transportation, 486 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 1997) (holding that a fax transmission was not a
writing).
~See discussion infra Section C.3.
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inconsistent approaches: ( 1) all electronic signatures satisfy legal signature requirements;
(2) electronic signatures satisfy legal signature requirements only when they possess
certain security attributes; or (3) digital signatures satisfy legal signature requirements.
Moreover, not only is legislation inconsistent from state to state, but in some cases
inconsistent approaches have been enacted within the same state.
In the paper world, at least in the United States, anything can qualify as a
signature .. The current definition of signature in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
includes "any symbol made with an intent to authenticate. "iZ Because there is no
requirement as to the nature of the mark that qualifies, courts have found that, in addition
to the traditional handwritten signature, a wide variety of marks (including a simple "X")
will qualify. 58 Several states have taken the same approach with electronic signaturesthat is. any form of electronic ·•symbol" on a message can qualify as a signature.~ All
such statutes take a technology-neutral approach to the means by which such signatures
ll U.C.C. § 20 1(39) ( 1999) (emphasis added).
~See notes 4 7-56 and accompanying text.
~See ARIZ. REV . STAT. ANN. § 41-l32(D)(4) (West 1998) (defining electronic signature an "electronic

or digital method of identification that is execut~d or adopted by a person with the intent to be bound by or
to authenticate a record" 47-56); FLA STAT ANN§ 282.72(4) (West 1998) ("Electronic signature means
any letters, characters, or symbols, manifested by electronic or similar means, executed or adopted by a
party with an intent to authenticate a writing."); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5-105 (effective July I, 1999)
("[A]ny symbol executed or adopted, or any security procedure employed or adopted, using electronic
means or otherwise, by or on behalf of a person with intent to authenticate a record ."); IND . CODE ANN.§
5-24-2-2 (West 1998) ("[A)n electronic identifier, created by computer, executed or adopted by the party
using it with the intent to authenticate a writing."); MISS. CODE ANN . § 25-63-1 ( 1998) ("[A]ny word,
group of letters, name, including a trader-assumed name, mark, characters or symbols made manually, by
device, by machine, or manifested by electronic or similar means, executed or adopted by a party with the
intent to authenticate a writing."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN . § 506:8 ( 1999) ("Electronic signature means a
digital signature. executed or adopted by a party with an intent to authenticate a writing."); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3701.75 ("[A]ny of the following attached to or associated with an electronic record by an
individual to authenticate the record: (a) a code consisting of a combination of letters, numbers, characters,
or symbols that is adopted or executed by an individual as that individual's electronic signature; (b) a
computer-generated signature code created for an individual; (c) an electronic image of an individual's
handwritten signature created by using a pen computer."); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.835 (1998) ("[A]ny
letters, characters or symbols, manifested by electronic or similar means, executed or adopted by a party
with an intent to authenticate a writing."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-5-330 (Law. Co-op 1998) ("[A]ny
identifier or authentication technique attached to or logically associated with an electronic record that is
intended by the party using it to have the same force and effect as a manual signature.); TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.108 (West 1998) ("[A]n electronic identifier, created by a computer, intended by
the party using it to have the same force and effect as the use of a manual signature."); VA. CODE ANN.§§
59.1-467, 59. 1-468, 59.1-469 (Michie 1998) ("[A]n electronic identifier, created by a computer, intended
by the party using it to have the same force and effect as the use of a manual signature."); W. VA. CODE§
39-5-2(e) ( 1998) ("[AJny identifier or authentication technique attached to or logically associated with an
electronic record that is intended by the person using it to have the same force and effect as a manual
signature."); WIS . STAT. ANN.§ 137.04(2) (West 1999) ("[A]ny combination of words, letters, symbols
or characters that is attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and used by a person for
the purpose of authenticating a document that has been created in or transformed into an electronic
format.") .
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are created (i.e .. they do not specify the technology that must be used, only the result that
must be achieved). The only requirements are, quite simply, the existence of a symbol or
security procedure, and an intent to authenticate on the part of the signer. The proposed
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act also takes this approach.!!!!
A second category of statutes, however, requires that electronic signatures possess
certain attributes or meet certain requirements before they will be considered legally
enforceable. Virtually all of these statutes take a technology-neutral approach to these
requirements.
Perhaps the most common requirements imposed by this second category of
statutes derive from a decision of the U.S. Comptroller General that was first included in
the California legislation enacted in late 1995. 61 Under statutes adopting this approach,
an electronic signature is legally effective as a signature only if it is: ( 1) unique to the
person using it; (2) capable of verification; (3) under the sole control ofthe person using
it: and (4) linked to the data in such a manner that if the data is changed, the signature is
invalidated. Some statutes have varied this approach by including these four
requirements in the definition of an electronic signature (i.e., it's not an electronic
signature if it doesn't possess those four attributes) but also specifying that only
electronic signatures are legally effective as signatures. In either case, however, this
approach requires attributes of security as a precondition to the validity of the signature
itself, something not required for paper-based signatures. Statutes in nearly a third of the
states have adopted this approach.a The draft European Directive takes a similar

2!! See Unifonn Electronic Transaction Act, § 2(8) (Final Version, approved July, 1999),

<http://www .law. upenn.edullibrary/ulc/ulc.htm#ueccta >
!1 See U.S. Comptroller General, Matter ofNational Institute of Standards and Technology" Use of

Electronic Data Interchange Technology to Create Valid Obligations, 71 Camp. Gen. I 09 ( 1991);
(Dec. 13, 1991); CAL. GOV'T. CODE §16.5 (West 1999).
g See ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.510 (Michie 1999) (applying generally to all communications); CAL.
GOV'T CODE§ 16.5 (limiting application to communications with public entities); GA. CODE ANN.§
10-12-4 (Michie 1998) (applying generally to all communications); IDAHO CODE § 67·2357 ( 1998)
limiting application to the filing and issuing of documents by and with state and local agencies); 15 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/14.0 I (limiting application to communications between a state agency and the
comptroller); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/5 (West 1998) (limiting application to communications between
financial institutions and their customers); IOWA CODE ANN. § 1555A.27 (West 1999) (limiting
application to prescriptions); KAN. STAT. ANN ..§ 60-2616 (1997) (applying generally to all
communications); KY . REV . STAT. ANN.§ 369.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1999) (applying generally to all
kinds of communications); MD. CODE. ANN. STATE GOV'T § 8-504 (1998) (limiting application to any
communications among governmental entities); NEB . REV. STAT. § 86-1701 ( 1998) (applying generally
to all communications); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294-D:4 ·( 1999) (limiting application to
communications between the state and any agency or instrumentality of the state); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6658 I ( 1999) (limiting application to filings with public agencies); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 15 § 965
(West 1999) (applying generally to all communications); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 42-127-4 (1998) (limiting
application to transactions between public agencies).
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approach.~

Unfortunately, the meaning of these four requirements is not entirely clear.
and such requirements may create significant and unnecessary hurdles.2:!

~See European Commission, supra note 6. However, the draft European Directive does not require that
these elements be present in order to create an enforceable electronic signature.
!!:! The four requirements generally impose conditions not nonnally required to create an enforceable

signature on a paper document. They can be explained as follows :
(a)
Unique to the Person Using It- The requirement that an electronic signature be ·•unique to the
person using it" is presumably intended to ensure that not more than one person would produce the same
electronic signature. It is likely that a digital copy of a handwritten signature would be considered to be
unique to the individual signer- i.e., every person presumably has a unique way of writing his or her
signature. Likewise, the requirement of uniqueness could also presumably be satisfied by a biometric-based
signature that incorporates certain attributes un ique to the signer, such as a fingerprint or a retinal scan. The
requirement can also be satisfied by a digital signature where the public-private key pair used by the signer
was randomly generated and of sufficient key length so that the likelihood of anyone else generating the
same public-private key pair would be exceedingly remote. By contrast, however, while the name ''John
Smith" or the letter "X" typed at the bottom of a paper document can qualify as a signature, it is not unique
to any person that uses this method of signature, and thus would presumably not qualify as an electronic
signature.
Such an absolute requirement of uniqueness is not necessary. If the law of signatures in the context of
paper-based transactions does not require that signatures be unique, it may not be appropriate to impose
such a requirement on electronic transactions (in certain situations, the recipient of the message may be
taking a risk that it cannot authenticate the signature in court, but the recipient takes a comparable risk with
a paper-based transaction containing a non-unique signature, such as an "X"). Where uniqueness is
required, it seems that it should be required only in the domain in which the signature is used, rather than on
a true worldwide basis.
(b)
Capable of Verification- The requirement that a signature be capable of verification does not
mean that the signature itselfmust consist of or include the signer's name. Rather, it focuses on the ability
to detennine or verify the identity of the signer ofthe message. Thus, verification based on reference to
other sources of information is likely to be sufficient. For example, under the California Digital Signature
Regulations, a digital signature is capable of verification ifthe recipient of the digitally signed document
can verify that the document was digitally signed by using the signer's public key to decrypt the message,
and a digitized handwritten signature created using signature dynamics is capable of verification if the
handwriting measurements can allow a handwriting and document expert to access the authenticity of the
signature. See CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 22003 (West 1999).
It should be noted, however that even the conclusion of an expert in handwriting analysis who has compared
admitted signatures of the purported signer with the signature in question is at best subjective. See, e.g.,
U.S. v Rosario. 118 F 3d 160 (3d Cir. 1997) (" Handwriting analysis is at best an inexact science, and at
worst mere speculation itself.").

Under the Sole Control of the Person Using It- The California Digital Signature Regulations
(c)
provide that (I) a digital signature is under the sole control of the person using it when the person who
holds the relevant key pair assumes a duty to exercise reasonable care to retain control of the private key
and prevent its disclosure; and (2) a digitized handwritten signature created using signature dynamics is
under the sole control of the person using it if the signature digest captures the handwriting measurements
and cryptographically binds them to the message and makes It computationally infeasible for the
handwriting measurements to be bound to any other message. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 22003 . Yet, it is not
clear whether this is a proper interpretation of the "sole control" requirement or whether the requirement is
appropriate where another party may be "authorized" to execute a signature on behalf of the signer, such as
by operating a check writing machine or using the signer's private key with appropriate authorization .

17

A different set of legal signature requirements is imposed by the UNCITRAL
Model Law. Specifically, the UNCITRAL Model Law requires that:
1.
an electronic signature must include a method to identify the signer,
2.
an electronic signature must include a method to indicate the signer's
approval of the information contained in the message, and
3.
the method used must be as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for
which the message was generated or communicated . ~
A third category of legislation focuses not on the attributes an electronic signature
must possess in order to be enforceable as a signature, but rather on the technology used
to create the signature itself. Statutes falling within this third category authorize the use
of only a specific type of electronic signature (i.e., a digital signature) and ignore the
general category of electronic signatures. Such legislation has been enacted in five states:
66
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Utah, and Washington.
Yet a fourth category of enacted legislation says nothing whatsoever about what
constitutes a valid electronic signature.il
These inconsistent approaches create a certain level of uncertainty for businesses
trying to do e-commerce in multiple jurisdictions, especially if such businesses do not use
electronic signatures that comply with requirements in all jurisdictions.

(d)
Linkage to the Data Signed- The final requirement is that the signature must be linked to the data
being signed in a manner such that if the data is altered after the signature is made, the fact of such
alteration is disclosed to persons relying on the electronic record. This requirement is critical for a secure
signature, because otherwise the electronic signature of one person could be altered to look like the
electronic signature of another, or an electronic signature could be simply excised from one electronic
record and pasted onto another. See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration Regulations on Electronic
Records and Electronic Signatures, 21 C.F.R. § II. 70 ( 1999), (providing that "electronic signatures ....
shall be linked to their respective electronic records to ensure that the signatures cannot be excised, copied,
or otherwise transferred to falsify an electronic record by ordinary means"). It is questionable, however,
whether this requirement should apply to "all" electronic signatures, and it surely does not apply to paper
documents. /d.
~See United Nations, supra note 16, at Article VII, subpara. I.

~MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 325K.20 (West 1998); MO ANN . STAT.§ 28.657 (West 1999); N.H. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 294-D:4 ( 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 ( 1998); WASH . REV . CODE ANN. §
19.34.900 (West 1998). This legislation does not prohibit (or render unenforceable) the use of any other
form of electronic signature, it simply leaves the issue open. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN . § 46-3-101
( 1998) ("[N]othing in this chapter precludes any symbol from being valid as a signature under other
applicable law such as Utah Uniform Commercial Code Section 70A-l-201(39).").
~The term ·'electronic signature" is used, but is not defined, in the following statutes: CONN. GEN.

STAT. ANN.§§ 19(a)-25(a) (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 §§ 2706(a), 5942 (1998). LA .. REV.
STAT. ANN.§§ 32,2145, 1520,3733.1 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 221.173 (West 1998); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN.§ 239.042 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 16-1-115 (1998); WYO. STAT.
ANN.§ 9-1-306 (Michie 1998) (VT. CODER. 26 (1995). In all of these states, there appears to be no
other electronic signature legislation defining the term.
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b.

What Types ofTransactions Are Covered?

Electronic signature legislation has also taken a variety of approaches regarding
the types of transactions for which the use of electronic signatures is authorized. Nearly
40% of the states expressly authorize the use of electronic signatures for virtually all
transactions. 68 Other states have statutes that authorize the use of electronic signatures
only for certain categories of transactions, such as U.C.C. filings. medical records, or
motor vehicle records.§2 Some states, however, condition the authorization to use
electronic signatures on the type of party involved in the transaction. For example, some
statutes authorize the use of electronic signatures only where both parties are government
agencies,!!! while other statutes require at least one of the parties to be a government

~ Statutes that authorize the use of electronic ~ignatures for all types of transactions include: ALASKA

STAT.§ 09.25.510 (Michie 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 282.72 (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN.§ 10-12-4
(Michie 1998); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5-105 (effective July I, 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §60-2616
(1997); KY. REV. STATUS. ANN. §369.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 325K.20
(West 1998) (referring to digital signatures only); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-63-1 ( 1998); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 28.657 (West 1999) (referring to digital signatures only); NEB . REV. STAT. § 86-170 I ( 1998);
N.H. REV . STAT. ANN.§ 294 D:4 (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 965 (West 1999); OR. REV.
STAT.§ 192.835 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 26-5-330 (Law. Co-op 1998); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 46-3101 (1998)(referring to digital signatures only); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-467, 59.1-468, 59.1-469
(Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19/34/900 (West 1998) (referring to digital signatures only);
W.VA. CODE§ 39-5-2 (1999); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 137.04(2) (West 1999). Some of these statutes do
have limited exceptions, such as for wills. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5-120 (effective July I,
1999).
U A number of state electronic signature statutes only pertain to specific types of transactions. See, e.g.,

ALA. CODE§ 40-30-5 (1998) (referring to electronic filing of tax returns and other documents with the
Department ofRevenue); COLO. REV . STAT. ANN.§ 4-9-413 (West 1999) (referring to electronic filing
of U.C.C. Financing Statements); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-402 (West 1999) (referring to
electronic signatures for medical records maintained in hospitals); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 2706(a),
5942(a) ( 1998) (referring to certain state documents relating to budget, accounting, and payroll); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN . § 231-8.5 (referring to electronic filing of court documents); IOWA CODE ANN.§
48A.l3 (referring to voter registration forms); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 155A.27 (West 1999) (referring to
prescriptions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 2144 (West 1999) (referring to medical records); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1401 (West 1998) (referring to applications under the Motor Vehicle Code);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3701.75 (West 1999) (referring to health care record authorizations). The
status in these states of electronic signatures used for other types of transactions is unclear because it has not
been addressed by legislation .
.!!! Several statutes limit the authorization to use electronic signatures to transactions between government

agencies. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41-132 (limiting application to use by state agencies, and forthe
acceptance of documents filed with the Secretary of State); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 2706(a), 5942(a)
( 1998) (limiting application to the use of electronic signatures for certain state documents relating to
budget, accounting, and payroll); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 369.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1999) (limiting
application to the use of electronic signatures by state agencies in determining whether state construction
contractors should be released from performance bond); MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV'T § 8-504 ( 1998)
(limiting application to communications among governmental entities); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 294-D:4
( 1999) (limiting application to communications between the state and any agency or instrumentality of the
state); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-27-4 ( 1998) (limiting application to transactions between public agencies).
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entity.l! In yet other states, statutes authorize the use of electronic signatures only for
transactions involving a specific private entity, such as a financial institution.ll
3.

The Role of Legislation in Removing Barriers

Taking such varied approaches to what qualifies as an electronic signature, what
types of transactions can be undertaken electronically, and what types of parties may use
electronic signatures may only be making matters worse fore-commerce. For example,
one problem created by statutes that authorize the use of electronic signatures only for
transactions involving certain types of parties, or only for certain types of transactions, is
that it raises a concern that, by implication, any other use of electronic signatures is not
authorized. By providing for the enforceability of electronic signatures in certain limited
types of transactions, the legislature may have implicitly evidenced an intention to
preclude the enforceability of electronic signatures in other types of transactions. To put
it another way, we would not need specific legislation authorizing the use of electronic
signatures if electronic signatures were generally enforceable. And, of course, when
different states set different standards as to what attributes are required for an electronic
signature before it will be considered enforceable, businesses face daunting practical
difficulties in using electronic signatures for transactions on a nationwide (not to mention
a worldwide) basis.
The bottom line is that in trying to remove barriers, we may have created more
uncertainty. While there may be disagreement on the proper definition of an electronic
signature, or on exactly which types of transactions are not appropriately conducted by
electronic means, the lack of uniformity between the states may be creating a more
significant barrier to e-commerce.

1! Many statutes authorize the use of electronic signatures only for transactions where at least one of the

parties is a government entity. See ALA. CODE§ 4-30-5 ( 1998) (referring to filing of tax returns and other
documents with the Department of Revenue); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 22003 (West 1999) (applying to
communications with public entities); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (West 1999) (referring to electronic
tiling ofU.C.C. Financing Statements); IDAHO CODE§ 67-23-57 (1998) (referring to filing and issuing of
documents by and with state and local agencies); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-24-2-2 (West 1998) (referring to
transactions with the state); IOWA CODE ANN. § 48A. I3 (West 1998) (referring to voter registration
forms); ME. REV. STAT. ANN . tit. 29-A §§ 1401, 1205, and 1410 (referring to use in connection with
applications under the Motor Vehicle Code); MO. ANN. STAT. § 28.621 (West 1999) (applying to filings
with the Secretary of State for certain business organizations); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-15-40 I, 2-15-404
(1999) (allowing Secretary of State to implement an electronic filing system); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§
239.042 (Michie 1997) (referring to financial transactions with the state); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 14-3-15.2
(Michie 1998) (referring to public records and filings); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-58.1 ( 1999) (limiting
application to filings with public agencies); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 1-08-12 (1997) (limiting application to
filings with public agencies); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN . § 403.027 (West 1998) (limiting application to
transactions with the state comptroller or between publi~ agencies); WYO. STAT. ANN . § 9-1-306 (Michie
1998) (limiting application to filings with the Secretary of State). The status of electronic signatures used
for other types of transactions is unclear because it has not been addressed by legislation.

ll See, e.g., the Illinois Financial Institutions Digital Signature Act 1999, 1997 H.B. 597 (arguably
superceded by 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5-105 (effective July I, 1999)).
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B.

1.

CAN I TRUST THE MESSAGE?

The Issue

The second primary concern of parties to an electronic transaction is the issue of
trust. That is, what is required before a party will act in reliance on electronic messages
in real time, and enter into commercial transactions, ship product, extend credit, transfer
funds, change the party's position, or otherwise enter into binding legal commitments
with significant economic consequences? The importance of trust for the success of ecommerce is widely recognized. For example, the Commission of the European
Communities noted that:
The first objective is to build trust and confidence. Fore-commerce to
develop, both consumers and businesses must be confident that their
transaction will not be intercepted or modified, that the seller and the
buyer are who they say they are, and that transaction mechanisms are
available, legal, and secure. Building such trust and confidence is the
prerequisite to win over businesses and consumers to e-commerce.ll
Likewise. the world's largest software industry trade association observed
that: "[t]he notion oftrust in e-commerce is of critical importance and applies to
both consumers and businesses. From secure sales to the handling of personal
data to certifying transactions and individuals, trust is the underlying issue that
"iII dt!tt:rmine \\ hether e-...:ommerce reaches its full potential. "l:!
Trust, of course, plays a role in virtually all commercial transactions. Regardless
of whether the deal is struck in cyberspace or in the more traditional paper-based world,
transacting parties must trust the messages that form the basis for the bargain. ·Trusting a
message, from a legal perspective, requires consideration of the authenticity and integrity
of the message, as well as an assessment of whether the message is nonrepudiable by the
sender in the event of a dispute.

a.

Authenticity

Authenticity is concerned with the source or origin of a communication.~ Who
sent the message? Is it genuine or a forgery?

ll Commission of the

European Communities, A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce, (COM (97)
157 final, Apr. 16, 1997). < http://www.cordis.lulesprit/src/ecomcom.htm >.

l:! Software Publishers Association (n/k!a Software and lnfonnation Industry Association),

unJ Cummerc.:e. SPA ·s ~ iswnjvr the D1gital Future (May, 1998)
<http://www.spa.org/govmntlgovnews.htm >.
ll See FED. R. EVID. 90 I (a) ( 1995).
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Code, Content

A party entering into an online transaction in reliance on an electronic message
must be confident of that message. For example, when a bank receives an electronic
payment order from a customer directing that money be paid to a third party, the bank
must be able to verify the source of the request and ensure that it is not dealing with an
impostor. 76
Likewise, a party must also be able to establish the authenticity of its electronic
transactions should a dispute arise. That party must retain records of all relevant
communications pertaining to the transaction and keep those records in such a way that
the party can show that the records are authentic. For example, if one party to a contract
later disputes the nature of its obligations. the other party may need to prove the terms of
the contract to a court. A court, however, will tirst require that the party establish the
authenticity of the record that the party retained of that communication before the court
will consider it as evidence.77

b.

Integrity

Integrity is concerned with the accuracy and completeness of the communication.
Is the document the recipient received the same as the document that the sender sent? Is
it complete? Has the document been altered either in transmission or storage?
The recipient of an electronic message must be confident of a communication's
integrity before the recipient relies and acts on the message. Integrity is critical to ecommerce when it comes to the negotiation and formation of contracts online, the
licensing of digital content, and the making of electronic payments, as well as to proving
up·these transactions using electronic records at a later date. For example, consider the
case of a building contractor who wants to solicit bids from subcontractors and submit its
proposal to the government online. The building contractor must be able to verify that
the messages containing the bids upon which it will rely in formulating its proposal have
not been altered. Likewise, if the contractor ever needs to prove the amount of the
subcontractor's bid, a court will first require that the contractor establish the integrity of
the record he retained of that communication before the court will consider it as evidence
in the case.ZB
1! See U.C.C. §§ 4A-202, 4A-203 & cmt. ( 1998). Section 4A-202 solves this problem for a bank and its

customer who has agreed to transact its banking electronically and to be subject to Article 4A. /d. If the
bank verifies the payment order by using a commercially reasonable security procedure, the customer will
be bound even if it did not in fact authorize the payment order. § 4A-202(b). If, however, the customer can
prove that the person sending the fraudulent payment order did not obtain the information necessary to send
such an order from an agent or a source controlled by the customer, the loss is shifted back to the bank.
§ 4A-203(a)(2). If the bank does not follow the security procedure and the order is fraudulent, the bank
generally must cover the loss. § 4A-202{a).
11 See,

e.g., U.S. v. Eisenberg, 807 F.2d 1446 (8th Cir. 1986) (disputing the authenticity of letter); U.S. v.
Grande. 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1980) (disputing authenticity of invoice), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830,919
ll YI!U).

1! See, e.g., Victory Med . Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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c.

Nonrepudiation

Nonrepudiation is the ability to hold the sender to his communication in the event
of a dispute. 22 A party's willingness to rely on a communication, contract, or funds
transfer request is contingent upon having some level of comfort that the party can
prevent the sender from denying that he sent the communication (if, in fact, he did send
it), or claim that the contents of the communication as received are not the same as what
the sender sent (if, in fact, they are what was sent). For example, a stockbroker who
accepts buy/sell orders over the Internet would not want his client to be able to place an
order for a volatile commodity, such as a pork bellies futures contract, and then be able to
con1irm the order if the market goes up and repudiate the order if the market goes south. !ill
With paper-based transactions, a party can rely on numerous indicators of trust to
determine whether the signature is authentic and the document has not been altered.
These include using paper (sometimes with watermarks, colored backgrounds, or other
indicia of reliability) to which the message is affixed and not easily altered, letterhead,
handwritten ink signatures, sealed envelopes for delivery via a trusted third party (such as
the U.S. Postal Service), personal contact between the parties, and the like. With
electronic communications, however, none of these indicators of trust are present. All
that can be communicated are bits (Os and ls) that are in all respects identical and can be
easily copied and modified.
This has two important consequences. First, it often becomes extremely difficult
to know when one can rely on the integrity and authenticity of an electronic message.
This, of course, makes difficult those decisions that involve entering into contracts,
shipping products, making payments, or otherwise changing one's position in reliance on
an electronic message. Second, this lack of reliability makes proving up one's case in
court virtually impossible. For example, while a typewritten name appended at the end of
an e-mail message may qualify as a signature under applicable law, that name could have
bt:t:n typed by anyone, and if the defendant denies the ..signature" in a lawsuit, it may be
virtually impossible for the plaintiff to prove the authenticity of that signature. As a
result, nonrepudiation is by no means assured in such a case, and parties thus may choose
to forego e-commerce where the risk of repudiation is too great.
In many respects, trust is a key element of the measurement of risk. And the need
for trust can vary significantly, depending on the risk involved. Selling books on the
Internet, for example, may not require a high level of trust in each transaction, especially
where a credit card number is provided and the risk of loss from fraud is relatively low
22 See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 8. One definition of nonrepudiation is "[s]trong and
substantial evidence of the identity of the signer of a message and of message integrity, sufficient to prevent
a party from successfully denying the origin, submission or delivery of the message and the integrity of its
contents." ld at Section 1.20.
!!!!

See generally Follow the Money-- A New Stock Market Arises on the Internet, SCI. AM. 31 (July 1995).
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(e.g., a $20 book). On the other hand, entering into long-term, high-dollar value contracts
electronically may require a much higher level of trust. At a minimum, the risk of a
fraudulent message must be acceptable given the nature and size of the transaction.
Thus, where the amount at issue is relatively small or the risk is otherwise low,
trust in an electronic message's authenticity and integrity may not be a critical issue. If
e-commerce is to reach its full potential, however, parties must be able to trust electronic
communications for a wide range of transactions, particularly ones where the size ofthe
transaction is substantial or the nature of the transaction is of higher risk. In such cases, a
party relying on an electronic communication will need to know, at the time of reliance,
whether the message is authentic, whether the integrity of its contents is intact, and.
equally important, whether the relying party can establish both of those facts in court if a
dispute arises (i.e., nonrepudiation).
2.

The Legislutive Response

Most electronic signature statutes simply do not address the issue of trust at all.
Those statutes that do focus on the issue take two different approaches, although either
approach requires implementation of rules or standards, or a procedure or mechanism, for
determining which technologies are capable of creating such trustworthy signatures, and
when, and under what circumstances, that capability is considered fulfilled.
Under the first approach, a trustworthy electronic signature is a precondition to
enforceability as a signature. Statutes adopting this approach typically require that
electronic signatures possess four attributes- i.e., the electronic signature must be: (1)
unique to the person using it; (2) capable of verification; (3) under the sole control ofthe
person using it; and (4) linked to the data in such a manner that if the data is changed, the
signature is invalidated.!! If all of these requirements are met, the electronic signature
will be deemed to be a signature for purposes of that state's various statutory and
regulatory signature requirements- i.e., the electronic signature will be enforceable.
A number of other statutes have adopted a second approach. These statutes state
that almost any form of electronic signature can be enforceable and meet legal signature
requirements, while recognizing that some electronic signatures are more trustworthy
than others.n To encourage the use of those electronic signatures deemed to be more
trustworthy, and to provide relying parties with an enhanced level of assurance at the time
of reliance regarding the authenticity and integrity of messages using such signatures,
these statutes typically provide a legal benefit in the form of an evidentiary presumption
!! See genera/Jy supra note 61 (providing a Jist of statutes adopting this approach).

n Electronic signatures, like traditional signatures of ink on paper, come in varying degrees of security. A
handwritten signature, for example, is more trustworthy than an "X," and a notarized signature is more
trustworthy than both. Just as the law provides certain benefits to the more trustworthy forms (see e.g.,
FED. R. EVID. 90 I(a) ( 1995), (confirming that notarized signatures are considered self-authenticating),
these electronic signature statutes seek to define the characteristics required for a trustworthy (or secure)
signature.
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regarding the sender's identity and/or the integrity of the document. 113 Yet, the criteria for
determining which technologies and which messages are sufficiently trustworthy to be
accorded the benefit of such legal presumptions have varied significantly from statute to
statute.
Some of these statutes take a technology-neutral approach to identifying the class
of trustworthy electronic signatures that qualify for such a legal benefit. For example, the
Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act creates a class of trustworthy signatures called
"secure electronic signatures."!:! In addition to certain requirements regarding
implementation,~ a signature qualifies as ''secure" if the parties to the transaction agree
on such a characterization, or if the technology used to create the signature is certified by
the Secretary of State as capable of creating, in a trustworthy manner, an electronic
signature that:
•
•

is unique to the signer within the context in which it is used:
can be used to objectively identify the person signing the electronic record;

Courts have recognized that the legislature has the authority to establish legal presumptions. For Illinois
examples, see People v Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N .E. 2d 410, 412 (111.1984) ("[l}t is clear that the legislature of
a state has the power to prescribe new and alter existing rules of evidence or to prescribe methods of
proof."); Heitz v. Hogan, 480 N.E. 2d 185, 189 (111. App. Ct. 1985). Moreover, numerous Illinois statutes
provide for a variety of different evidentiary presumptions. See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503 (West
1998) ("The fact that an individual's name is signed to a return or notice shall be prima facie evidence for
all purposes that such document was actually signed by such individual"); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5110-10
(West 1998) The statute states that:

!!

In the event of a State Electoral Board hearing on objections to a petition for an amendment to
Article IV of the Constitution .. . , or to a petition for a question of public policy to be submitted
to the voters of the entire state, the certificates of the county clerks and boards of election
commissioners showing the results ofthe random sample of signatures on the petition shall be
prima facie valid and accurate, and shall be presumed to establish the number of valid and invalid
signatures on the petition sheets reviewed in the random sample . ...

ld; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 4515 (West 1998) (providing that a man is presumed to be the natural father of
a child if certain conditions are met, and providing further that such presumption "may be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence .. ); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-11 (West 1998) (stating that possession of a
device that intercepts or decodes the transmission of cable television service is prima facie evidence of a
violation ofthis section prohibiting the unauthorized use of a television interception or decoding device);
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/7 (West 1998) (specifying situations that give rise to a presumption that
certain property was furnished in exchange for a substance in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances
Act, which presumptions are "rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence").

5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/10-110 (effective July I, 1999). This Act also defines a class of secure
electronic records. Id at 175/10-1 I 0.

!!:!

~See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/10-11 O{a). The electronic signature must be (I) created in a manner that
was commercially reasonable under the circumstances; (2) applied by the relying party (to verify the
signature) in a trustworthy manner; and (3) reasonably and in good faith relied upon by the relying party.
/d.
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•
•

was reliably created by such identified person; and~
is created and is linked to the electronic record to which it relates in a manner
such that if the record or the signature is intentionally or unintentionally
changed after signing the electronic signature is invalidated.!!

An electronic signature that qualifies as a secure electronic signature enjoys a
rebuttable presumption that the signature is that of the person to whom it correlates.!!!
Similar types of presumptions for a technology-neutral class of secure records and secure
signatures appear in legislation that has been enacted in South Carolina and Singapore.!!
Other technology-neutral electronic signature legislation incorporating rebuttable
presumptions (although limited to certain types of transactions) has been enacted in
Alabama (limited to certain tax-related usage).2!! and in Ohio (limited to certain health
care usage).ll
Technology-specific statutes that confer similar legal presumptions have been
enacted in Minnesota, Missouri, Utah, and Washington, and all such statutes focus solely
on digital signature technology.n To ensure that the digital signature possesses a level of
trust sufficient to warrant enhanced legal recognition, these statutes impose a regulatory

/d. For example, an electronic signature might be reliably created by a specific person if some aspect of
the procedure used to create the signature involves the use of a signature device or other means or method
that is under the sole control of such person.

!!

!! /d. Note that these four requirements, while similar to the four requirements imposed by the statutes in the
second category noted above, are also different in two significant ways. !d. First, satisfaction of these
requirements is not a precondition to creating an enforceable signature, but rather is only a precondition to
qualifying as a secure signature entitled to an additional legal benefit of an evidentiary presumption. /d.
Second, the requirements themselves differ. !d. Relative uniqueness, rather than absolute uniqueness, is all
that is required for the first element. /d. The second element focuses on objective identification, rather than
focusing merely on being "capable of verification." /d. The third element rejects the "sole control"
requirement and focuses instead on a reliable assurance that the named signer actually signed or authorized
the signature. /d.
!!!

5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/10-120 (effective July I, 1999).

n The concepts of a "secure electronic record" and a "secure electronic signature" were first introduced in
the October 14, 1997 draft of the Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act released for public comment
by the Illinois Commission on Electronic Commerce and Crime (copy on file with authors). That concept
was subsequently incorporated in the fmal enacted version of the lllinois Electronic Commerce Security
Act, as well as in legislation enacted in South Carolina and Singapore. It has also been used in the draft
legislation being considered by UNCITRAL (which renamed the concept "enhanced electronic signature").
See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175; S.C. CODE § 26-5-330 (Law Co-op 1998); UNCITRAL, Draft Articles on
Electronic Signatures (December 15, 1998) < http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/english/sessions/wg ec/wp80.htm >;Singapore Electronic Transactions Act, supra note 32.
2!! ALA. CODE § 40-30-5 et seq. ( 1999).

2lOHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3701.75 (West 1999).
21See, MINN. STAT. ANN . § 325K.20 (West 1998); MO ANN . STAT.§ 28 .677 (West 1998); UTAH
CODE ANN . § 46-3-101 (1998); WASH . REV . CODE§ 19/34/900 (West 1998).
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structure on certification authorities who voluntarily elect to be licensed by the State. 93
Based on the apparent assumption that all certificates issued by licensed certification
authorities are trustworthy, and that a digital signature that is created using the private key
corresponding to the public key listed in such a certificate is a trustworthy signature, the
legislation has bestowed attributes of trust to messages verifiable by such certificates.2:!

3.

The Role of Legislation in Promoting Trust

Whether electronic signature legislation should address the issue of trust, and, if
so. whether such legislation should require some level of trust as a precondition to
enforceability, or offer the benefit of trust (in the form of evidentiary presumptions) as an
incentive to use more secure signature methods, is an issue that has generated rather
t:xtensive controversy.
Evidentiary presumptions serve a variety of purposes:
One purpose is to allocate the burden of production or persuasion to the
party in the better position to have the evidence. The common law
presumption that a letter reaches its addressee if it is properly addressed,
stamped, and deposited in the U.S. mail serves such a purpose. Obviously,
the sender usually will be in no position to prove receipt. Only the
addressee can affirmatively prove receipt or testify that he did not receive
the letter. A second purpose of evidentiary presumptions is ' to avoid an
impasse, to reach some result, even though it is an arbitrary one.' . . .
Finally, most presumptions coincide with what is probably true. For
example, the husband of the mother usually is the father of the child. 95
For electronic transactions, presumptions ofthe signer's identity and of message
integrity can help to provide necessary assurances to relying parties, thereby enabling
them to engage in online commercial activities with confidence that their transactions will
be easier to enforce in court if that should be necessary. Such presumptions can provide
the predictability and trust necessary to rely on a message, and act accordingly, in real
time .~ Such presumptions are based on the trustworthiness of the security procedure used
'llsee, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 325K.20; MO ANN. STAT. § 28.677; UTAH CODE ANN . § 46-3101; WASH . REV. CODE§ 19/34/100. The digital signature legislation enacted in Germany, Italy, and
Malaysia contains a similar approach.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN.§ 406(3). The Utah Digital Signature Act provides that if a digital
signature is verified by the public key listed in a valid certificate issued by a licensed certification authority,
then a court of the State of Utah "shall presume that": (a) the digital signature is the digital signature of the
subscriber listed in that certificate, and (b) the digital signature was affixed by that subscriber with the
intention of signing the message. /d.

2:!

~ Keith B. Hall, Practitioner's Note: Evidentiary Presumptions, 72 TUL. L. REV . 1321, at 1325-26 {Mar.

1998) (quoting from MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 343 (4th Ed. 1992)).
~A related issue is the effect of the presumption. Several statutes also give different effects to

presumptions. In some cases, the presumption is merely a prima facie case. See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP.
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to create the electronic signature, and the fact that the purported sender is more likely than
the recipient to possess the information necessary to prove or disprove the validity of the
signature.
Yet the use of presumptions in electronic signature legislation has also been
criticized. 21 Such criticism has centered on concerns that consumers and small businesses
that lack an understanding of the sophisticated technologies used to create the secure
electronic signature may unwittingly find themselves in a situation where their failure to
protect the security of their signature device (e.g .. their private key) will expose them to
substantial liability for unauthorized transactions made by persons who unlawfully
obtained access to their signature device.2! Unfortunately, the debate on either side of the
issue has not rigorously analyzed the attendant legal and policy issues involved, and often
has focused solely on emotional arguments such as ·'granpma could lose her private key
and someone could sell her house and clean out her bank account."
The criticism has also been particularly vocal regarding technology-specific
statutes that impose highly regulatory schemes and licensing requirements in exchange
for presumptions. Beyond the obvious problems that can be anticipated by the prospect
of fifty different state licensing schemes as well as a separate (and presumably
incompatible) licensing scheme that varies from country to country, these technologyspecific statutes are problematic because they appear to assume that only digital signature
technology is worthy of trust, assume or even require the use of a particular business
model for the implementation of digital signatures, and require a relatively high (and
therefore costly) level of authentication by the certification authority in order to ensure
that the certificates are trustworthy. Critics say that the net result, on a global basis, may
very well be the inhibition of e-commerce by virtue of incompatibilities between
jurisdictions. the erection of potential trade barriers between jurisdictions, and the
imposition of significant costs and operational constraints upon certification authorities
and trading partners engaged in electronic transactions. In other words, in taking one step
forward, we may be taking two steps back.

STAT. 5/503 (West I998). In other cases, the statute defines the presumption in terms of the burden of
going forward with the evidence. See. e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 95/4 (West I998) (noting that "[t]he
presumption provided shall only shift to the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence, and shall
in no event shift the burden of proof to the defendant"). In still other cases, the presumption is rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence. See e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. I5017 (West 1998) (referring to "such
presumptions being rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence"). Current law also provides that "a
signature on a document filed by facsimile in accordance with rules adopted by the Secretary of State is
prima facie evidence for all purposes that the document actually was signed by the person whose signature
appears on the facsimile." 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/15 (West 1998).
21 Early drafts of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, for example, included presumptions similar to

those in the Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, but the drafting committee ultimately voted to
remove all presumptions from the VET A.
.2! See also Reporter to the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act Drafting Committee, Memorandum

(Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecictaleta I 098m.html> (discussing some of the
reasons favoring and disfavoring the use of presumptions in electronic signature legislation).
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Whether legislation should address the issue of trust for e-commerce. and whether
it should do so in the form of presumptions or through some other means, is an issue that
deserves thorough study and analysis. Suffice it to say, for purposes of this article, that
developing practical and workable legislative approaches to the issue of trust in ecommerce could be critical to the growth ofbusiness-to-business and, ultimately,
business-to-consumer transactions.
C.
1.

WHAT ARE THE RULES OF CONDUCT?

The Issue

In addition to facilitating the trust necessary to encourage users of e-commerce
messages to act in reliance on ~hem, electronic signature legislation can provide the
predictability required by businesses to engage in e-commerce transactions. Predictability
is a watchword for the growth of commerce, and law can play a key role in providing this
valuable commodity. 99
Predictability in e-commerce will no doubt be founded upon many sources of
relevant law: longstanding principles of freedom of contract in which parties determine
the terms that will govern their online transactions, the rich common law tradition of
judge-made precedent recognizing such contracting principles and shedding light on
statutes governing commercial transactions, and legislation geared to e-commerce as well
as statutes of more general application. For example, as James Willard Hurst noted in his
analysis of the legal history of the lumber industry in Wisconsin between 183 6 and 1915,
the relevant law for providing the reasonably assured expectations that were essential to
22 Numerous commentators have discussed the need for predictability and the role played by the law in

providing such predictability. For example, in discussing the growth of the lumber industry in Wisconsin in
the 1800s, legal scholar James Willard Hurst noted that "[b]ecause marketing cannot go on save in a context
of reasonably assured expectations, the legal order as a whole was, of course, indispensable to the existence
of~ market." JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY
OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915 285 (1964) [hereinafter LAW AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH]. Legal scholar Lawrence M. Friedman, in discussing American common law's
move away from formality for its own sake over the past two centuries, emphasized that the businessman
had no need for "ceremonial formalism" but rather valued "substantive predictability"- "[e)conomic
decisions depended upon the ability to know, within limits, what was 'the law."' LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 92
( 1965) [hereinafter CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA). Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., one of this. country's
greatest jurists, observed that:
People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming
against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out
when this danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 160 (1992) (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The
Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)). As UCC Art. 2 drafter and legal scholar Karl Llewellyn
noted in his treatise on jurisprudence, the true ideal is not really certainty but rather "reasonable regularity
of decision" or ·•a reckonability equivalent to that of a good business risk." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 216, 18 (1960).
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tht! growth of the industry included not only that of simple contracts, but also .. the law of
more complex arrangements - of negotiable instruments, of secured transactions
(mortgage, pledge, reserved title. lien), ofbusiness association Uoint venture, partnership,
corporation), and of insurance. " 100
The difficult question is how predictability can best be provided to advance ecommerce. The Internet is revolutionizing the way that companies do business. and
parties engaging in online transactions face novel legal challenges that test the limits of
existing statutory and case law. In many instances, the rules in electronic commerce
transactions will follow from the rules set forth for paper-based transactions. For
example, to be enforceable, certain contracts must be signed by the party to be bound.
Likewise, for a contract to be valid, there must be an offer and acceptance as well as
consideration for the transaction. In other instances, however, e-commerce transactions
have raised, and will continue to raise, issues not easily answered by extensions of
traditional law, particularly regarding issues that are unique to a specific technology.
For example, while electronic signatures created through the use of a digitized
handwritten signature (or even via signature dynamics) are probably governed by
traditional rules relating to signatures, electronic signatures created through the use of
digital signatures raise a host of new legal issues. Because digital signatures are created
by using a unique and secret private key that is associated with the signer, an issue is
raised as to the liability of the identified signer if the private key is compromised and the
signature is, in fact, created by someone else. Likewise, because digital signatures
frequently involve the use of certificates to establish identity, and because certificates are
typically issued by a trusted third party, issues are raised as to the obligations of that third
part) and its pott!ntialliability in the event that certificates are erroneously issued,
improperly verified, or not revoked upon request.

The Legislative Response

2.

Most electronic signature statutes enacted to date say nothing about the rules
governing the conduct of parties using electronic signatures. A few states have, however,
enacted legislation addressing at least some of the rules governing the conduct of the
parties. This legislation generally falls into two categories.
The first category is exemplified by the technology-specific digital signature
legislation enacted in Minnesota, Missouri, Utah, and Washington.1!!! These statutes
address a variety of issues raised by the use of public key technology. First, they specify
the scope of the obi igations of the person obtaining a digital certificate to:
•
•
!.!!!! See
!.!!.!

make truthful representations in applying for a certificate;
review and accept a certificate before using it;
LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 99, at 285 .

See generully .1·upru note 93 .
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•
•
•

make certain representations upon acceptance of the certificate;
control and keep confidential the person's private key; and
promptly revoke the certificate upon compromise of the underlying private key.

Such statutes also extensively outline the obligations of certification authorities, that
seek the benefit of the state licensing provisions (and, in some cases, outline the
obligations of all certification authorities, whether or not licensed). Typically the statutes
specizy the obligations of the certitication authority to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

use a trustworthy system;
disclose its practices and procedures ;
properly identify a prospective applicant for a certificate;
publish issued certificates in a repository;
suspend and/or revoke certificates;
make warranties to the certificate applicant upon issuance of the certificate; and
make warranties to persons using the certificate to verify digitally signed
messages.

These statutes also usually specify qualifications required to become a licensed
certification authority, including rules governing personnel, the filing of a bond or
suitable guaranty, the use of a trustworthy system, the possession of sufficient working
capital. the maintenance of an office in the state, and the compliance with other licensing
requirements established by the state. 102 The statutes also permit certification authorities
· to limit their liability in a variety of ways.
Some technology-neutral electronic signature statutes address issues related to the
general use of electronic signatures, including rules regarding:
•
•
•
•
•

the creation and control of signature devices used by the signers of electronic
messages to produce a unique electronic signature;
instances in which signatures would be attributed to the named signer;
the unauthorized use of signature devices;
whether a party is obligated to accept an electronic signature; and
the circumstances under which the parties to a transaction may vary the provisions
of the statute (i.e., party autonomy).ill

In some cases, such as those involving the licensing of certification authorities,
the statute establishes a regulatory structure. In other cases, however, the statutory rules
simply address questions bound to arise sooner or later. For example, if a private key is
compromised, and an unauthorized message is used to defraud an unsuspecting third
!.!!! See supra note 93.

1M See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/5-120 (effective July I, 1999) see also Unifonn Computer

lnfonnation Transactions Act (Feb. 1, 1999 draft).
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party, we must answer the question of which party (i.e., the defrauded third party or the
person whose signature was "forged") should bear the resulting loss. Although numerous
public policy arguments can be made for each position, the fact remains that different
questions such as these cannot be indefinitely ignored - if they are not addressed by a
contract between the parties, they must either be answered legislatively or, if all else fails,
by a court.
Most forms of electronic signature legislation that apply to business-to-business
transactions provide few if any, provisions relating to the rules governing the conduct of
the parties using electronic signatures. Many statutes simply specify the attributes
required before an electronic signature will be considered enforceable. Several do.
however, provide that the use or acceptance of an electronic signature is at the option of
the parties to the transaction. 104 A few other statutes also provide some limited rules
governing the conduct of the parties using electronic signatures. These include, for
example, Georgia, which provides a remedy for a person whose electronic signature is
used in an unauthorized fashion;.W Hawaii, which provides that a time-stamp is prima
facie evidence that the time-stamped signature took ~ffect as of the date and time
indicated in the time-stamp;!!!§ and Illinois, which provides rules relating to electronic
recordkeeping, the creation and control of signature devices, and the rights and
responsibilities of parties using digital signatures. 107
A key issue that arises when prescribing rules of conduct for the parties is whether
such rules should be mandatory or operate simply as gap-fillers (i.e., default rules that can
be varied by contract). This issue of party autonomy (i.e., freedom of contract) has also
been critical for the United States in the context of its international negotiations regarding
electronic signatures through the UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce.
However, those seeking a regulatory licensing regime governing certification authority
services and the use of digital signatures, and persons seeking strong consumer
protection, have all favored legislation containing certain provisions that cannot be varied
by an agreement of the parties.
A review of existing U.S. electronic signature legislation reveals very few statutes
that address these issues. The technology-specific digital signature statutes enacted in
Minnesota, Missouri, Utah, and Washington, which provide for the voluntary licensing of
certification authorities, all contain numerous provisions that cannot be varied by
agreement of the parties. Moreover, they do not contain a general party autonomy
provision. Conversely, the electronic signature legislation enacted in Illinois, as well as
the proposed Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, contain express provisions
See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 16.5 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN.§ 10-12-4 (Michie 1998); SILL.
COMP. STAT. 175/5-140; N.H . REV. STAT. ANN . § 294-D:4 (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 965
(West 1999); S.C. CODE ANN . § 26-5-330 (Law. Co-op. 1998); W. VA. CODE§ 39-5-2(e) (1998).

!.!!i

ill GA. CODE ANN.§ 10-12-4 .

.!.!!§HAW. REV . STAT. ANN.§ 231-8-5 (Michie 1998) .
.W See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 715/5-105 (effective July I, 1999).
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authorizing parties to a transaction to vary the terms of the statute by agreement between
them. Most other legislation is simply silent on the subject of party autonomy. This
includes the legislation specifying the four conditions of trust that must be present before
an electronic signature will be considered enforceable, thereby leaving unanswered the
question of whether the contracting parties may agree between themselves to accept an
electronic signature that does not meet the requirements of those statutes.

3.

The Role of Legislation in Specifying the Rules ofConduct

a.

The Needjor Predictability

As we indicated earlier, most electronic signature statutes do not go beyond the
basic question of affirming that e-commerce transactions are in fact enforceable. Yet, we
should not discount the predictive value that legislation could provide -to contracting
parties, particularly where the technological issues are complex. Although courts
typically strive to achieve reckonability of result and to reflect prevailing commercial
practices in the opinions they issue, and the Uniform Commercial Code is designed to
permit courts to develop the law of commercial transactions "in the light of unforeseen
acd new circumstances and practices," 108 many judges will likely feel hard pressed to
grapple with some of the unique issues raised by the rapid and complex technological
changes associated withe-commerce.
For example, while most courts would probably feel comfortable in extending the
law to hold that electronic transactions are legal, can the same be said about the host of
new and highly technical legal issues raised by the use of digital signatures? An
electronic signature statute that merely indicates that electronic transactions are
enforceable does nothing to resolve the issue of liability of an identified signer when a
private key has been compromised, or of a certification authority for erroneously issuing
or improperly verifying digital certificates. Lacking well-built rules fashioned by the
legislature to address such complexities, will the decisions that are issued by courts be
perceived to be the right ones? Given the novelty of the legal issues, what will be the cost
to predictability, and thus the nationwide growth of e-commerce, of conflicting (albeit
well-reasoned) court opinions that vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and, perhaps,
from judge to judge?
Although a believer in the Grand Style of judging, Karl Llewellyn- the central
figure in drafting Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the latter of which has been
described as the most successful codification of American law) -emphasized that judges
must be given the proper tools in the form of rules well-built to fit the situation. He
advocated " 'the on-going production and improvement of rules which make sense on
their face, and which can be understood and reasonably well applied even by mediocre
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men.' "!.!!2 Llewellyn attacked the then-current sales law as being '·full of rules and
concepts that are badly tailored to the facts and needs of life, full therefore of situations in
which it takes a better than average judge to get results which are both sound in result and
clean in doctrinal craftsmanship and clear guidance for the future."ill!
Although courts will no doubt strive for continuity and predictability of result in
their opinions, we should consider the alternative to a case-by-case, wait-and-see
revelation of the law of e-commerce. As Llewellyn observed:
What does it cost a polity in delay and uncertainty and in legal discomfort
or injustice to have the making or review of a rule wait upon the chance
raising and appeal of issues one by one by dragging one? Consider, in
contrast, what a Uniform Commercial Act or a Uniform Commercial Code
does in making available in a jurisdiction where rulings are sparse the
experience and wisdom of the whole country- all at a single stroke. Or
consider the problem of accessibility of doctrine as it bears on the manhours of talented labor (ifthere is to be accuracy based on knowledge), and
so on the expense, needed for advice.!!!
If properly drafted, statutes arguably can provide greater certainty and
predictability in a shorter period of time. The question arises whether the ·'slow drip, drip
of case-law wearing away the stony abstraction of the law"ill is the best way. to promote
e-commerce and develop the legal guideposts by which companies steer their course.
Unlike courts, which as interpreters of the law must wait until a dispute arises before they
can in effect make law regarding a particular statute or issue, state and federal legislatures
are continually poised to create new laws and amend or abolish existing laws. While
legislatures can systematically approach a given set of issues and troubleshoot areas of
perceived legal uncertainty for contracting parties, courts must limit themselves to actual
disputes: "[i]t is no answer to say that all important questions will turn into disputes;
'disputes' are not litigation, and only litigation- primarily, appellate litigation- makes
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L. REV. 465,494 (Jan. 1987), (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 38 (1960)).
Wiseman, supra note 109 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn in an undated paper, apparently written between
1943 and 1949). In Llewellyn's treatise in which he discussed the need for predictability and reckonability
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See Llewellyn, supra note II 0, at 518. See also U.S. Government, Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce ( 1997) < http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm > (To encourage electronic commerce, the
U.S. government should support the development of both a domestic and global uniform commercial legal
framework that recognizes, facilitates, and enforces electronic transactions worldwide.").
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CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 99, at 245 .
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new law. . . . The common law is therefore not only slow; it is impotent to effect certain
kinds of significant legal change."ill
Likewise, it is no answer to say that private parties can merely contract around any
areas of legal uncertainty. The world has embraced e-commerce in many respects
be~ause of the potential it offers for reducing transaction costs, increasing efficiency, and
streamlining transactions. Requiring parties to contract around areas of legal uncertainty
while waiting months and even years for needed precedent from the courts might actually
increase transaction costs, decrease efficiency, and impose cumbersome contracting
obligations that would not be necessary in more traditional paper-based transactions.
Therefore we should not discount the potential value offered by legislation that
establishes default rules regarding electronic signatures and other related e-commerce
issues. Such default rules can decrease transaction costs because the parties need not try
to spell out or anticipate every possible scenario arising out of the transaction.lli Nor
should we assume that parties will always resolve all issues relating to electronic
signatures through their agreements. Most commercial transactions, especially those that
become relatively routine, are characterized by shorter and shorter agreements that
frequently fail to deal with many of the issues that could arise.
While such cost concerns are likely to be important for all parties doing business
online, they can be key for entrepreneurs launching their businesses on the Internet; for
some of these start-ups, legal fees are an expense that they cannot afford,ill and yet
entering contracts in which the legal consequences are not clear also poses a risk where
the price may be too high. Instead, electronic signature legislation can provide rules that
show parties how they can minimize risk regarding new technologies (i.e. digital
signatures), and prevent disputes from occurring in the first place, by determining in
advance what consequences will follow from certain action. Avoiding disputes is a
desirable objective from a business point of view; in addition to the legal costs involved,
litigation can be expensive in terms of damaged business relationships, adverse publicity,
and loss of good will.
Providing predictability in business transactions through legislation might well
include specifying the rules governing the conduct of the parties and, as a consequence,
defining the risks and liabilities of the parties to the transaction. We should consider
whether taking a legislative approach to developing the law of e-commerce would have

ill Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 22 (2d ed. 1985).
ill Indeed, it seems particularly fitting that "default rules" should be established to govern the computer-

driven world of e-commerce, given that the term "default rules" is computer jargon for rules that a computer
program automatically follows unless the user specifies other-wise.
ill While lawyers will no doubt be called upon to interpret the statutes that are enacted, a dispute with a

trading partner over a murky digital signature issue (especially a dispute that may well have to climb its way
to the appellate level against a well-financed litigant) could be far more cost-prohibitive and more likely to
thwart the growth of e-commerce.
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any advantages over relying solely on a case-by-case approach. An ounce of prevention
through the legislative establishment of default rules could well be worth a pound of cure.
b.

The Proper Role ofTechnology Neutrality

The U.S . government and numerous commentators have stressed that e-commerce
legislation should be "technology neutral." In fact, in many circles, this has become the
mantra by which electronic signature legislation is evaluated. According to the
Framework/or Global Electronic Commerce, for example, "rules should be technologyneutral (i.e., the rules should neither require nor assume a particular technology).''!!!
Similarly, the U.S. proposal for an international convention one-commerce states as
follows:
Technology Neutrality- Any rules should neither require nor hinder the
use or development of authentication technologies. States should
anticipate that authentication methods will change over time and avoid
legislation that might preclude innovation or new applications. States
should avoid laws that intentionally or unintentionally drive the private
sector to adopt only one particular technology for electronic authentication
to the exclusion of other viable authentication methods. ill
This position grows, in part, out of the concern that legislation addressing one
particular form of electronic authentication (e.g., digital signatures) may have the
unintended consequence of precluding other methods of authentication that might also be
appropriate, and thus inhibit the development of other technologies that might be equal or
superior to digital signatures. In other words, states and countries should recognize that
there are (or will be) many methods that will be sufficiently reliable for authenticating
electronic messages for a given purpose.
Yet whl;lt is meant by the term "technology neutral" is often not clear. In some
cases it is a code for the position that legislation should not address the special issues
raised by any specific technology. In other cases, it means that legislation should not
unfairly favor one technology over another. These are, however, two different positions,
as the latter view does not necessarily prohibit a legislative solution to the new issues
raised by one technology (such as digital signatures), so long as that solution does not
discriminate against other similar technologies.

1.!.!!

Framewvrkjor Global Electronic Commerce (July I, 1997) <http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm

>
ill Draft International Convention on Electronic Transactions (May 25, 1998)
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Attaining the ideal of technology neutrality need not preclude consideration of
unique and legitimate legal issues raised by the use of a digital signature PKI!l!
infrastructure. Quite simply, the use of digital signatures raises a set of singular issues
that must be addressed at some point by transacting parties. These issues include the
responsibility of the signer of a message for the use or misuse of the signer's private key.
the obligation of a certification authority to properly authenticate persons to whom it
issues certificates, and the responsibility of message recipients to verify the integrity of
ihe digital signature before relying on it. In a closed PKI system, these issues and others
can, of course, be addressed by contractual agreement between the parties. But the fact
that all fifty states have adopted a rather extensive Uniform Commercial Code designed
primarily to provide "gap-filler" provisions suggests that parties engaged in commercial
transactions do not always take the time to address every legal issue likely to arise
between them. ill Of course, several commentators have argued that an open PKI system
will never develop and that legislation is not needed to address issues raised by such an
environment. But this begs the question as to whether it is desirable for an open PKI
system to develop and whether legislation providing the needed certainty might facilitate
that public policy objective.
Abstract concepts can only go so far in legislation regarding unique technology
and communications media. For instance, under First Amendment jurisprudence,
broadcasting media (i.e., television and radio) are regulated differently than print media
(i.e., newspapers). Broadcasters can be sanctioned for airing indecent speech that would
not be sanctioned if it were published in printed form. ill A number of differences
between the various technologies results in such differential regulation. Despite the
existence of different statutory schemes for these various technologies and
communications industries - whether it be radio, television, cable, telephone, or the like that has not precluded the development of other new technologies and communications
media, such as the Internet. Therefore, creating a statutory scheme that addresses the
unique legal issues raised by digital signatures, for example, would not necessarily
preclude the development of other such technologies and business models.
As indicated below in our discussion regarding the positive historical role that
legislation has played in the economic growth of the U.S., different industries and market
segments can raise their own unique legal issues and justify their own particularized
statutes. For example, the need to promote growth of the lumber industry in 19th Century
Wisconsin led the state legislature to enact log-labor liens to encourage laborers to work
in the woods,ill while the need to encourage construction in early America led state
infrastru~ture" means the framework of rules governing the rights and
responsibilities of participants in a system that uses public key cryptography for purposes of authentication
and ensuring integrity and/or of encryption.

ill "PKI" or "public key

ill Whether gap-filler or default rules should be legislatively ·resolved only after commercial practice has

developed is, of course, an issue that deserves further consideration.
lli!

F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation. 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).

ill See infra section C.4.
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legislatures to establish the mechanic' s lien. ill Likewise, because the promotion of ecommerce has been identified as a desirable public policy goal and because particular
types of electronic signatures, such as digital signatures, raise certain unique issues, it
may be appropriate to address those issues legislatively so long as it is done in a manner
that does not unfairly favor one technology over another.
4.

Some Closing Thoughts on Why a Legislative Approach Alay Be Warranted

We live in an age of statutesill- a time when the various state and federal
legislatures have emerged as the dominant force in ascertaining public policy and
translating it into law.ll:! Thus, it is not surprising that forty-nine of the fifty U.S . states
have responded legislatively to the legal issues raised by electronic signatures.
It is important to understand, however, that legislation can come in many forms.
and produce markedly different results depending on those forms. Statutes, or
corresponding regulations, can control or mandate certain behavior as an extension of the
state's "police power." Examples abound of instances in which the government has
imposed bureaucratic procedures or controls on various industries with the stated purpose
of protecting consumers, such as from the dangers of unlicensed occupations,ill or from
railroads that became "overmighty subjects" that had to be controlled by some sort of
watchman. ill It would be hard to dispute that rigid controls or heavy bureaucratic
structures imposed on e-commerce in its nascent state could be counterproductive.
Likewise, statutes that impose mandatory provisions that parties cannot contract around
can seriously inhibit the development of a new industry. Freedom of contract, a guiding
principle of the Uniform Commercial Code,m should be preserved online, at least in
business-to-business transactions. 128 On the other hand, statutes that promote
predictability, reduce uncertainty, and provide default rules to fill in gaps in contractual
coverage or to minimize the need (and the attendant cost) of contracting to anticipate
every possible eventuality can play a facilitating role. These are statutes that are designed
not to function as straitjackets that parties cannot contractually get out of, but rather to
serve as a welcome guide through unexplored Internet territory.

ill See infra section C.4.

ill Robert A. Hillman, et al., COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

COOE § 1.01, at 1-2 (1985).
lliAbnerJ. Mikvaand Eric Lane, LEGISLATIVE.PROCESS I (1993).

supra note 113, at 455-457. Those occupations hearing the "siren song of licensing" saw
it as a way to restrict competition and increase the prestige of the trade. ld

ill See Friedman,

illJd. at 449.
ill U.C .C. § 1-102, cmt. 2 (1998).

ill But see U.C.C. § 1-102. It is worth remembering that even the U.C.C. contains exceptions to the parties'

ability to agree otherwise. /d.
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Good arguments have been made that any electronic signature statute that goes
beyond merely removing the most obvious barriers toe-commerce (e.g., going beyond the
question of"Is it legal?") will actually hurt, not help, e-commerce. 129 These arguments
are especially persuasive when it comes to compulsory controls or regulations that parties
cannot contract out of. Although we live in the Information Age, we do not live in a
world of perfect information- no crystal ball will tell us whether the electronic signature
statute we pass today will in fact achieve its objectives or cause unintended
consequences. But we must also keep in mind that doing nothing more than removing the
most obvious barriers is not necessarily a "safe" approach to promoting e-commerce and
avoiding unintended consequences. It is possible that in standing pat and failing to do
what we can do to provide default rules and facilitate trust, we could also be hindering the
growth of e-cornmerce.
Legislation is neither inherently bad nor good. U.S. legal history is filled with
examples of statutes that were ill-conceived. ineptly drafted, enacted too early or too late
to achieve their objectives, or just simply counterproductive.m By the same token, U.S.
history also provides numerous instances in which legislation has been extremely
beneficial and has functioned to promote, rather than restrict, economic growth. ill
Legal scholar James Willard Hurst, for example, noted that law was used in
Wisconsin as a "positive instrument" to develop the 19th Century lumber industry in that
state. Toward that end, the state legislature enacted log-labor liens to encourage laborers
to work in the woods. and also included navigation guaranties in stream franchises to
expand traffic volume.ill
Likewise, legal scholar Lawrence M. Friedman has identified numerous instances
in which state legislation has been used to facilitate and promote economic growth. 133
Statutes freeing corporations and municipalities from traditional contractual disabilities
facilitated economic development and provided a sort of government aid. Legislation
also played key roles in ensuring the extension of credit and thus of economic growth in
the U.S. For example, "[a] strong mortgage law, giving creditors strong rights, was as
Such arguments include: (I) we do not yet know enough about e-commerce; (2) the time for legislation
or regulation is after identifiable problems exist in a mature industry, not before an industry even exists, and
(3) drafting commercial statutes that regulate commercial practices that do not exist do not enable
commercial transactions but rather impede them.

ill.
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See generally James Willard Hurst, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
( 1950); LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH supra note 99; CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA supra note
99; Friedman supra note 113 .
ill More often than not, law follows on the heels of change to provide stability and legitimacy: "its role has
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necessary for debtors as for creditors, if only to make capital flow into real-estate
investment."lli To lay a foundation for swift development of the economy, state
legislatures in many instances also manipulated contract remedies to indirectly encourage
such development. such as through the enactment of a variety of lien laws. For example.
legislation to create the mechanic's lien was first passed in Maryland to encourage master
builders to enter into contracts to erect and finish houses in the new capital city of
Washington, D.C.; eventually, state after state adopted increasingly broader versions of
the lien, which played a "developmental" role in the growth of the United States,
mobilizing labor and capital to ensure that houses got built. Lien laws were "enormously
important because of the pervasive, ruinous force of the business cycle. . . . The law
reflected a desperate search for security- how to protect one's own assets and how to get
recourse against the other man's ...ill Like land grants, mechanic's liens functioned as
promotional devices: "[b ]y the act of giving real security to the worker, the statute gave a
line of credit to the land-owner.... " 136
Without such security, capital may not have flowed as swiftly to develop the new
frontier that was the United States. In the early years of America's development, people
generally favored:
legal arrangements which legitimized and encouraged the maximum
exercise of private will. But economic growth was the end, rather than
some abstract ideal of freedom of private enterprise from public
interference. Positive use of law in the economy- land grants to subsidize
the building of canals and railroads are a good example- was widely
approved where this use of law was deemed likely to promote economic
development. Abstraction, then, had to give way whenever it interfered
with the greater goal.ill
The U.S. economy depends more on credit than any other country in the world,
and lending institutions in the U.S. are willing to extend credit and transfer funds because
of the legal certainty of security interests under U.S. law, specifically Article 9 of the
· Uniform Commercial Code. 138 Article 9 was designed to apply to "all consensual security
interests in personal property and fixtures,"ill and the aim of the Article was "to provide a
simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured
ill See Friedman, supra note 113 at 246.

illtd. at 245 .
CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 99, at 43 . By the same token, boat and vessel acts
(such as the one enacted in Wisconsin in 1838) provided laborers and suppliers with an in rem action for
claims against vessels in local waters. ld at 144.
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financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty.l' ~
Article 9's success in achieving such objectives, by shaping rules based on commercial
lending marketplace principles. ''has fostered the development of the world's largest and
most active commercial and consumer credit markets.".!:!!
1

11

Conversely, getting credit in Mexico- whose personal property secured financing
law has been compared to that of the U.S. before the advent of Article 9ill -can be
difficult and often costs three times more than in the United States or Canada (whose
Canadian Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) is based on the U.S. model).ill
Mexico's "crazy quilt" of varying security devices, each with its own filing system and
standards for granting priority interests (where it is very difficult to determine whether all
the necessary legal documents have been filed to create a binding security agreement),
makes filing extremely costly and creates uncertainty, thereby discouraging the extension
of credit by banks.!:!.:! As one commentator observed, "Mexican banking laws do not offer
tht! legal certainty and protection demandt!d by banks needed to give them the confidence
to lend money to small start-up companies."ill The lack of clear investment laws or
.. rules of the game" thus has hindered Mexico's economic development.ill
Article 9 provides support for the proposition that codification of legal principles
can help reduce costs and increase predictability for contracting parties, thereby
promoting economic growth. Yet Article 9 and Mexico's experiences may have even
more to teach us about the potential dangers of legislation. Although electronic signature
legislation can act as a catalyst in promoting economic growth by increasing
predictability, there is a very real danger that a "crazy quilt" of conflicting electronic
signature legislation could actually decrease predictability and inhibit the growth of ecommerce.
IV.

CONCLUSION

!:!!! /d § 9-101, cmt. (emphasis added).

Dr. Boris Kozolchyk, What to Do About Mexico's Antiquated Secured Financing Law (Section II.B.), <
http://natlaw.com/pubs/bk9.htm >.
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Although it seems proper to reject the imposition of undue restrictions on ecommerce, we must recognize that legislation can, if properly written, encourage rather
than restrict, and promote rather than disable, the desirable public policy goal of global ecommerce. In evaluating the merits of electronic signature legislative initiatives, we must
be sure to distinguish between regulatory legislation, which often dictates restrictive
standards and conditions, and enabling or facilitating legislation, which can be used to
support freedom of contract and increase predictability and certainty in online
transactions without inhibiting the development of new business models and technology
for authentication and message integrity. We must also keep in mind that limiting the
legislative helping hand that we extend toe-commerce is not risk-free; benign neglect
may well produce stagnation or at least slow the development of business online.
Retention of existing law during a period of rapid technological innovation can,
paradoxically, create instability and uncertainty. Conversely, when law moves with
change in business practice, law can actually have its most stabilizing effect and facilitate
economic growth.
We have seen what has already been done by the initial trailblazers in e-commerce
-companies whose businesses were already firmly rooted in electronic media (such as the
computer industry) or whose businesses translated easily toe-commerce business
models.ill While many are using the Internet to great effect for advertising and
distributing other content, many more have yet to realize the ultimate promise of this
powerful communications medium to engage in online transactions. The difficult
question is this: what role can legislation play in encouraging the exploration of the
transactional frontiers that this New World of e-commerce has to offer?
The answers to the legal issues raised in this article are far from clear. Electronic
signature legislation can and should serve as a vehicle for advancing e-commerce, but we
no doubt will need to adapt our legislative approaches as new business models and
technologies emerge and the case law develops. In particular, we should closely monitor
whether the wide diversity in the various state laws regarding electronic signatures is
hindering the development of e-commerce, new business models, or new technologies,
and whether the lack of uniform state or federal e-commerce legislation is putting the
U.S. at a competitive disadvantage. History has shown us that Mexico's delay in
reforming its divergent mix of secured transactions laws to provide predictability and
keep pace with the legal innovations of countries such as the U.S. and Canada greatly
inhibited the extension of credit in Mexico and thereby hindered its economic growth.
We would do well not to make the same mistake with our electronic signature laws.
One thing is certain: great change predominates the e-commerce world, and unless
we move with change, we will become its victims.

1

~ Examples include credit card-based sales of consumer products (i.e. amazon.com) and online stock
trading.
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Electronic Transactions In the New Millennium:
The California Uniform Electronics Transactions Act Becomes Law
By Michael E. Arruda 1 and Irina A. Shestakovcr
Baker & McKenzie, San Francisco

This article summarizes the provisions of the California Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(the '"Act"') 3 which became law on January 1, 2000.
In a nutshell, the Act establishes the validity of transactions arising out of an electronic
communication between parties, be it a simple Internet sale and purchase or a more complicated
electronic data exchange. Its key purpose is to accord electronic records and electronic signatures the
same legal effect as written records and hand signatures and, in the limited cases where they are not
the same, to spell out the effect of actions undertaken electronically. It was the express intent of the
legislature that the new Act be consistent with other provisions of existing law, and thus minimize the
need to adopt new rules for electronic transactions.
BACKGROUND
Most provisions of the Act arise out of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) which
was prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the same
Conference that prepares other uniform laws, most notably the Uniform Commercial Code. UETA is
the product of work by a NCCUSL drafting committee comprised of scholars and practitioners from
around the United States, and takes into consideration comments presented by its advisors , industry
and academia, and by the interested public at numerous hearings held to air drafts of the proposed
law. NCCUSL's objective was to "produce a new act which, if adopted by the states, would modify
state contract and other law to the extent necessary to ensure that the use of electronic
communications and records will not defeat the enforcement of legitimate transactions. "'4 By enacting
UETA, it was the express desire of the California legislature to create a common platform for
electronic transactions with the other states enacting it. 5
The Act addresses the following areas of interest to those conducting commerce in
cyberspace:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The use of electronic records and electronic signatures;
the formation of contracts using electronic records and signatures;
the creation and retention of electronic records;
liability for errors in electronic records;
the sending and receiving of electronic records and signatures; and
the admissibility of electronic records in legal proceedings.

APPLICATION OF THE ACT
The Act applies only to transactions involving records or signatures transmitted electronically 6
so long as the records or signatures have been "created, generated, sent, communicated, received or
stored on or after January 1, 2000. " 7 As with all laws, the Act has exceptions and excludes from its
coverage transactions subject to the laws on wills, codicils or testamentary trusts and transactions
governed by various provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, Business and Professions Code,
1

(Background)
(Background)
1
California Civil Code, section 1633.1 ec seq.
• NCCUSL, The ETA Forum, Electronics Transactions Background, www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum, at 1.
~ ld., section 1633.6(3).
• /d., section 1633.3.
7
/d., section 1633.4.
2

Financial Code, Health and Safety Code, Insurance Code, Public Utilities Code, Vehicle Code, Civil Code
and Code of Civil Procedure. 8
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS ELECTRONICALLY
Agreement to Conduct Transactions by Electronic Means
It is important to emphasize that the Act does not require the use of electronic records or
signatures. Instead, it provides parties to a transaction with a choice regarding the medium that will
apply to their transaction. Only where the parties "agree" to conduct the transaction by electronic
means do the provisions of the Act apply. 9 The parties' "agreement" to conduct their transaction by
electronic means can be either explicit or implicit. However, the California Act significantly departs
from UETA with regard to explicit agreements to conduct business electronically by providing that
provisions in standard form paper contracts that purport to do so are not effective. Instead, in order
to create ·a binding agreement to conduct business electronically, the parties must do so either in an
electronic record or a separate agreement whose primary purpose is to authorize an electronic
transaction. . The agreement of the parties to transact business electronically may be inferred from
the context and surrounding circumstances, including the parties' conduct. However, the mere fact
that a party has used electronic means to make payment or to register a product or sign up for a
warranty, for example, is not enough to support a finding of the parties' agreement to interact
electronically. It is important to note that the parties cannot agree to vary these safeguards in the
Act.
Equally important is the principle that one electronic transaction does not necessarily
determine a party's choice for all other transactions with the same counter party. The Act gives a
party who agrees to transact business by electronic means the right to decline to conduct future
transactions by the same means. 10 Thus, if a party sells goods or services by electronic as well as non·
electronic means and a buyer purchases the goods or services by electronic means, the buyer has a
choice regarding how s/he wishes to conduct further business - electronically or non-electronically.
Again, the parties are prohibited from varying this provision of the Act.
The ''Writing" Requirement
A key provision of the Act affects the so-called "writing" requirements of a transaction. If the
parties have agreed to undertake a transaction electronically and the law applicable to the transaction
requires the information delivered to be in writing, the writing requirement is satisfied if the
information is generated in an electronic record that is capable of retention by the recipient upon its
receipt. 11 The electronic record is not enforceable against the recipient if the sender somehow
prevents the recipient from storing or printing the record. And there are very limited circumstances in
which the parties can agree to vary this provision of the Act. 12
The Act also provides that a contract may be formed by the mere interaction of electronic
agents of the parties without involvement of the individuals . It further provides that the legality of a
contract created by an electronic agent is not impaired by the fact that an individual was not aware of
the electronic agents' action or the resulting terms or the contract. However, before a contract can
be formed by an electronic agent, it is first necessary that the parties reach an agreement to transact
business electronically. Any missing terms of the contracts formed by an electronic agent will be
filled in by the substantive law applicable to the transaction.
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Sending and Receiving Electronic Records
The Act establishes specific rules regarding when electronic records are "sent" and "received",
which are key determinants of whether there has been an offer or acceptance for the purpose of
creating a contract.
•

An electronic record is sent when the information is properly directed to the recipient and
either (i) enters an "information processing system" beyond the control of the sender, or
(ii) enters a "region of an information processing system" that is under the control of the
recipient. 13
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•

An electronic record is received "when the electronic record enters an information
processing system that the recipient has designated or uses for the purpose of receiving
electronic records of the type sent, in a form capable or being processed by that system,
and from which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record. " 14

These provisions may be varied by the parties' agreement provided that the method of sending
and receiving an electronic record chosen by the parties are reasonable under the circumstances. The
Act does not elaborate on what constitutes "reasonable." The Act also provides rules regarding the
place of dispatch and receipt that may be useful in situations where location (for example, delivery) is
an important element of the transaction.
In this age of 24-hour days, it is no surprise that under the Act receipt of an electronic record
can occur even if no individual is aware of its receipt. Conversely, mere notification of the receipt of
an electronic record is not conclusive evidence that the record is the same as the one that was sent.
Thus, issues of proof are not completely resolved in the Act. 15
Enforceability of Electronic Records and Signatures
The Act provides that the legal effect or enforceability of an electronic record or signature may
not be denied solely because the records or signature is in an electronic form. Nor may the legal
effect or enforceability of a contract be denied merely because an electronic record was used in its
formation. Similarly, the Act affirmatively ·provides that an electronic signature or record satisfies any
law reqairing a record to be in writing or a signature be affixed. 16
Attribution of an Electronic Record or Signature
The Act recognizes that there are potential issues associated with the authenticity of
electronic records or signatures and addresses the issue of attribution in cases of claims of forgery,
unauthorized signature or simple disagreement. Electronic records or signatures may be attributable
to a particular person only if it was that person's act. 17 The Act does not prescribe a magical method
to establish the identity of the person to which the electronic record or signature is attributed, but
indicates that one way might be to show the efficacy of the security procedure agreed by the parties.
Special Signature Requirements - Notarization and Signatures Under Penalty of Perjury
Signatures that are required to be notarized may be rendered electronically, as can the
notarial (which must include all the usual information regarding the notary, such as name, commission
11
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California Civil Code section 1633.15 (b)
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•• /d. section 1633.7
17
/d. section 1633.9
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expiration, etc.) 18 Where a signature must be made under penalty of perjury, such as an affidavit,
this, too, may be done electronically so Long as the document conforms to the usual requirements of
Law.
LIABILITY FOR CHANGES AND ERRORS

The Act also establishes rules to resolving disputes regarding changes or errors in electronic
transmissions. If the parties to an electronic transaction have agreed to a security procedure ( to
detect changes or errors in electronic record exchanges) and one party to the transaction fails to use
the agreed procedure, then Liability for any error is on the party who failed to use the procedure, so
Long as the change or error could have been detected through compliance with the agreed procedure. 19
In an automated transaction involving an individual, the individual may avoid the consequences of his
error generally by promptly notifying the other party and complying with reasonable instructions given
by the other party regarding correction of the error. 20 In cases not covered by the Act, the general
rules relating to mistake would apply.
RETENTION OF RECORDS

The Act establishes rules relating to the retention and admissibility of records. 21 Where an
existing law imposes a retention requirement, that requirement can be met by storing the document
electronically so long as the electronic form is accurate and accessible for future reference. This
applies where the relevant Law requires that an original be retained, such as in the case of birth or
death certificates and even in cases where penalties are imposed for failure to retain the original.
Electronic records also will satisfy the various laws requiring a person to retain records for evidentiary,
audit, or similar purposes.
These rules do not apply to information, e.g. computer programs or software, whose sole
purpose is to facilitate the transmission of the record. The Act further authorizes the use of a third
party to retain records provided that the third party observes the prescribed requirements of accuracy
and access. 22
The rules appear intended to allow parties to move from conventional written records to
electronic records for retention as Long as accuracy and accessibility requirements are met.
CONCLUSION

Overall, the California Act eliminates any confusion about the intended respect to be accorded
to electronic records or signatures and to transactions emerging from them. Its goal to give the same
weight to the digital environment as is accorded to the paper world could not be more clear.
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